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       Kinchen, Shirletta Jeanette. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2011. “We want 
what people generally refer to as Black Power”: Youth and Student Activism and the 
Impact of the Black Power Movement in Memphis, Tennessee, 1965-1975. Major 
Professor: Aram Goudsouzian, Ph.D. 
This study examines the impact and influence of the modern, or classical Black 
Power Movement (1966-1975) on African American youth and student activism in 
Memphis, Tennessee from 1965-1975. This period represented a political reawakening of 
sorts for African American youth and students in the city after the desegregation 
campaign of the early 1960s. After being so integral in the campaign to abolish 
segregation in the city’s public facilities and venues in the early 1960s, a lull in overt 
youth and student activism developed. However, by the mid-to-late 1960s a new, 
indigenous youth and student movement developed in the community and on the city’s 
college campuses. This movement emerged simultaneously as the Black Power 
Movement began to command the nation’s attention.  
Influenced by the national Black Power Movement, but informed by local politics 
and local circumstances, some of Memphis’s African American youth and students 
evoked the tenets of the Black Power Movement. The Black Power Movement promoted 
racial and cultural pride, self-determination, racial autonomy, and independent economic, 
political, and cultural institutions in black communities. Both challenging and embracing 
the conventional understanding of Black Power and the Black Power Movement, youth 
and students agitated in the community and campuses, presenting an alternative political 
voice to Memphis’s more moderate African American political outlets, such as the 
Memphis branch of the National Association for the Advance of Colored People 
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(NAACP). However, civil rights and Black Power were not mutually exclusive 
ideologies. On the contrary, youth and students were informed by both movements, and 
on many levels, their political organizing reflected that idea.  
This study is also an example of how Black Power operated on the local level. 
Histories of the Black Power Movement have tended to focus more on the Movement’s 
more fiery and outspoken proponents, ignoring its impact on organizing in local 
communities. Recent historiography has shifted its focus from simply documenting the 
Movement on a national scale. Black Power studies now include more works that 
examine Black Power organizing over a sustained period of time in areas not considered 
hotbeds of the Movement. This study provides a glimpse into the ways that youth and 
students in Memphis, Tennessee who came of age during the height of the modern Black 
Power Movement localized the Movement by both explicitly and implicitly using Black 
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“We want what people generally refer to as Black Power”: Youth and 
Student Activism and the Impact of the Black Power Movement in Memphis, 
Tennessee, 1965-1975 
 
“We’re no different from any others actually, even though some operate on different 
levels from where we are operating now. Some say that they operate on the grass-roots 
level. Some say they deal with the problem on a legal level, etc. We would like to right 
now confine more of our activities in terms of organizations to the grassroots level 
because this is where the people really are.” 1
 
 – Charles Cabbage, Co-Founder, the 
Black Organizing Project and the Invaders 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. rarely appeared rattled. For many Americans, the civil 
rights leader had come to epitomize grace under pressure. Though King had moments of 
doubt, the public rarely caught a glimpse of that side of him. Yet on March 28, 1968, 
while leading a march in downtown Memphis, Tennessee, in support of striking African 
American sanitation workers, the panicked look on King’s face told the story. Before the 
march could reach the intended destination, violence and looting erupted among the 
protestors near the back of the crowd.2 The unidentified rabble-rousers pushed and 
shoved other protesters, threw bricks at windows, and turned protest signs into weapons.3
                                                     
1Charles Cabbage, interview by James Mosby, July 13, 1968, The Ralph J. Bunche Oral 
History Collection, The Civil Rights Documentation Project, Washington, DC. 
  
For King, unrest during marches was not an uncommon occurrence. In other instances, 
marchers felt the sting of water spraying from hoses, bites from dogs, and blows from 
police billy clubs. However, it was unusual for the violence to emanate from within the 
march. King had not initially intended to come to Memphis.  
 
2Taylor Branch, At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years 1965-1968 (New York: Simon 





King and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) staff’s focus 
remained on preparing for the upcoming Poor People’s Campaign. Yet the sanitation 
workers strike provided an optimal opportunity to launch his campaign. The workers 
struggle for union recognition and better financial compensation and working conditions 
made Memphis the perfect prologue for King’s Poor People’s Campaign.  
In the aftermath of the botched march, a frustrated King realized that neither he 
nor his staff were fully aware of all the organizing elements in Memphis’s black 
community – especially those espousing Black Power rhetoric. King had visited 
Memphis on several occasions prior to 1968 for various events, and was familiar with the 
city’s leadership structure. The middle-class, NAACP-affiliated distanced themselves 
from the chaos. Without much debate, the blame for the chaos fell squarely on 
Memphis’s young Black Power ideologues, the Invaders.  
Beyond the fracas, King had cause to worry. In the years following the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Watts, Detroit, and 
Newark exploded. The Black Panther Party had taken the Black Power banner in the 
wake of Malcolm X’s death to become the vanguard of the Movement. What many 
considered a departure in philosophy was actually more of a public unveiling of a deeply 
rooted belief in Black Power.4
                                                     
4Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power 
Movement in America (New York: Henry Holt Publishing, 2006), 135-137. 
 This ideology existed within the Movement before the 
Watts riot, before the popularization of the Black Power call, and before the formation of 
the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California in 1966. King and young Black Power 




Surprised and angry at the march’s outcome, King searched for answers. Invader 
Calvin Taylor remembered that King blamed Lawson for the oversight. Taylor recalled 
King saying, “Lawson didn’t tell me about the Black Power elements in the city…he led 
me to believe there were none.”
 But King did not consider that those same divergent viewpoints would get 
exposed during the sanitation strike in Memphis, which had shifted from a labor issue 
between the black sanitation workers and the city government into a full-fledged civil 
rights push for the entire black community. When his good friend and fellow nonviolent 
practitioner Reverend James Lawson asked King to detour to Memphis to help the 
sanitation workers, the SCLC leader did not consider the possibility that he would have to 
deal with the Black Power debate. However, the march placed King back in the middle of 
the controversy.  
6
King’s revelation and Lawson’s oversight are both telling. King’s assumption that 
Memphis did not have any “Black Power elements,” and Lawson’s neglect to inform 
King about Memphis’s most vocal proponents of the Black Power Movement – the city’s 
youth – illuminate some elements of the two leaders’ perception of Black Power. 
Although Black Power, in comparison to other political and social movements in 
Memphis, was a fringe movement, Memphians felt the impact of Black Power. That 
political current ran through segments of Memphis’s African American students and 
  
                                                     
5Andrew B. Lewis, The Shadow of Youth: The Remarkable Journey of the Civil Rights 
Generation (New York: Hill and Wang Publishing, 2009), 223-224.  
 
6Calvin Taylor, interview by Bill Thomas, August 17, 1968, Container 24, Folder 116, 





youth who had been influenced by the impact of the national movement for Black Power, 
while informed by local politics and local circumstances. African American college 
students and youth organizations in Memphis subscribed to, borrowed from, and 
amended Black Power ideology to suit their local struggles. In essence, they localized the 
Movement. Students and radical youth community activists protested and organized 
using an array of moderate and radical approaches, infusing elements of Black Power 
ideology to confront and change local conditions on campuses and in the community.  
 
This study uses student and youth activism in Memphis as a way to examine the 
impact of Black Power politics at the local level. The labels “student” and “youth” 
underscore the fact that in regards to this particular effort, not all youth were students, 
and conversely, not all students were adolescents. Several student leaders discussed in 
this study were veterans of the Armed Forces, and consequently, older than some of their 
counterparts. Yet the center of Memphis’s Black Power activity lay in these two groups. 
It was the city’s youth and students, on campuses and in the community, that adopted the 
language, embraced elements of the philosophy, and promoted Black Power throughout 
the city. 
The period from 1965 to 1975 represents a political reawakening of sorts for 
youth and student activism. In the aftermath of the successes of the city’s sit-in 
movement in the early 1960s, a lull in student and youth organizing occurred. “The 
[student] movement came [to Memphis] late,” explained Coby Smith, co-founder of the 
Black Organizing Project and the Invaders.7
                                                     
7Coby Smith, interview by Shirletta Kinchen, Memphis, TN, July 1, 2010. 
 Smith also suggests that Memphis was 
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unlike other Southern cities that were centers of major civil rights movement activity 
because they housed students on local college campuses from a variety of backgrounds 
and areas of the nation, some of whom became integrally involved in the movement 
during their college experience. Major Memphis institutions, by contrast, either lacked on 
campus housing provisions, or African Americans lacked access to the facilities. As a 
result, local leaders did not consider Memphis ripe for a student-initiated movement such 
as those that developed in Nashville, Atlanta, Tallahassee, and Greensboro.8 So there was 
no Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), only a small local chapter of 
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and an NAACP branch that fluctuated between 
periods of lethargy and intense activism before becoming one of the strongest branches in 
the South.9 An indigenous student and youth movement developed in the early 1960s, 
declined in the middle of the decade, and reemerged toward the end of the decade.10
                                                     
8Ibid. 
 With 
little to no assistance from outsiders, the Black Freedom Movement in Memphis was 
genuinely a local movement, but primarily spearheaded, led, and shaped by adults. 
However, while influenced by the activism of the NAACP and neighborhood civic clubs, 
youth attempted to place their own imprint on the Movement, on high school and college 
campuses and through community organizing.  
9Elizabeth Gritter, “Local Leaders and Community Soldiers: The Memphis 
Desegregation Movement, 1955-1961” (Senior Honors Thesis, American University, 2001), 47. 
Gritter suggests that the NAACP, Shelby County Democratic Club, and the Bluff City and Shelby 
County Council of Civic Clubs “were so strong that the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee, Congress of Racial Equality, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference either 
did not develop in Memphis or did not have nearly as significant influence.” 
 
10Laurie B. Green, Battling the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom 
Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 9-10. 
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This study further provides an opportunity to explore how Black Power operated 
outside of the spaces generally considered the hotbeds of the movement. Using Black 
Power politics to agitate for issues that they considered important, students and youth 
responded to local conditions, struggles, and issues. Far from being a cauldron of Black 
Power, Memphis, as “the urban center of the tri-state Delta region,” represented progress 
for the many African Americans who migrated from the rural Mississippi and Arkansas 
Delta to make a better life for themselves and their children.11 The children in turn 
became the catalyst of Memphis’s movement to desegregate public facilities in the early 
1960s, a period which represented the apex of student activism and until the onset of the 
sanitation strike in 1968, of black activism in general in the city.12 Operating in what 
Coby Smith called “the spirit of Ida B. Wells,” Memphis’s youth had always sought some 
form of power, some form of autonomy.13 Smith’s evocation of Wells instead of a more 
contemporary activist such as Malcolm X is telling.14
                                                     
11Ibid, 7. 
 Wells’s outspokenness was rare for 
both the time period and for her gender. Her ties to Memphis appealed to Smith’s sense 
of homegrown revolution and desire to continue Wells’s legacy of militancy. The 
experience and ideology of Coby Smith and other young Memphians suggests how Black 
 
12Ibid. For example, Marion Barry’s family moved to Memphis from Itta Bena, 
Mississippi and Laurie B. Green considers Barry apart of the “Postplantation Generation.” 
Memphis provided more economic and social opportunities for his family than did Mississippi, 
but while Barry experienced more freedom, he became acutely aware that his options were still 
limited by Memphis’s system of segregation.  
 
13Coby Smith, interview. 
 
14Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1992 (New York: Hill and 
Wang Publishing, 1993), 591.  
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Power philosophy could be applied in a particular political and geographical 
circumstance.  
 
How did students and youth in Memphis conceive of, define, interpret, and 
ultimately, navigate Black Power? At the most basic level, what did the Movement 
mean? When probed by an interviewer about his organization’s platform, Charles 
Cabbage, co-founder of the Black Organizing Project (BOP) and the Invaders, answered, 
“We want what people generally refer to as Black Power.”15
Like Black Power radicals around the nation, BOP espoused self-determination 
and argued that blacks should have more control of their communities. They railed 
against police brutality and poverty, and they challenged inadequacies in housing, 
education, and employment opportunities. They also advocated black empowerment 
through economic and political channels, and on several levels they promoted race pride 
and race consciousness. Other black Memphis college students agitated for more control 
and influence in campus decision-making, engaging more moderate Black Power politics 
in order to change campus dynamics. Black students at Memphis State University in the 
late 1960s, many of whom did not explicitly refer to themselves as Black Power 
advocates, in particular eschewed separatism, a tenet of the Movement that many Black 
 His organization may have 
been far removed from the national spotlight, and it may have employed different tactics 
and approaches, but he believed that the BOP shared goals with other prominent Black 
Power and radical organizations and individuals who received more national press and 
publicity.  
                                                     
15Charles Cabbage, interview. 
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Power advocates embraced, in favor of integration – but integration on their terms. Some 
of Memphis’s more radical young activists advanced a more aggressive agenda, 
threatening to use force if necessary to accomplish their ultimate goal of “black 
liberation.”16 The youth and students in Memphis show the diversity of the Black Power 
experience, both embracing and challenging the conventional understanding of “what 
people generally refer to as Black Power.”17
 
  
Students and youth in Memphis grappled to define Black Power and make the 
ideology applicable to their local circumstances. What did it mean? Ideologically, Black 
Power was a political, cultural, and economic call to arms for black people. Black Power 
promoted racial and cultural pride, self-determination, racial autonomy, as well as the 
nurturing of independent economic, political, and cultural institutions in black 
communities. To some advocates of the ideology, blacks had to extricate themselves 
completely from white society. Only through this purge would blacks achieve any form 
of true power.18
                                                     
16Ibid. 
 In the case of Memphis, certain tenents of the modern Movement were 
rooted in the figures such as Robert Church, Jr. whose wealth and political organizing 
within the Republican Party gave him some measure of autonomy for an African 
American during Jim Crow. In creating their own Black Power framework, youth and 
students saw Black Power as the means to gain “liberation,” and for others simply a way 
17Charles Cabbage, interview.  
18Jeffrey O.G. Ogbar, Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity 




to show people that they “meant business.” 19
 
 For students, Black Power represented 
more of a change in consciousness and identity than a call for armed revolution; in their 
minds, the direct action protests closely associated with the civil rights movement could 
also serve as instruments of Black Power protest. Charles Cabbage’s proclamation of 
solidarity with other revolutionary organizations, by contrast, tied the activist and his 
organization to the Movement’s more extreme elements.  
Scholars have broadened our understanding of the Black Power Movement by 
exploring its effect in local communities, on college campuses, in unions, in poverty 
programs, among black feminists, and in welfare rights struggles. By casting a wider net, 
historians have not only uncovered the movement’s depth and effectiveness, but also 
provided insightful analyses of its limitations and ineffectiveness. These works have 
helped historians move beyond presenting the movement as simply a “destructive, short-
lived, and politically ineffective movement.”20 Instead, “Black Power Studies” now 
encompass a more nuanced assessment of the successes, failures, and the legacy of the 
movement.21
                                                     
19Charles Cabbage, interview; “Black Power And What It Means,” Tiger Rag, February 
16, 1968.   
 Instead of juxtaposing the civil rights movement and Black Power 
Movement against each other, scholars now embrace the “long Black Power movement” 
 
20Peniel E. Joseph, “Reinterpreting the Black Power Movement,” Organization of 
American History Magazine of History, Volume 22, Number 3, (July, 2008): 4-6. 
 
21Peniel E. Joseph, ed., The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black 
Power Era, (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2006), 8-9; Joseph coined the term, “Black Power 
Studies,” which he uses to describe the emerging works that reexamine the Movement. “Black 
Power Studies,” Joseph suggests, “highlights connections between two historical periods, 
characterizing the civil rights and Black Power era as a complex mosaic rather than mutually 
exclusive and antagonistic movements.” 
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that traces the roots of the classical Black Power period (1966-1975) to postwar era 
activism and examines Black Power radicalism “side-by-side with nonviolent 
moderates.”22
Published in 1992, William Van DeBurg’s New Day in Babylon: The Black 
Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 is one of the first works that fully 
attempted to “explore the rise, maturation, and ultimate decline of the Black Power 
Movement.”
  
23 Exploring its manifestations in such areas as style, sports, and film, Van 
DeBurg argues that culture “broadened the appeal and facilitated the acceptance of Black 
Power tenets.” Although not ignoring the Movement’s political impact, he suggests, 
culture, made the Movement “malleable.” 24
William Chafe’s Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the 
Black Struggle for Freedom shows how Greensboro’s African American community 
battled against the city’s “progressive mystique.”
 
25
                                                     
22Ibid. 
 In his chapter on Black Power in 
Greensboro, Chafe argues that activists who came of age during the sit-in Movement 
used community organizing to achieve power and destroy the progressive mystique by 
“operating outside of it.” Using alliances between community and campus, Black Power 
activists worked to build an independent Black Power base to challenge the structure of 
23William Van DeBurg, New Day in Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American 




25William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black 
Struggle for Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 173. White business and civic 
leaders in Greensboro operated under the guise of what Chafe refers to as the “progressive 




white racism in Greensboro. Chafe’s groundbreaking study is important not only in how 
it examines Black Power on the local level, but also in how it presents Black Power as an 
extension of the black community’s earlier struggles for civil rights. In Chafe’s work 
Black Power is not reactionary; the sit-ins represent a “starting point” of agitation and 
Black Power an extension. 26
Several recent studies further by highlighted the influence of Black Power in local 
communities.
 
27 Peniel Joseph argues, “Black Power’s reverberations, although national 
and international in scope, were felt most practically at the local level.”28 He suggests 
that despite the iconography – the clinched fists, the leather jackets and berets, the 
aggressive posturing – that symbolized and ultimately shaped the public’s perception of 
the Movement, Black Power at the community level still worked toward fulfilling 
“concrete objectives at the neighborhood level” even if it was “less glamorous.”29 
Komozi Woodard, Robert Self, Donna March, and Devin Fergus among others, have 
enhanced our understanding of how Black Power operated on the local level.30
                                                     
26Ibid, 173.  
  
 
27Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, ed., Groundwork: Local Black Freedom 
Movements in America (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 2; Jeanne Theoharis and 
Komozi Woodard, ed., Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940-1980 
(New York: Palgrave and MacMillian Publishing, 2003), 1-13. 
 
28Peniel E. Joseph, ed., Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at the Local Level, (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2010), 5.  
 
29Ibid; Peniel E. Joseph, “Rethinking the Black Power Era,” The Journal of Southern 
History, Volume LXXV, Number 3, (August, 2009): 707-716. 
 
30For more on these authors please refer to: Komozi Woodward, A Nation Witihin A 
Nation: Amari Baraka (Leroi Jones) and Black Power Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 1999); Robert Self, American Babylon: The Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003); Donna Jean Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, 
and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California (Chapel Hill: University of North 
12 
 
As Peniel Joseph suggests, pitting Black Power as the civil rights movement’s 
“evil twin” obscures the “parallels” and “intersections” between the two movements.31 
Although early studies may be guilty of this interpretation, they create a starting point for 
more inquiry and analysis in future studies. For example, Hasan Jeffries’s examination of 
civil rights and Black Power in Lowndes County, Alabama, shows the continuation of 
SNCC’s grassroots mobilization efforts after SNCC’s so-called abandonment of 
grassroots organizing. Building upon works by Clayborne Carson and Charles Payne, 
Jeffries’s study helps to increase our understanding of SNCC and Black Power.32
Joseph’s characterization of Black Power at the local level as less glamorous but 
concrete aptly describes the tenor of the Memphis Movement. If it lacked the theatrics of 
Black Power organizations like Oakland’s Black Panther Party, or Los Angeles’s US 
organization, it nevertheless shaped the city’s black politics. For example, black students 
on the campuses of predominately white Memphis State University and historically black 
LeMoyne-Owen College experimented with Black Power politics in efforts to reform 
their campuses. In contrast to some other campuses around the country, students on these 
respective campuses hailed primarily from the city. They understood the city’s dynamics 
more than outsiders, and as such, were immersed in the day-to-day realities of life not 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
Carolina Press, 2010); Devin Fergus, Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American 
Politics, 1965-1975 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009). 
 
31Peniel E. Joseph, ed., Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at the Local Level (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2010), 1; Peniel E. Joseph, ed., The Black Power Movement: 
Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era, (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2006), 10. 
 
32Hasan Kwame Jeffries, Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama’s 
Black Belt (New York: New York University Press); Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and 
the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Charles Payne, 
I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).  
13 
 
only as college students, but as black Memphians. At these institutions, changing the 
campus politics by default altered the community dynamics.  
 
 
Where Memphis and the national Black Freedom Movement intersect is often 
hard to determine. The city’s movement was primarily self-contained. The national 
NAACP boasted that at times the Memphis branch was among the strongest branches in 
the South; the chapter rivaled the membership numbers of branches around the country. 
Branch leaders along with the black community’s civic leadership usually determined the 
mode, scope, and target of protest and often times lagged behind the pace of the national 
movement. Memphis’s cultural currency also tends to obscure the city’s more politicized 
history of protest. The story of Memphis then becomes neatly packaged into accounts of 
Beale Street, blues music, Sam Phillips’ Sun Records, Elvis Presley, and Stax Records’ 
and the Memphis sound. While those entities were sometimes politicized, black activism 
in the city had, until recent years, received relatively scant scholarly attention.   
Some new studies offer insights into the black community’s organizing tradition, 
extending the Memphis narrative beyond the city’s cultural relevance. Works from 
Michael K. Honey, Laurie B. Green, G. Wayne Dowdy, and Sharon D. Wright focus on 
Memphis’s black activism in the realm of labor, politics, and identity. Central to their 
analyses, however, are adult activists – youth and students remain peripheral. Honey’s 
Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King’s Last Campaign; 
Dowdy’s Crusades of Freedom: Memphis and the Political Transformation of the 
American South; and Wright’s Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis all 
discuss youth activism within the context of the city’s sit-in movement during the civil 
14 
 
rights movement in the 1960s.33 Still, despite crediting the heroics of the youth for 
breaking Jim Crow’s hold on the city’s public facilities, they focus on elder activists and 
labor, political, and civic leadership. Laurie B. Green’s Battling the Plantation Mentality: 
Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle weaves the activism of youth and students into 
her thematic examination of “how African Americans in Memphis from the 
postplantation generation struggled to imagine, articulate, and realize ideas of racial 
justice, equality, and freedom from the eve of the Second World War through the 1968 
Sanitation Strike.”34
The pages that follow are not a strict chronological account; rather they present 
several ways that youth and students explicitly and implicitly localized, adopted, adapted, 
and tailored Black Power philosophy to suit their specific conditions. This is not a story 
of a city engulfed in a Black Power revolution, nor is it a story of how Black Power 
triumphed over the moderate politics of the city’s white and black establishment. Instead, 
it does show how Memphis youth and students presented an alternative view of Black 
Power politics, suggesting not only how an emerging generation defined the black 
 As part of the “postplantation generation,” students’ articulation of 
freedom and “the activism that emanated from that” receive intense scrutiny in Green’s 
study. This work continues where Green’s analysis of Memphis’s students and youth 
activism ends, while expanding the analysis to engage the emergence, impact, and 
influence of Black Power and the larger Black Power Movement.   
                                                     
33G. Wayne Dowdy, Crusades for Freedom: Memphis and the Political Transformation 
of the American South (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2010); Laurie B. Green, Battling 
the Plantation Mentality: Memphis and the Black Freedom Struggle (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007); Michael K. Honey, Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, 
Martin Luther King’s Last Campaign (New York: W. W. Norton Publishing, 2008); Sharon D. 
Wright, Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis (New York: Routledge Publishing, 
1999). 
 
34Green, Battling the Plantation Mentality, 13.  
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“The City Was on Fire”: The Beginnings of a Movement 
 
“How long, how long will the Negro citizens of Memphis have to wait to gain the 
rights which the Constitution of the United States grants them?” 1
 
 – Reverend Benjamin 
L. Hooks 
“It became my position even more than ever that organizers going into strange 
communities and being treated like outsiders needed to go back to their home 
communities where you can get some protection around yourself, where you can have 
some support” 2
 
 – Charles Cabbage, Co-Founder, the Black Organizing Project and 
the Invaders 
 
“Will 1960 be different?” asked the opinion section of the Tri-State Defender’s 
first publication of the new year. The article included a wish list of different outcomes for 
racial progress and uplift for 1960. “We wish for a nation,” it read, “in which skin color is 
not the standard of measurement or the final test by which to judge one’s ability and 
performance.” The newspaper suggested that the nation use 1960 as a measure of how 
close it could come to making that a reality, but the author also reflected on past and 
continuing transgressions. Citing the example of a lynching of an African American man 
from Mississippi, the writer cautioned that such actions not only reflected horribly on the 
state of Mississippi, but “smeared America’s conscience,” and by ignoring Mississippi’s 
racial problem, as well as racial injustices in other Southern states, America was 
complicit in a “conspiracy of silence.” While the Cold War and the threat of the atomic 
                                                     
1“Jails Fail to Stop Sit-Ins,” Tri-State Defender, March 26, 1960. 
2Charles Cabbage, interview by Michael Honey, Memphis, TN, August 4, 2004. 
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warfare were causes for concern, in the end, freedom, justice, and dignity were not only 
the rights afforded to whites, but to the “brotherhood of men.”3
 If some of Memphis’s African American leadership had their way, indeed 1960 
would be different. The beginning of the decade marked a significant period of change 
for the city of Memphis and the African American community in particular. That year 
saw an increase in political power and representation for blacks whose votes were once 
controlled through machine politics. Black Memphians were encouraged by the promises 
of the events that happened before the new decade even began, particularly the 1959 
desegregation of the city’s only public institution of higher learning, Memphis State 




By 1960 the national spotlight was shifting to the nation’s black youth, who 
through sit-ins and other direct action protests had begun to place their own stamp on the 
black freedom struggle. In Memphis black students responded to those protests by 
initiating their own, becoming integral actors in the local freedom movement. When the 
sit-ins stopped, and public accommodations, venues, and other facilities were 
desegregated and the students returned to their campuses, a lull in overt student activism 
developed, unlike in many instances around the country where the students took the 
protest back to their respective campuses. However, from that inactivity came the seeds 
of a local Black Power Movement. It sprung from students and youth, some of whom 
  
                                                     
3“Will 1960 Be Different,” Tri-State Defender, January 9, 1960.  




were new arrivals, others who had left the city to pursue educational opportunities 
elsewhere, to serve in the military, or to work in areas of the country with more civil 
rights movement activity. They returned to Memphis more politicized, more conscious of 
society’s injustices, and more determined to reignite a student movement in Memphis.  
 
In the mid-to-late 1950s a cadre of young African American professionals, some 
of whom had been denied the opportunity to attend institutions in their own state, arrived 
or in some cases returned to Memphis armed with degrees from some of the country’s 
most elite institutions “to challenge the white system of oppression.”5 Attorneys formed a 
segment of the new black leadership and employed the more moderate approach of 
pursuing racial justice through litigation, while also challenging the racial status quo via 
the political arena. In 1959, running for local office on the all-black “Volunteer Ticket,” 
Attorneys Archie Walter (A.W.) Willis, Jr., Benjamin L. Hooks, Jr., and Russell 
Sugarmon, and ministers Henry Bunton and Roy Love believed that Memphians were 
ready for black representation in local politics. Despite a large voter turnout, no one on 
the Volunteer Ticket won election. However, G. Wayne Dowdy suggests that the 
campaign “electrified the black community” and also “integrated Memphis into a larger, 
national movement that was battling on many fronts to crush segregation and secure full 
citizenship for black Americans.”6
                                                     
5Sherry L. Hoppe and Bruce W. Speck, Maxine’s Unwilling Pupils: Lessons Learned in 
Memphis’s Civil Rights Classroom, An Authorized Biography of Maxine Atkins Smith (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2007), 18. 
 Though defeated, the Volunteer Ticket represented an 
early glimpse of the city’s new black political leadership, as well as the black 
 
6Dowdy, Crusades For Freedom, 66-72. 
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community’s resolve to break white domination over local politics.7
Someone might look at the Volunteer Ticket and mistake it for a partial roster of 
the Executive Committee of the Memphis Branch of the NAACP. Representing the 
primary vehicle that promoted and protected the interest of Memphis’s African 
Americans community, the branch’s leadership consisted of the more “prominent blacks 
in the city,” and left those outside of the inner circle distant from the organization’s 
political maneuvering.
 The 1959 political 
maneuverings of Sugarmon, Willis, Hooks, and other black candidates served as a 
prelude to the changing political and social fortunes forthcoming to black Memphians in 
1960. 
8 The chapter organized in June 1917, and officially chartered in 
1918 in response to the brutal lynching of Ell Persons, whom whites falsely accused of 
raping a white woman. Despite an official investigation from James Weldon Johnson that 
yielded no evidence of Persons’s guilt, a white mob burned the victim alive in a public 
spectacle. Robert Church, Jr., the son of Robert Church Sr., the nation’s first black 
millionaire took the lead in organizing the branch. Under Church’s watchful eye, the 
Memphis chapter began to thrive, while Church became a leading black voice in the 
Republican Party.9
                                                     
ttIbid. In the aftermath of the election, Sugarmon, Willis, and Hooks along with A. Maceo 
Walker, H. A. Gilliam, and Jesse Turner formed the Shelby County Democratic Club, which 
Dowdy argues was the leaders’ attempt to “expand black political power in Memphis.”  
 
 
8James D. Conway, Jr. "Beyond 1968: The 1969 Black Monday Protest in Memphis, 
Tennessee" (Seminar Paper, University of Memphis, 2006), 9. 
 
9Gloria Melton Brown, "Blacks in Memphis, Tennessee: A Historical Study” (PhD diss., 
Memphis State Univerisity, 1982), 58; Church took the lead in organizing the local branch 
because of his political influence, but Bert Roddy served as the first head of the branch.  
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The branch represented Memphis’s version of W.E.B. DuBois’s Talented Tenth 
philosophy – Memphis’s black elite attempted to uplift the city’s black masses.10 When 
the branch experienced a period of inactivity after Church’s influence with the 
Republican Party ended in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the chapter’s reorganization in 
the 1940s and 1950s ushered the chapter back to a place of prominence among the 
nation’s local branches. The constellation of young black professionals –Vasco and 
Maxine Smith, Russell and Laurie Sugarmon, A.W. and Anne Willis, Ben and Frances 
Hooks, Jesse and Allegra Turner, and H.T. Lockard – changed the direction of the branch 
and the city’s black freedom struggle.11 However, other organizers took note of the city’s 
“sophisticated leadership” and those readily recognized as leaders in the community. 
“You had to have degrees to have any power here…This made Memphis different than 
some cities,” noted Memphis union organizer Alzada Clark.12
 
  
Maxine Smith recalled the excitement that she and her husband Vasco felt about 
returning to Memphis. “What are we so excited about? Memphis was completely 
segregated,” Smith remembered. “We didn’t have jobs. We didn’t have a home…[But] 
you know it’s home.”13
                                                     
10Ibid. 
 The Smiths made the return home on the heels of the Brown v. 
Board decision, which outlawed the separate but equal doctrine in public schools, hopeful 
that its impact would change the racial dynamics of the completely segregated city.  “We 
 
11Roger Biles, Memphis In the Great Depression (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1986), 106. 
 
12Honey, Going Down Jericho Road, 38. 
 
13Gritter, “Local Leaders and Community Soldiers,” 9.   
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came back to Memphis looking for a civil rights organization in the community to 
identify ourselves with and the NAACP was the one here,” recalled Maxine.14
But Lockard, who Russell Sugarmon described as a “very determined person” and 
Vasco Smith, credited for laying the “foundation for a lot of things that happened early 
on” before their arrival did not allow Brown or the ambiguity of Brown II’s “all 
deliberate speed” ruling to deter the movement.
 Although 
Brown made Smith and other African Americans optimistic about the possibility that the 
segregated barriers in other social and political arenas would also tumble, the failure of 
the Supreme Court to provide any guidelines for enforcement and the reluctance and 
refusal of the states to comply dampened their hopes.  
15 Instead of beginning the desegregation 
efforts with the grade schools, in 1955 Lockard, the NAACP branch, and five students 
targeted the city’s only public institution of higher education, Memphis State College and 
its five-year gradual plan for desegregation. The Tennessee State Board of Education’s 
proposed plan recommended that desegregation begin at the graduate school level in an 
attempt to “avoid friction.” While unsatisfied with the school’s gradual plan, Atty. Willis 
called the Board’s recommendation “unique” because it was the first case in the country 
that offered any solution for integration.16
                                                     
14Maxine Smith, interview by James Mosby, July 11, 1968, The Ralph J. Bunche Oral 
History Collection, The Civil Rights Documentation Project, Howard University, Washington, 
DC. 
 After four years and attempts by Maxine Smith 




16“Negroes Tell Bias of MSC Lawsuit,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, October 12, 1955.  
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While celebrating the 103rd anniversary of President Abraham Lincoln’s signing 
of the Emancipation Proclamation, sponsored by the Emancipation Association of Shelby 
County at a ceremony at Ellis Auditorium, Lieutenant George W. Lee, an influential 
African American political and business leader in the city, suggested that blacks would 
flex their political muscle in the upcoming year in an “emancipation campaign” of their 
own. He was speaking to the newly elected City Commission as well as his audience. 
Judge Hobson R. Reynolds, an assistant to the Commissioner of Federal Housing 
Administration, also spoke at the ceremony and echoed Lee. Reynolds advocated the use 
of black political power in the same manner that Black Power activists such as Stokely 
Carmichael would promote years later. “When we get enough Negroes voting in all cities 
and precincts, when we can vote a mayor in and vote him out, when we can elect a sheriff 
and vote him out, it won’t be long before we have all our civil rights and become first 
class citizens wherever we live,” Reynolds proclaimed. Comparing the struggle of 
African Americans to that of the biblical story of Moses and the children of Israel, 
Reynolds told the crowd that that like Moses, “we have been on top of the mountaintop. 
We have viewed freedom…it looks good to us…with the help of God we are going to 
                                                     
17“Eight Negroes enrolled at Memphis State, ‘No Doors Barred,’” Says Dean Robison, 
Memphis Press-Scimitar, September 11, 1959; Hope and Speck, Maxine Smith’s Unwilling 
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have it in this generation.” The meeting culminated when leadership adopted a program 
to eradicate discrimination in the city.18
Shortly after the Emancipation Proclamation celebration, two African American 
men were refused entry into an automobile show at the same Ellis Auditorium where Lee 
and Reynolds promised to attack racism head-on. The two men, Burleigh Hines, Jr. and 
George Hardin, worked for the Tri-State Defender and decided to spend their lunch break 
and their money at the event. Police officers turned the two men away from the auto 
show, which in addition to showcasing the latest automobiles was also a fundraiser for St. 
Jude Children’s Hospital.
  
19 Star of the television show Make Room for Daddy Danny 
Thomas began plans to bring the hospital to Memphis in 1955 and the city pledged to 
help raise money for the project.20 Hines questioned the city’s motives for bringing the 
hospital to Memphis. Would the hospital simply be another “landmark”? Would it be 
segregated?21 After the incident the men contacted Downing Pryor, president of the 
Memphis Auto Dealers Association, the event’s sponsor. Pryor explained to the men that 
the association only followed the city’s segregation policy. “You can’t negotiate the law,” 
Pryor explained. By keeping out African Americans “we will probably lose $30,000 to 
$40,000 in ticket sales. This is a matter for the city – don’t single out the automobile 
dealers.”22
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Defender, January 9, 1960.  
 
 
19“Bar Negroes From Auto Show: City is Blamed,” Tri-State Defender, January 16, 1960. 
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21“Bar Negroes from Auto Show,” Tri-State Defender, January 16, 1960. In 1968 




Memphis’s African American community nevertheless pledged to purchase cars 
from dealerships outside of the city. On January 15 over three hundred angry and 
frustrated African Americans attended a meeting at Pentecostal Temple to protest the ban 
of African Americans from the auto show.23 The crowd agreed not to buy cars from 
Memphis dealers for at least twelve months. However, in a larger display of their 
contempt and frustration with the city’s discriminatory policies, black Memphians also 
decided to protest the “biased methods employed by the zoo, the stupid manner in which 
the buses maintain their seating arrangement, the library nonsense, the eating situation at 
the railroad stations, bus terminals, and airports, segregation in public schools, and 
segregation in Ellis Auditorium,” the issue that brought the crowd together in the first 
place. A who’s who of the city’s black leadership including Benjamin L. Hooks, Jr., Jesse 
Turner, Reverend J. W. Golden, W. W. Walker, A. Maceo Walker, James T. Walker, and 
O. Z. Evers took turns addressing the audience. “The Negro is the lowest paid, the last 
hired and the first fired. They are frequent victims of malicious police brutality,” said 
Turner, vice-president and treasurer of Tri-State Bank. While James T. Walker suggested 
that progress would come a lot faster if blacks joined civic clubs and the NAACP. The 
leaders elected Ben Hooks to lead the temporary organization to address the community’s 
concern.24
Vowing to go the limit, A. W. Willis, Jr. told the Tri-State Defender that at least 
two individuals inquired about the possibility of bringing a suit against the city to open 
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Ellis Auditorium on a “non-segregated basis.”25 The temporary organization that formed 
out of the fervor of the January 15 meeting officially became the Memphis and Shelby 
County Improvement Association (MSCIA) with Hooks continuing as head of the 
organization. MSCIA leadership immediately drafted a resolution to all Memphis area 
automotive dealers demanding a public apology by February 1 for the embarrassing 
exclusion of blacks from the auto show.26 Although Pryor and the Memphis Auto Dealers 
Association issued an apology by the deadline, MSCIA remained unmoved by the auto 
dealers’ “weak” apology.27 The leadership did, however, derive some satisfaction in 
discovering that the auto show netted a loss of $21,000.28
 
 
According to the Tri-State Defender, “gears in the freedom fight” had shifted. 
After the auto show snub the paper estimated that it had received more letters to the 
editor in one month than it normally did in one year. However, according to the paper, 
some black Memphians caught up in the excitement of the meeting at Pentecostal Temple 
failed to follow through with the pledge to avoid the city’s car dealerships. The paper told 
to black Memphians to “put up or shut up,” and realize their collective buying power and 
join forces with the MSCIA and the NAACP. “Why don’t we stop playing cat and mouse 
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with this business of segregation and discrimination and why don’t we decide to put our 
money where our mouth is and get some real action,” the article asked.29
“The Negro youth have just about lost patience with their adults. They want their 
constitutional rights…we have got to accept the challenge or stand condemned before our 
youth,” proclaimed Ruby Hurley, Secretary for the Southeast Regional NAACP. Hurley, 
speaking at the NAACP’s Southeast Regional Conference in Memphis, referenced the 
explosion of sit-ins that began on February 1, 1960 in Greensboro, North Carolina when 
four students at historically black North Carolina A&T College quietly sat at a 
Woolworth’s lunch counter and asked for service.
 
30 Students in neighboring Nashville 
had already been carefully planning to move on the capital’s segregated facilities before 
the spontaneous protest of the four A&T freshmen.31
                                                     
29“Put Up Or Shut Up,” Tri-State Defender, February 27, 1960.   
 As “an important locale for 
Southern student activism,” students from the city’s historically black institutions –
Tennessee A&I, Fisk, Meharry Medical College, and American Baptist Theological 
Seminary – constituted the majority of the movement’s participants, but some white 
students from Vanderbilt also became involved in the sit-ins. A tightly organized 
movement, the early efforts of the young Nashville activists were led by Vanderbilt 
Theology School student James Lawson, who later became a central figure in the 
Memphis civil rights struggle. As an “admirer of Gandhi,” Lawson instituted workshops 
in nonviolent direct action techniques that made the participants in the Nashville Student 
30“NAACP Youth Resolve to Extend Sit-Ins All Over Southeast Area,” Tri-State 





Movement “the best schooled in the theory and practice of nonviolent direct action.” The 
local Nashville movement spawned national leaders in Diane Nash, John Lewis, James 
Bevel, and LeMoyne College alumnus, Marion Barry.32 The Nashville contingent would 
provide the initial phase of the new student movement with its character.33
Both the Nashville and A&T students utilized direct action protest, an old but 
effective tactic. In The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Aldon Morris argues that it 
was direct action protest in such places as Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Montgomery, 
Alabama; and Tallahassee, Florida that “set the modern civil rights movement in 
motion.”
 
34 Direct action proved to be extremely effective because it resonated with 
young people around the country. Sit-ins were “democratic and egalitarian,” as well as 
“easy to replicate.” It was not necessary for students to belong to any organization to start 
or participate in a sit-in. “Each person became the leader of his or her protest,” Andrew 
B. Lewis suggests. The students’ use of direct action in the sit-ins “revived the 
movement” when it stagnated after the Brown v Board decision and the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott.35
The sit-ins eventually sparked the beginning of a new phase of the student-
initiated movement that led to the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), arguably the most influential civil rights organization of the 1960s. 
SNCC was more radical, more assertive, and more grassroots-oriented than the other 
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major civil rights organizations of its day. At the organizing meeting on the campus of 
Shaw University, SCLC Director of Programs Ella Baker, reminded the students that 
there was more at stake than just winning the right to enjoy a hamburger at a lunch 
counter. She suggested that the students form SNCC and work together, independent of 
the adult organizations, to create a mass movement to challenge the entire Jim Crow 
system.36
 
   
 The 1960 sit-in at the Greensboro Woolworth spawned similar responses across 
the country. And with adults reneging on their promises to boycott the auto dealerships, it 
became imperative for students in Memphis to act. “We had talked about conducting a 
sit-in before Greensboro,” recalled Edgar Young, a student at the historically black 
institution LeMoyne College. “No one thought it would work because protest movements 
were played down and didn’t get much publicity, so we didn’t.”37 Laurie Green argues in 
Battling the Plantation Mentality that many of the students involved in the sit-in 
movement were already familiar with grassroots activism through their participation with 
neighborhood civic clubs, but this new, more direct protest method invigorated the 
students and infused a new sense of race pride and freedom.38
                                                     
36Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s 
(Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1995), 9. 
 As a student at the all 
black Owen Junior College in 1960, Gwen Glover felt encouraged by the groundswell of 
student activism in other places. Glover recalled, “One Friday, the kids were talking 
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Memphis Press-Scimitar, March 19, 1980. 
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about it [the Greensboro sit-in] in the newspaper and on TV. It was frightening and scary, 
but it inspired me to do something in Memphis.”39
While the sit-in movement around the country gained more and more momentum, 
Memphis’s African American leadership battled internally with the speed and intensity of 
the movement. The Tri-State Defender reported on a “conflict brewing between two of 
the most potent Negro groups in Memphis – the NAACP and the Binghampton Civic 
Club.” O. Z. Evers, who filed a lawsuit against the bus company and the city in 1956 that 
then-NAACP President H.T. Lockard argued on his behalf, attacked the NAACP and its 
leadership for its “state of complacency.”
  
40 Evers, the president of the Binghampton 
Civic Club, a neighborhood grassroots organization, suggested that the NAACP lacked 
“social responsibility.” Evers asked, “why haven’t we joined hands with the rest of the 
Southern Negroes in the sit-downs?” 41
                                                     
39“African-American College Students Used Sit-Ins to Tear Down Walls of Segregation,” 
Tri-State Defender, March 12-18, 2009.  
 NAACP Counsel, Russell B. Sugarmon, Jr. felt 
no need to defend the organization, but took a shot at Evers and his accusation. “Our 
record stands for itself…anyone criticizing the NAACP should first join it and then make 
his disapprovals known,” said Sugarmon. But Sugarmon also suggested that the civic 
club membership included a number of youth and instead of waiting for the NAACP, 
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which remained committed to fighting racial injustice through the court system, they 
should act.42
Evers assumed that adults needed to dispatch the students to move. To a large 
degree the students worked closely with the adults in planning protest and targets. 
However, some students, acting independently of the NAACP, had already begun 
formulating ways to attack the city’s segregated venues. While the NAACP was planning 
how and when to begin a sit-in campaign, according to Maxine Smith, the students 
“jumped the gun.”
 
43 Marion Barry, president of SNCC, provided the students with a 
spark. A local product and graduate of Booker T. Washington High School and LeMoyne 
College, Barry, Memphis’s most famous student activist, returned to the city where his 
activist career began. He would “carry the gospel to the students,” encouraging his alma 
mater to get involved.44
If anyone could connect Memphis’s local struggle to the national movement 
emerging across the nation, Barry could. During Barry’s matriculation at LeMoyne he 
served as the Vice-President of the campus chapter of Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, joined 
the student council, and led the school’s chapter of the NAACP. As a youth growing up 
in his South Memphis neighborhood, Barry despised the inequalities that Memphis’s 
African American community endured. Aside from the day-to-day indignities that blacks 
faced on a personal level, segregation remained a way of life. The reality that places 
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generally reserved for children and family enjoyment and educational enrichment were 
either off-limits or only open to blacks on specific days of the week was especially hard 
for youth to understand. On “Black Thursday” they could visit the zoo, Brooks Memorial 
Art Gallery, and the main branches of the library, and during the summer the city hosted 
the Negro Tri-State Fair. For one day African Americans could visit the fairgrounds.45 
“We had no power and no previous cases to look at,” remarked Barry. “In the segregated 
Negro libraries there were no books or anything about race or Negroes. Still, I felt I 
should be doing something about the race problem,” Barry continued.46
While at LeMoyne, Barry put his thoughts into action and confronted the race 
problem as the head of the college’s NAACP chapter. As a senior in 1959, Barry wrote a 
strongly worded letter encouraging Dr. Hollis F. Price, the President of LeMoyne 
College, to remove former Memphis Mayor Walter Chandler from the college’s board of 
trustees. Chandler, who served as mayor of the city from 1940 to 1946, and then again in 




We feel that it is humiliating and embarrassing that such an obvious demagogue  
should have direct connection with our college, especially when this institution  
stressed to its students the importance of fighting for equal rights. We feel that to  
permit such deplorable antics to go unanswered, in view of this alleged emphasis 
and to allow their performer to remain on the board constitutes and [sic] insult to 
 Barry and the students expressed discontent with Chandler’s role, taking particular 
exception to the disparaging statements attributed to the former Mayor during the trial. 
Barry wrote on behalf of the student body:  
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Barry’s admonishment of Mayor Chandler placed Dr. Price in a precarious 
situation. Jeffrey Turner argues in Sitting In and Speaking Out: Student Movements in the 
American South, 1960-1970 that “public colleges, more vulnerable to external pressures 
because of state control, were less likely than private institutions to produce 
demonstrations.” Yet as Memphis’s primary vehicle for higher education for African 
Americans, LeMoyne itself could only insulate so much from scrutiny and reprisals.49
On one hand, Chandler held a position as a trustee of the historically black 
college. On the other hand, as special counsel for the city, he argued in favor of the 
segregationist transit policy. Barry urged the administration to confront that contradiction 
and support the students’ fight to destroy the system that Chandler was working to 
continue. In spite of their efforts, Chandler stayed on as a member of the board of 
trustees. The incident, however, cemented Barry’s status among the LeMoyne student 
body. When he returned a year later and addressed the student body in the wake of the 
sit-ins, Dr. Price asked Barry to leave LeMoyne’s campus. Instead, LeMoyne students 
 
Furthermore, Price’s tenure marked the first time in the school’s history that an African 
American served as president. Therefore, he had an obligation to answer not only to the 
students and the community, but also to the school’s board of trustees.  
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followed Barry to Owen Junior College, where he continued to encourage student 
protest.50
As in Greensboro and Nashville, it was the students at the city’s historically black 
college led the sit-in charge. “Everybody was saying we would get put out of school if we 
participated…President Price told us that our parents could lose their jobs,” recalled 
Grace Austin-Meacham forty years after the her participation in the sit-in movement in 
Memphis.
 
51As a LeMoyne College student in 1960, Austin, like others her age, decided 
that risking their education, parents’ jobs, and future career opportunities to change the 
status quo was a risk worth taking. Former LeMoyne student Charles Diggs suggested 
that students risked any financial supplement awarded by the school for participating in 
the movement. “In a roundabout way the administration said, ‘well if you got arrested for 




A week after the Tri-State Defender reported on the rift between the Binghampton 
Civic Club and the NAACP, students from Owen staged the city’s first sit-in. On March 
18, 1960, seven Owen students quietly walked into a downtown store and sat at the 
whites-only lunch counter. They were refused service and not arrested, but another group, 
this time from Owen and LeMoyne, “frustrated by the lack of progress in desegregating 
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the libraries,” followed their actions the very next day. 53 In contrast to sit-ins in other 
cities where protestors focused on integrating lunch counters, students in Memphis 
targeted the city’s public libraries in a move that clearly prioritized their desire for equal 
access to the city’s educational resources.54 Blacks could patronize the Vance Avenue 
and Cossitt Branch libraries, but not other libraries with more resources.55 “Fiction, 
biographies, and some reference works were off limits,” recalled Edgar Young, “I had a 
library card, but I couldn’t check out the books I wanted.” Young argued that his parents’ 
tax dollars entitled him to equal access to the libraries. In an effort to break the barrier 
that restricted their right to use the library, the students targeted the Cossitt and main 
library branches. Shortly after the students’ arrival, library employees called the police, 
who subsequently arrested the students.56
Despite any earlier conflict between the Binghampton Civic Club and the 
NAACP, black leadership and the black community rallied around the students. In the 
immediate aftermath of the students’ arrest, the NAACP called a meeting with black 
ministers and “leading black citizens of Memphis.” The NAACP issued a statement of 
support for the students, even though the organization did not initiate the movement. And 
although students attended the meeting, the ministers dominated the platform. “We will 
go to jail and we are willing to suffer. If we are not willing we do not need to be free,” 
said a minister. The ministers, community leaders, students, and their parents left the 
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meeting and proceeded directly to the jail to greet the arrested students as they were 
released.57
Black community leaders urged the adults to support the students by attending 
their court trial, but when more people arrived than the room could hold, the 2,000 
supporters filled the Mt. Olive CME Cathedral sanctuary.
  
58 After the ministers led the 
group in prayer, they proposed what essentially amounted to a boycott of downtown 
stores for the Easter holiday. Leaders stopped short of calling the protest a boycott; 
instead, they asked the audience to sacrifice their usual Easter shopping for the greater 
good of the growing movement. Any black person who chose Easter fashions over the 
black community’s stance should “hang their head in shame,” said one minister. “We 
would rather be dressed like paupers than to be dressed like princes and be treated like a 
slave,” said Reverend D. W. Browning.59
The Tri-State Defender dubbed the arrested students the “New Negroes,” 
referencing Harlem Renaissance writer Alain Locke’s volume of the same name. Beyond 
simply a title of a literary work, the New Negro movement of the 1920s advanced a new 
militancy and the transformation of the image of African Americans as subservient and 
passive to assertive, independent, and racially conscious.
  
60
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in the same category as Harlem Renaissance era cultural and political figures. The 




In response to their growing protest activity, LeMoyne students, some of whom 
held membership in the college’s chapter of the NAACP, the branch’s youth councils, or 
in neighborhood civic clubs organizing, formed the Student Movement Organization 
(SMO).62 Although SMO did not affiliate with SNCC in an official capacity, the group 
operated in a similar fashion to the local student movement groups that eventually formed 
SNCC. Instead of continuing to operate through the civic clubs or the NAACP, the 
students chose to form an autonomous, student-centered organization to coordinate sit-
ins. Adults remained central to the movement in terms of financial and legal support. 
However, “student protestors brought a spirit of urgency to the movement that 
transformed previous civil rights approaches.”63
 
 While they welcomed the support of the 
adult community, the sit-ins represented protest on their terms. 
The intensity and frequency of the protests increased into the spring. The black 
community strengthened their support for the “darlings of democracy.”64
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targeting the libraries, the protestors blitzed the city’s segregated business and public 
facilities.65 Students expanded their protest to golf courses, park and recreational 
facilities, museums, and restaurants throughout the city.66 Their strategy of sitting-in at 
lunch counters during the lunch hour caught proprietors and policemen off-guard.67 In 
late March, the Memphis Committee on Community Relations (MCCR), a moderate, 
interracial coalition of some of the city’s more prominent African American and white 
civic and community leaders, appealed to Mayor Henry Loeb and the City Commission 
to finally end segregation in public facilities.68 The attorneys representing the sit-inners 
asked the students to stop demonstrations for two weeks as they negotiated with city 
officials.69 The attorneys cautioned the city officials that although they appealed to the 
students for a “cooling off period,” they ultimately had “no control over the actions of the 
city’s young people.”70 The students resumed protest two weeks later when city officials 
refused to desegregate public facilities.71
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The city’s rebuff of the attorneys’ proposal reaffirmed the students’ belief that 
change would only come through continued protest. As they placed white-owned and 
white-controlled public facilities, business, and community institutions under attack, 
students also picketed the Cotton Makers Jubilee, the African American counterpart to 
the white-only Cotton Carnival celebration. The event, which celebrated all things cotton, 
followed Memphis’s usual segregated pattern. This time, however, students not only 
criticized the Cotton Carnival, but also argued that the Cotton Makers Jubilee helped to 
“further the cause of segregation.”72
We feel that cotton does nothing for Negroes to cause them to celebrate. The 
Cotton Makers Jubilee represents the Negro version of the Cotton Carnival and 
does represent the thinking of the Negroes who are aware of the critical issues we 
are facing in Memphis. By condoning a cotton celebration, Negroes are paying 
tribute to the system that undergirded the entire slavery period. The Cotton 
Jubilee is another segregated institution just like the library, zoo, and other 
facilities here, and just like the lunch counters.




The student further suggested that the event’s sponsors were “brainwashed” into thinking 
that having a segregated event was better than no celebration at all.74
 The activism of the students, however, excited and inspired the black community. 
Russell Sugarmon described it as a “shot of adrenaline” to the community, but students 
 The sit-ins 
transformed their consciousness. No longer did they accept segregation as the status quo. 
By boycotting the event, the students exposed the hypocrisy of the celebrated community 
festival. They also challenged the adults, urging them to reexamine their role in 
perpetuating segregation.  
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felt the most empowered. They could open the newspaper, turn on the radio, or if 
fortunate enough, the television and read, hear, or see students around the country 
engaging in same fight to crush segregation. Protest united the students from different 
locations, with different economic backgrounds, and with different levels of political 
engagement, together working toward the same goal.75
 
  
With the “inevitability of court-ordered desegregation” looming, the city stopped 
the practice of segregation in libraries, buses, restaurants, the city zoo and parks in the 
fall of 1960. An eighteen-month “Freedom Movement, which included daily picketing 
and sit-ins, weekly Freedom Marches, a boycott of Main Street stores and their branches, 
weekly Neighborhood Freedom Rallies, and Pickets and Sit-in Schools” sparked in part 
by the students’ sit-ins applied the pressure that forced the city and merchants to open up 
facilities to blacks. 
 In October 1961 the first African American students entered public elementary 
schools, and by 1962 the movies and restaurants and intrastate transportation facilities 
were ordered to end their segregated practices. “The official end of legalized segregation” 
in Memphis finally came in 1963 when the Memphis City and Park Commission finally 
outlawed segregation in recreational facilities. City government officials ended 
segregationists’ practice ahead of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.76
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with the city to end segregated practice in public facilities and businesses. In doing so the 
city avoided most of the extremism that other city’s experienced during this time. 
However, the pressure from the NAACP and students from LeMoyne College and Owen 
Junior College began the movement that helped to transform the city’s racial dynamics.77
The barriers of segregation began to tumble in 1960 as a result of several 
developments. First, the sit-ins, boycotts, pickets, and protests initiated by the students 
and supported by the NAACP and the black community pressured city officials and 
segregated businesses to seriously reconsider their policies. Second, early desegregation 
efforts by African American leadership prior to 1960 laid the groundwork for the young 
activists. Although students demanded immediate redress instead of the negotiating and 
litigious strategies used by organizations like the NAACP, the early efforts of the 
NAACP and civic clubs to dismantle Jim Crow made the students’ campaign that much 
more effective. Third, during this period there was very little dissension among the black 
community. The moral and financial support from the black community helped keep the 
movement going. Last, but most important, the resolve of the students to crush the city’s 
system of segregation reinvigorated the entire black community. Despite years of fighting 
and protests, very little had changed for blacks in the city. Not only did the protests bring 
about the desegregation of public facilities, but it also helped increase the membership of 
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An April 1964 New York Times article suggested that Memphis had “made more 
progress toward desegregation with less strife than any other majority city in the Deep 
South.” Still, many in the black community, and even in the black leadership were not 
satisfied with what they called only “token” gains. While the NAACP and the Shelby 
County Democratic Club continued to battle in court and in the political arena, in the 
shadows frustrated students looked around Memphis and saw desegregated facilities, but 
they still encountered police brutality and lived in impoverished communities. At 
Memphis State University, the students continued to face hostility and incidents of 
discrimination on campus. The Freedom Movement, while successful in many ways, did 
not address the other inequities of their day-to-day realities. Though the campaign pushed 
the city further to eliminate discrimination in public facilities, businesses, and other 
venues than any other effort in the city’s history, the slow progress and moderate 
approach of the black leadership frustrated some students. The frustration was most 
apparent in some youth and students who would later become active on campuses and in 
the community as voices in the call for Black Power. 79
 
   
When David Acey returned home to Memphis after his stint in the Army, he 
realized that not much had changed in the city or on the campus of Memphis State. He 
enlisted in the Army in 1960, a year after the school was integrated, and during the period 
of the sit-ins. Yet when he returned home four years later, his homecoming was 
bittersweet. Like many soldiers that returned home, Acey looked to transition smoothly 
into civilian life. He enrolled in Memphis State under the Serviceman Readjustment Act, 
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or the G.I. Bill. In 1944 Franklin Roosevelt signed the G.I. Bill into law, providing 
veteran’s assistance in pursuing education, opening small businesses, and affordable 
home loans to aid in the American dream of homeownership. However, Acey’s smooth 
transition clashed with the harsh reality of Memphis State’s racial landscape. Acey 
already had a year of college experience at LeMoyne College prior to his enlistment. 
“When I enrolled, we had no black teachers, no black secretary, no policemen, no nothing 
African American or black but the people picking up the garbage and cutting the yard. 
We didn’t have sororities; we couldn’t participate in any homecoming activities. We 
couldn’t do anything but go to class…I felt cheated,” Acey recalled forty years later.80
Acey, James Pope, and Ester Hurt, all future leaders of the Memphis State Black 
Student Association (BSA), were military veterans. Their time serving in the military and 
traveling around the world had exposed them to life outside of the Jim Crow South. 
Historically, black men have viewed military service as a “rite of passage into manhood.” 
After World War II Black GI’s, embittered by the discrimination they faced, but 
emboldened by their service in the military, returned ready to confront the racism at 
home. These veterans became important catalysts for the modern civil rights 
movement.
  
81 Through their military service Acey, Pope, and Hurt arrived at Memphis 
State ready to start a movement of their own. “Us veterans…thought that things could be 
better here at the university,” said Pope.82
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Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith believed things could be better not only at 
Memphis State, but in Memphis in general. Both men were high school students during 
the sit-in movements, but that experience impacted them both differently, altering their 
path to activism. In the mid-1960s, both young men, Cabbage from South Memphis and 
Smith from North Memphis, left the city to pursue other interests. The two men did not 
know each until they left Memphis, but what they found outside of the city informed their 
more radical political orientation, which eventually sparked a movement that impacted 
many of Memphis’s black youth. 
It was sports, not the civil rights movement that took Charles Cabbage away from 
Memphis and to Atlanta in 1966. When Charles Cabbage arrived at historically black 
Morehouse College as a promising basketball talent, he admitted to his political naïveté. 
Despite the flurry of sit-ins, boycotts, and demonstrations happening in Memphis during 
his high school days at Carver High, Cab, as his friends called him, did not participate, 
underscoring the varying levels of political consciousness among the city’s youth. 
Cabbage starred in basketball and track at Carver and his focus on athletics, combined 
with what he perceived as a lack of youth organizing in Memphis, did not leave time or 
generate much interest in participating in the local movement in the early 1960s. “There 
wasn’t that kind of free thought going around down here [in Memphis]…I wasn’t 
involved because there wasn’t no structure, they weren’t organizing or anything.83
                                                                                                                                                              
8240th Anniversary Commemoration of Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Man, The Mission, 
The Movement,” The University of Memphis, (Audio Recording in the Possession of the Author) 
April 2, 2008. 
 But 




Fascinated by the faster pace of the Atlanta movement and the depth of the 
movement activity, as home to SNCC, SCLC, and the Atlanta University Center, Cab 
soon began to flow in and out of different political circles, organizing anti-war protests 
on Morehouse’s campus, and soaking up knowledge from more experienced activists.84 
“They talked revolution. They were always talking about politics. I found that fascinating 
because I didn’t have a background in those things. I had transferred from LeMoyne 
College…And I just wanted to belong, you know, because they [politically active 
students] were talking about things that I didn’t know anything about.”85 The opportunity 
to join Atlanta’s movement landscape enticed Cab away from his athletic pursuits, and he 
retired from the hardwood to focus his full attention on helping the black community.86 
"He really thought he was going to become a basketball phenomenon. He didn't because 
of the social ills, “ said activist Calvin Taylor, “Something told him that something 
needed to be done more about what was facing American society in the '60s than 
basketball."87
Unlike Cab, Coby Smith had participated in the city’s civil rights campaigns. 
Smith traced his roots in organizing back to his grade school days in Memphis. As a 
Battalion Commander in National Defense Cadet Corps at Manassas High School, Smith 
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won the Legion of Valor award in 1963 during his senior year and became not only the 
first African American Memphis Cadet Corps member to win the award, but also the first 
Cadet Corps member from Memphis to ever win the honor.88 Where Cabbage excelled 
athletically, Smith did so academically. Regarded as one of the city’s best and brightest 
young students, black or white, in 1963 Smith became one of the first two Africans 
Americans accepted to Southwestern College at Memphis.89 Smith’s parents fueled his 
early political inclinations and ties to the civil rights movement. They were both 
politically active and involved in the NAACP and the Shelby County Democratic Club. 
In his senior year, Smith helped organize a boycott at Manassas High School at the 
urging of James Lawson.90
Smith also participated in the James Meredith March Against Fear in 1966. His 
involvement in the Meredith March became a catalyst for his life of activism, pushing 
Smith out of Memphis and to Atlanta where he felt he could become more active in the 
movement. In 1966, James Meredith, the first African American to enroll at the 
University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), set out to march from Memphis to the state capitol 
in Jackson, Mississippi in order to show African Americans that they “could exercise 
freedom now even in Mississippi.”
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between individuals and organizations during the Black Freedom Movement, the march 
exposed a shift in the philosophies between some civil rights activists.  
Akinyele Umoja’s study of armed resistance during the civil rights movement 
suggests that the Meredith March characterized a change in the temperament of the 
Southern civil rights movement.92 Even while participating in the march, Smith clearly 
disagreed with the nonviolent tactics and the tacticians that dominated its leadership. 
Smith credited the Meredith March with providing an opportunity to meet nationally 
recognized civil rights leaders. He also remembered local leaders discouraging him from 
speaking at one of the march’s strategy sessions – an early indicator of the divide 
between the older and younger generation. Smith remembered that the elders only offered 
him the chance to speak when his mother intervened on his behalf. During the march to 
Mississippi, Smith recalled engaging in debates with Dr. King about the use of 
nonviolent direct action as a tool for change. “I would walk along everyday talking to 
Martin King about stuff like that [non-violence] down in Mississippi. He had befriended 
me in the Meredith March.”93
Although Richard Wright, Paul Roberson, and U.S. Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr., had used some incarnation of the phrase “Black Power,” Carmichael’s use of 
it during the Meredith March represented the national debut for the Black Power 
slogan.
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profound impact on the development of Smith’s political consciousness. He also used his 
time in Mississippi to make connections with other civil rights activists. “I was just 
hooking up with other organizers,” he said including SNCC members Carmichael and 
Cleveland Sellers.95
Once active in the Atlanta scene, Cab and Smith connected with members of 
SNCC. Since its inception, SNCC had taken a more radical approach than other civil 
rights organizations. The Mississippi Freedom Summer campaign of 1964 marked a 
noticeable shift in the makeup of SNCC, and after 1964 whites began to, if not 
outnumber blacks, at least make up an increasingly larger percentage of the organization. 
According to Clayborne Carson, “A group of SNCC activists began to see racial 
separatism as an ideal that would awaken the consciousness of black people and begin a 
new phase in the black struggle.”
  
96
Like many in SNCC, both men expressed resentment with white attempts to 
organize in black communities. Their attitudes reflected many of the feelings that 
pervaded SNCC at that time. “SNCC had become very frustrated with the white 
youngsters,” Smith said. “Most of them were friends of SDS (Students for a Democratic 
Society) and they – we wanted them to go organize in the white community. We can take 
care of our community ourselves, you all are just in the way…down here getting your 
 By 1966 SNCC had taken a more radical turn with 
Carmichael at the helm. When Cabbage and Smith arrived in Atlanta, SNCC had lost 
youthful optimism. The organization’s embrace of Black Power coincided with the two 
young activists arrival in Atlanta.  
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jollies off on black folks, work on your mamas and your daddies – they’re the ones that 
killing us.”97 Taylor recalled Cabbage and Smith’s frustration with the pacifist approach 
employed by some members of SNCC. The two men no longer took pride in the restraint 
it took to remain nonviolent and both Cabbage and Smith began to reject nonviolence.98
The shift in attitude became even more apparent when Clifford Karchmer, a 
student at Princeton University, profiled Smith in a paper entitled “American Radicalism” 
in the 1960s. Karchmer had spoken with Smith in 1964 while Smith was still a student at 
Manassas High School. According to Karchmer, during their first meeting Smith exuded 
pride at his appointment as one of only three African Americans on the Juvenile Court 
Jury. From that experience, Karchmer believed that Smith felt confident that the 
“American political system could assure racial equality.” Three years later Karchmer 
returned to Memphis and found a much different Coby Smith. No longer an optimistic 
high school student, Smith’s Atlanta transformation and his frustration with the slow 
racial progress now informed his political viewpoint. Angry, Smith spoke openly about 
revolution and overthrowing the system that “never intended access to the black man.” 
Karchmer suggested that Smith’s nihilistic musings were partly due to the “vacuum left 




Despite Smith’s critique and loss of faith in the moderate leadership, the Memphis 
NAACP provided inspiration to the future Black Power activist in his early days of high 
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school activism. Smith credited the black establishment with his early knowledge of the 
civil rights movement. “We came up under Maxine [Smith] and those,” recalled Coby 
Smith.100 The NAACP effectively used coalition politics in an effort to avoid the intense 
and violent racial unrest that plagued other cities.101 Because its leaders negotiated with 
whites, they acquired a stigma that their decisions were made in the best interest of the 
city’s black elite first, and the black community secondly. Sensing a need for community 
action and what they perceived as “independent community action, by members of the 
black community who had a free hand to operate without the controls from any outside 
forces,” Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith felt a strong desire to offer an alternative form 
of leadership to the black community in Memphis. There was not simply just a need to 
organize, the two men suggested, but also to create an organization independent of the 
city’s traditional black leadership. 102
After a year and a half in Atlanta, Cab and Smith turned down opportunities to 
continue organizing in Atlanta and in other locations with SNCC and SCLC. They 
wanted to return to Memphis and spark a movement in their hometown. “SNCC wanted 
me to go to Baltimore,” recalled Cabbage, “but I thought that people needed to go back 
where they came from and begin organizing in their own local communities for them to 
have any impact.”
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venues they once could not, the black community continued to deal with issues of police 
harassment and brutality. Disparities in housing, employment, and education remained 
even larger hurdles to black progress. The city’s preemptive desegregation of public 
facilities had not stopped isolated proprietors from refusing African Americans service or 
making black patrons uncomfortable in their establishments.  
Labor historian Michael Honey’s chronicle of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the 
Memphis sanitation strike reveals the contradictions in the city’s racial dynamics. Blacks 
could vote without the intimidation tactics that plagued blacks in other cities in the Jim 
Crow South, and a reorganization of the city government opened up City Council 
positions for African Americans. Yet outside of isolated incidents, signs of black progress 
remained hard to find.104 In her study of Memphis politics, Sharon Wright also suggests 
that despite certain advancements, “racial polarization in Memphis worsened after the 
protests of the 1960s.”105
Edwina Harrell, who became an active force in Memphis State University’s Black 
Student Association in 1968, explained that she returned home to Memphis and became 
associated with Cabbage and Smith and their incipient movement “out of a desire to be 
actively involved in the struggle for civil rights.” In high school Harrell explained that 
she was “stimulated by the things I had heard in parts of Georgia and Mississippi where 
college students had left school to work with the NAACP.” Like Cabbage and Smith, 
Harrell left Memphis for Atlanta to attend Spelman College where she became more 
politically conscious. “I had been involved with some other groups away from home and 
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I thought how challenging it would be to come home and do this work,” she explained. 
The excitement and freedom of being actively involved in making decisions and forcing 
change had eluded Harrell in Memphis. Around the nation black students and black youth 
were acting on their own behalf in the larger interest of the community. Yet in Memphis, 
after the sit-ins, youth and student activism independent of the black leadership was rare. 
Limited networks and organizing vehicles for youth and student activism left students 
such as Harrell, Cabbage, and Smith without a place in the movement to come home 
to.106
Like the Smiths, the Hooks, the Sugarmons, and the Willises a decade before, 
Cabbage and Smith also returned to Memphis armed with a college education, but they 
owned a different kind of organizing experience and a more radical disposition. Hoping 
to spark a new revolution, Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith left Atlanta and returned to 
Memphis to form the Black Power organization, the Black Organizing Project (BOP), 
which eventually became a catalyst for the city’s youth and student based Black Power 
Movement. They expressed great excitement “about the possibilities of organizing the 






Memphis’s black community had answered the call of  the Tri-State Defender for 
a new outlook on racial progress in 1960. The tenor of African American activism began 
to change in the mid-1950s with the emergence of a new cadre of young, black 
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professionals who assumed leadership roles in the NAACP and other political and civic 
organizations. By 1960, youth and student activism emerged side-by-side in a new spirit 
of protest aimed at disarming Jim Crow in Memphis. Seizing on the momentum of the 
national wave of sit-ins and other direct action protests, students at LeMoyne College and 
Owen Junior College established their political voice through their own direct action 
campaign, sparking an eighteen-month Freedom Movement that eventually destroyed the 
last vestiges of legal segregation in Memphis. However, to students such as Charles 
Cabbage and Coby Smith, these changes ultimately did little to transform the racial 
dynamics of the city. They became “frustrated by Memphis’s black leaders’ status quo 
way of doing things,” and through the experience and knowledge gained through their 
activism with the civil rights movement in Atlanta, they returned to Memphis in 1967, 
becoming the impetus of the city’s modern Black Power Movement.108
 
  
                                                     





“Damn the Army, Join the Invaders”: The Black Organizing Project and the 
Invaders 
 
“The looters got away very early in the game 
Have you ever seen a thief linger around to be contained? 
They claimed our Negro leaders could not control the crowd. 
Unfounded lies and accusations, they denounce our leaders loud… 
They lay everything on Black Power, but them boys are college bred.  
And are too smart to rob a pawnshop, while the coppers beat their heads… 
Will they lump us all together forever and a day? 
Or will…a new awakening, humane and fairness be their way? 1
 
 —Ettam Pryor, 
Poem on Memphis Racism 
 
 “So when the march got started and all of this business happened you see…Just 
as the march rounded Main and got to, I guess…Main and Beale (Streets),” explained 
Calvin Taylor, “King and them probably up near Goldsmith’s. And the young men 
there…the youngsters…the Stokely Carmichaels who wanted to see their names in the 
paper the next day decided that this was the moment to make the trouble…and they 
began breaking out windows and running.”2
                                                     
1“Poem on Memphis Racism,” Tri-State Defender, April 6, 1968. 
 Taylor, a senior at Memphis State University 
and a member of the Memphis based Black Power organization, Black Organizing 
Project (BOP), recalled the events that transpired on March 28, 1968, when a nonviolent 
march, intended to demonstrate support for the black sanitation workers in Memphis and 
show the city’s white citizens the solidarity of the African American community, turned 
violent. In an attempt to endorse the labor stoppage of the sanitation workers, and as a 
precursor to his Poor People Campaign, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) tried to lead the march. Civil Rights veteran 
and fellow nonviolent practitioner Reverend James Lawson, and head of the local 
  
2Calvin Taylor, interview.  
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organization, Community on the Move for Equality (COME), prodded King to come to 
Memphis to support the striking sanitation workers. The hastily organized march turned 
chaotic. Lemoyne-Owen College student Ronald Hooks assessed the situation. “People 
were trying to walk much too fast for a crowd that size. Dr. King was being pushed and 
people were walking on each other’s heels.”3 Taylor suggested that local leaders used 
King’s celebrity recklessly by placing King at the front of the disorganized march 
without much thought to the outcome.4 As the situation deteriorated, organizers of the 
march and SCLC staff whisked King away. With chaos all around, it was ironic that King 
once proclaimed, “Riots are the voice of the unheard.”5
If any one event foreshadowed the chaotic March 28 demonstration it was the 
disturbance that occurred earlier in the day at Hamilton High School. At Hamilton, a 
predominately black high school in South Memphis, COME leaders encouraged students 
to leave school and join the march to support the strikers. COME leaders and BOP 
leaders recruited African American students to leave their college and high school 
campuses all over the city in an effort to inflate the march’s numbers and provide a good 
showing for the national news media that followed King and his staff as they crusaded 
around the country. In addition to students from Hamilton High School, students from 
other area high schools and colleges also left their respective campuses to join the march. 
Estimates placed the number of marchers downtown that day anywhere between three 
thousand and five thousand with the majority of march participants in high school and 
 
                                                     
3Joan Beifuss, At the River I stand: Memphis, the 1968 Strike, and Martin Luther King 
(Memphis: St. Luke’s Press, 1990), 292. 
 
4Calvin Taylor, interview. 
 
5Martin Luther King, Jr., Edited by Clayborn Carson, The Autobiography of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. (London:  Abacus, 2000), 293. 
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college.6  Lawson assigned members of the COME staff to escort students from Hamilton 
and other local high schools downtown, but at Hamilton, as students attempted to leave to 
join the nonviolent demonstration, police, who had been dispatched to restore order, 
began pushing students back into the school.7 Soon rumors circulated that the police 
killed a young girl in the melee. The rumor increased the anxiety level in an already tense 
atmosphere.8
Back on Beale and Main Streets where the “Stokley Carmichaels” had gathered, 
sounds of broken windows and flying bricks accompanied chants of “Black Power” and 
“Burn it Down Baby.”
 
9 “I saw a group of young punks with sticks hitting a pawn shop 
window,” said one marcher. “And I said to myself, ‘Good heavens! What the hell are 
they trying to do to us?  Get us all shot?’”10
                                                     
6Invaders, “FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067” (Memphis, Tennessee, March 1968). 
 Dissenters transformed protest signs used to 
display movement slogans into weapons and missiles, a move that prompted city leaders 
to seriously consider changing the protest guidelines. A report compiled on civil unrest in 
the aftermath of this disturbance concluded: “In the disorders that erupted from the 
demonstration in Memphis, it was observed that rioters were employing sticks, which had 
previously been used by marchers to mount signs. As a result of this experience, 
Memphis is reportedly considering an ordinance that would require that signs used in 
 
7“Day’s Log of Police Calls Traces Racial Disturbance Shock Waves,” Memphis 
Commercial Appeal, March 29, 1968.   
 
8David Tucker, Memphis Since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civic Reformers 
(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 159. 
 





demonstrations be carried by the person rather than on mounted sticks.”11 While not 
explicitly implicating the Invaders, the Tri-State Defender reported, “thirty youth joined 
the march with the intentions of tearing up Beale.”12
The strike also forced the Memphis City Police Department to reconsider its 
policing options. In February the department mandated that its officers work 12-hour 
shifts and forego off-days and personal leave in an effort to maintain order.
 
13 The 
department also allowed officers to use guns from their personal arsenal in addition to 
their department-issued service revolvers. Looters smashed windows of stores on Beale 
Street and took merchandise. In the midst of the melee, police officer Leslie Dean Jones 
shot and killed sixteen-year-old Larry Payne with his off-duty weapon.14 According to 
Jones, Payne allegedly stole a television set from Sears and Roebuck. The officer pursued 
Payne into the Fowler Homes Housing Project where he claimed that the youth 
threatened him with a butcher’s knife.15 Witnesses reported hearing Payne yell, “don’t 
shoot,” as Jones “shoved the gun in Larry’s stomach and shot.”16
                                                     
11Civil Disorders After-Action Reports, Sanitation Strike Archival Project, University of 
Memphis, Container 5, Folder 16. 
 The highly contentious 
 
12Tri-State Defender, April 4, 1968; “Relatives of Slain Youth Dispute Policeman’s 
Story,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 30, 1968.  
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relationship between the police and the black community added to the combustible 
situation.  
Some black youths at the march wore jackets emblazoned with the word 
“Invaders” on the back. The line of demarcation between looters, militants, and march 
participants vanished in the fracas. Fair or not, true or not, the blame for the riot now fell 
squarely on the shoulders of the Invaders, one of several smaller organizations under the 
auspices of the Black Organizing Project.17
The abrupt nature of the Beale Street Riot, or Tough Thursday as some called it, 
shocked the COME staff and Dr. King, but the restive, emotionally charged nature of the 
black community should not have come as a surprise to those closest to the Memphis 
situation. BOP founding member Coby Smith blamed King’s neglect of the existing 
organizing structure: “You don’t go into an area and bypass the people who are there.”
  
18 
Just six days before the March 28 riot, the Commercial Appeal reported a judge’s 
Chicago ruling that, “making a crowd angry is perfectly permissible under the First 
Amendment.”19 Furthermore, the judge decreed that the spirit of the First Amendment 
allowed for a person to move others to action and cited the American Revolution as an 
example of such action.20
                                                     
17Beifuss, At the River I Stand, 294. 
 This ruling held true for the disaffected young Black Power 
advocates in Memphis. Smith further detailed the temperament of the city: “The city of 
Memphis has willfully and vagrantly attacked the black community. It’s a clear line 
 
18Coby Smith, interview.  
 
19“Judge Cites Right to Incite Crowd: Will Says First Amendment Defends Action,” 





here...I don’t know why you persist in saying Dr. King,” he explained to a reporter. “This 
is Memphis; the city belongs to people here. The black people here have to set the temper 
of the times.  If Dr. King is going to come in here, he’s going to have to come in here and 
analyze the situation and meet the needs of the people here.  If he doesn’t the same thing 
will happen to him everywhere he goes that happened here in Memphis.”21 Smith’s 
warning never became reality – on April 4, 1968, King died from a fatal gunshot wound 
on the balcony of Memphis’s Lorraine Motel.22
 
  
Taylor and others in BOP distanced themselves from the events on March 28. No 
one with any influence or leadership status in the group even admitted to attending the 
march, yet the bricks, bottles, and rocks hurled that day represented the actions of a 
frustrated and neglected constituency of blacks, particularly black youth who exploded 
during what later became one of the most tragic moments in civil rights history. In the 
same march where sanitation workers wore placards that read, “I Am A Man,” stating 
what they believed the city’s racist and paternalistic white power structure failed to 
acknowledge, these youth in their own manner, demanded acknowledgment. BOP 
member Calvin Taylor took no responsibility for the disruption, but confessed that his 
organization created the tension that day: “We represented the [frustrated] element that 
really did break it [the windows], but these people were not controlled by us.”23
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realized that neither he nor his organization could control any one person’s action, yet 
they took credit for the heated environment that led to the ruckus.  
 
Whether they accepted the blame for the riot or not, Taylor identified his 
organization’s impact on the situation – BOP and the Invaders did represent Memphis’s 
Black Power element. For years, the city’s black leadership kept its youth on the fringes 
of civil rights and political activity. Black leadership’s failure to effectively utilize and 
sustain a significant youth presence created a void that BOP and the more radical 
Invaders filled. Using Black Power politics, BOP attempted to organize and politicize 
Memphis’s black youth and provide an alternative model of empowerment to youth who 
felt disaffected by the city’s more conservative models of civil rights activists. As the 
Black Power Movement emerged nationally, BOP and the Invaders infused the city with 
their version of Black Power politics. City officials, the white community, and many in 
the black establishment branded them punks, thugs, and undesirables. The organization 
symbolized for many Memphians, black and white, the “evils” of the Black Power 
Movement in their own city. The formation and early beginnings of BOP reveal the 
organization’s efforts to confront and change the city’s political dynamic and foster a 
Black Power revolution in Memphis. 
 
Formed in 1967, the Black Organizing Project represented a stark departure from 
Memphis’ traditional outlets for black activism. Memphis was regarded as an “NAACP 
town,” with the local branch of the NAACP spearheading most of the black protest 
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activity in the city.24  “The Black Organizing Project organized in the streets, in the 
schools, in the churches, in the pool rooms,” Smith explained, recalling the early 
beginnings of BOP. When he and Cabbage returned to Memphis from Atlanta in the 
summer of 1967, they initially started organizing by creating sports and recreational 
activities for the city’s “incorrigible” black youth. “My emphasis is on the young. 
Nobody has really been able to communicate with them before…you’ve got to be able to 
relate to them and to understand their problems,” explained Smith.25 As the summer 
progressed, the emphasis shifted to academics and political theory with a group that the 
press labeled a “boy’s club.” The purpose of the Black Organizing Project, Cabbage 
explained, “is to stimulate in young blacks a sense of black identity, black pride, and 
black consciousness, to create in the blacks an independent spirit, to cease to be 
dependent upon and influenced by the white race.”26
As students themselves, they eventually expanded their base to the city’s college 
campuses. They introduced some students to the revolutionary readings of Malcolm X, 
Franz Fanon, and Che Guevara. They also encouraged students to read The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X, Franz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, and C.L.R. James’ 
Black Jacobins in their attempts to politicize and educate the black youth in Memphis.
  
27
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“We began to teach awareness of what it was to be black and live in America and brought 
that down to what it meant to be black and live in Memphis,” Smith said. BOP leaders 
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also played audio recordings of speeches given by the Black Power Movement’s 
ideological father, Malcolm X.28
 
  
By the time Coby Smith and Charles Cabbage returned to Memphis to initiate the 
Black Organizing Project’s program and start their “Black Power bit,” ideologically the 
Black Freedom Movement was at a crossroads.29 From a legislative standpoint, the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 secured 
African Americans access to public facilities and the voting booth. And while those gains 
represented progress, some African Americans viewed the legislation as a culmination of 
years of struggle, while other blacks remained dissatisfied and disillusioned. Though 
traditionally historians have viewed the Black Power Movement as a reactionary 
response to the perceived limitations of the civil rights movement. Black Power activists 
considered their actions a tactical change, another way to continue the fight and redefine 
the struggle.30 The same year of BOP’s birth also marked the publication of Stokely 
Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton’s, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, in 
which the two men outlined and defended their political ideology. Black Power, 
Carmichael and Hamilton argued, demanded that blacks “consolidate behind their own, 
so that they can bargain from a position of strength,” and not weakness as they had been 
doing historically.31
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29Calvin Taylor, interview. Taylor discusses the beginnings of BOP and Smith and 
Cabbage attempts to organize in the Memphis community, which he says was referred to as the 
“Black Power bit.” 
 




Power advocates, providing motivation to Smith and Cabbage. Carmichael himself 
proved influential to the men since they were acquainted with him during their days in 
Atlanta. “We were just trying to bring about change – to see businesses in our 
communities and make life better for our people,” said Smith, “Whites had the power of 
life and death over us. That had to change.”32
That change initially came around the fall of 1967 and the spring of 1968 in the 
form of an eight-point program entitled, The Black Organizing Project: Where We Go 
From Here, which articulated their program and marked the more formal beginnings of 
BOP.
 
33 The program emphasized their modified take on Carmichael and Hamilton’s 
thesis, as well the ideologies of forefathers of the Black Power Movement such as Black 
Nationalists Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X. Ironically and unintentionally the program 
borrowed its name from Dr. King’s 1967 work, Where Do We Go From Here: 
Community or Chaos, as both platforms looked to outline a new, progressive agenda. 
BOP’s goals resembled those of the Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPP). Bobby 
Seale and Huey Newton founded the BPP in 1966 in Oakland, California in response to 
the Oakland Police’s assault on the black community. What We Want, the Party’s Ten-
Point platform, outlined the organization’s aims and stressed their desire for the black 
community to control its own destiny. 34
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Power: The Politics of Liberation (New York: Vintage Books Random House, 1967,1992), 47.  
  The BOP outlined similar objectives for 
Memphis’s black community, including community control over education, finances, 
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politics, and land ownership. Specifically, the platform called for: an independent black-
controlled school board, an independent financial base, policing of the black community 
by blacks (excluding “brainwashed black policemen), and establishment of a Black 
United Front to “coordinate and implement all Black community politics, full land 
ownership in the areas of the city where the majority of blacks lived, control of the War 
on Poverty resources, and the unconditional release of all incarcerated blacks.”35  It also 
called for a “Ghetto Tax.”36 The Ghetto Tax, the organization argued, was white penance 
for setting up businesses in the black community, but not investing any resources to help 
the community. Above all, the program stressed and warned, “We must gain our 
Liberation through any means at our disposal.”37
As initially conceived and constructed, BOP operated as an umbrella organization 
that housed several different subsidiary youth and student organizations. As they 
organized and raised consciousness levels, “high school and college students began 
networking forming groups that took up the banner of unity.”
 
38
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included: the Black Student Association (BSA) at Memphis State University, the 
Intercollegiate Chapter of the NAACP at Lemoyne College, the African American 
Brotherhood at Owen College (LeMoyne and Owen merged in 1968), the City 
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unifying board. The board then made decisions and implemented those decisions in their 
respective groups.  
According to members of BOP, they helped push black students to form the BSA 
and become a more active force on campus. Cabbage recalled that a group of Invaders 
stormed the cafeteria and stood on top of the tables and demanded that the black students 
take action.39 Soon after, BSA leaders such as David Acey, Ester Hurt, and James Pope 
began to mobilize black students on campus. Memphis State’s BSA eventually became 
one of the most active organizations on campus. “We’re beginning to move on the 
college campuses to organize there,” Charles Cabbage explained, “and from there we’re 
beginning to form what we call an umbrella structure to involve more organizations out 
in the community.”40 Despite their local orientation, BOP’s goals did not differ from 
those of most Black Power advocacy groups. “Black people need to control their 
communities,” Charles Cabbage commented, “They need to control the economics, the 
politics, the social life as well as the cultural life of their community.”41
 
 
After being honorably discharged from the Air Force, Vietnam veteran John Burl 
Smith returned to Memphis and expected to resume his normal life. On July 1, 1967 
Smith and Charles Cabbage stopped for gas at a local station. After Smith finished 
pumping the gas, he could not locate the car’s gas cap. He accused the white station 
owner of stealing the cap in an effort to “run a scam.” 42
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suggested, would steal gas caps from customers and then resell the caps to their owners 
for a dollar. Perplexed and aggravated by the scheme, Smith confronted the owner and 
called the police. After his service in the military Smith described himself as both an 
“American and a Negro.” 43 John Smith’s friend, Coby Smith, described the veteran’s 
attitude as very “all-American.”44 Smith’s self-appraisal recalled W.E.B. Dubois’ concept 
of double-consciousness. The desire “for a man to be both a Negro and an American 
without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of 
opportunity closed roughly in his face.” Yet Smith’s definition dealt less with an internal 
struggle to belong and more with a newfound idealism and patriotism associated with his 
time in the military. ‘Black Power’ was not in my vocabulary at the time,” recalled John 
B. Smith.45
When the police arrived at the scene and sided with the station owner, Smith 
realized that he was “just another nigger to them.” Smith’s skirmish with the police put 
the veteran on notice that America’s promise of equality did not always apply to every 
one. The ill-fated encounter at the gas station soon changed John Smith’s stance on Black 
Power. “Here I was, a Vietnam War Veteran,” Smith explained, “and I thought I had 
some rights. I believed in the Constitution. Cabbage said to me at the time, ‘The 
Constitution doesn’t work for people like you and me,’ but I didn’t believe him.”
 
46
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confrontation. Multiple police officers arrived on the scene and arrested Smith and 
Cabbage. “They threw us in jail...we had committed no crime – just because we were 
black…that was my baptism by fire. Everything changed after that.”47
“Before that I didn’t even believe in Black Power,” John Smith said. Charles 
Cabbage had been trying to persuade Smith to commit to their movement. John Smith’s 
coming of age experience played out on different stages in a myriad of ways in cities to 
young black men all across the nation. Incidents of injustice, like Smith’s, pushed many 
young black men toward militancy in instances when they had no intentions of becoming 
involved in the Movement. His awakening came during BOP’s infancy and his arrest 
indirectly triggered the rise of the Invaders. Not only did Smith become more politically 
conscious after the incident, but he also became the unofficial head of the Invaders.
 
48 
Smith’s political point of view radically changed, so much so that Cabbage claimed “he 
took to it [Black Power] like a duck to water.”49 Initially Cabbage’s younger brother, 
Richard Cabbage, headed the group, but the elder Cabbage promoted John Smith to the 
leadership because, “he had the military training and he had the tactical know-how and he 
was great at organizing young fellows.”50
Who were the Invaders? If BOP was the brains of Memphis’s Black Power 
Movement, then the Invaders were the muscle. A member described the group’s purpose 
as “responsible for security, for putting out sheets [pamphlets and newsletters] on 
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guerrilla warfare, training people in liberation tactics.”51 FBI and local law enforcement 
officials labeled the group as “just a bunch of kids trying to cash in on the Black Power 
idea.” The “military end” of the BOP, the Invaders derived their name from a short-lived, 
but popular 1967 television show starring Roy Thinnes. The show’s premise centered on 
aliens from a dying planet. The aliens had one mission: to make Earth their new home. 
The aliens took human form, which made it hard to discern real human beings from the 
alien life-forms. Every week, Thinnes’ character, David Vincent, tried to convince the 
world that these Invaders truly did exist and to stop them from taking over Earth. The 
action series lasted only a year, but it lasted long enough to inspire the young militants.52
The name came up – the idea behind everything now was for the BOP to take on 
the form of a great TV program that was on at the time known as 
 
Calvin Taylor described the theory behind the name:    
The Invaders.  
And The Invaders worked on this premise…that we looked, talked, act, and carry 
ourselves in the form of everyday, ordinary people act.  So if you saw me 
downtown, I’d look like any other shopper downtown and you wouldn’t know if I 
was really a black man, you know, getting ready to bomb your place or just a 
black man in the city.53
 
 
While college students populated most of BOP’s cells, the Invaders targeted high 
school students. Smith and Cabbage decided early in the organization’s infancy, despite 
their college background, that they would not restrict their organizing to college 
campuses.54
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 They opened their organization up to just about any young black man or 
woman who believed in their agenda, with the majority of the group’s make-up 
 
52Worldvision Television, “Invaders Introduction,” 
http://www.clivebanks.co.uk/Invaders%20Intro.htm [accessed 2003]. 
 
53Calvin Taylor, interview. 
 
54Charles Cabbage, interview. 
68 
 
consisting of Carver High School students and graduates.55 Taylor suggested that age did 
not matter – simply living in the racist society qualified the young high school students 
for membership. Taylor remarked, “A black boy, when he’s fourteen, isn’t really a boy, 
he’s a man – ‘cause he knows what the world is all about. So we decided we’d go a step 
further – and we’d get people in high school…and people who were freshmen and 
sophomores in college to make up this Invader group.”56
Taylor’s view that racism and society’s ills accelerated black boys’ path to 
manhood underscored the issues of masculinity that scholars of gender and the civil 
rights and Black Power Movements suggest permeated both movements. In his study of 
race and manhood during the civil rights movement, Steve Estes argues that those issues 
of masculinity were deeply entrenched in the struggle for racial equality.
  
57 During the 
height of the Black Power period, some black men, and particularly some Black Power 
activists, developed a sense of hyper-masculinity in their quest to reclaim and prove their 
manhood, often times marginalizing women in the process. Black Power organizations 
such as the Black Panther Party, Estes’ argues, utilized a “masculinist liberation 
ideology” that won the organization recruits as well as allies, but also promulgated “the 
use of violence to prove their manhood rather than to further a progressive political 
agenda.”58
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their manhood. Despite assertions from the community, Invaders insisted that they were 
no boy’s club. To be an Invader, “every boy must be a man,” Invader Lewis Welch 
insisted.59
While the community boasted of very prominent and accomplished black 
professional men such as Benjamin Hooks, Russell Sugarmon, Vasco Smith, and A.W. 
Willis, the Invaders offered the city’s young black men an alternative model of manhood. 
In comparison to the city’s older black male leaders, Invaders such as John B. Smith and 
Charles Cabbage talked tough, wore fashionable clothing and hairstyles, were from the 
same neighborhoods and close enough in age to relate the high schoolers. Exuding the 
cool that defined the aesthetic of the movement, the Invaders for many black young men 
were the closest representation of the Black Panther Party, Stokely Carmichael, or H. Rap 
Brown. But many local black community leaders balked at the Invaders’ brand of 
manhood and suggested that they use their influence over the young males for more 
positive action. “The Invaders ought to lead their followers into an invasion of night 
schools…such an invasion should be a major program of their black militancy. Then will 
begin the real ‘march’ to the realization of the black ‘man’ image…rather than the ‘boy’ 
designation,” wrote journalist, educator, and WDIA Disc Jockey Nat D. Williams.
   
60
By early 1968 members estimated Invader membership at anywhere from 1,500 to 
2,000 young Black males between the ages of 13-22.
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actual number on the membership roster to confuse people into believing that they had 
more influence than they really did and to promote the idea that they alone controlled the 
city’s black youth. The Invaders mirrored the Black Panther Party more than they did the 
stringently organized Fruit of Islam.62 Similar to the BPP, the Invaders embraced the so-
called brothers on the blocks: the gang members, the dropouts, the hoodlums and 
converted the recruits to the revolutionary cause.63 The Panthers used the Marxist 
terminology, Lumpenproletariat, to describe the “lower-class…downtrodden…brother on 
the block most open to rebellion and revolution.”64 Most middle-class African Americans 
in Memphis belonged to or supported the initiatives of the church and/or the NAACP, 
and BOP looked to empower other segments of the black community. “[The Invaders] is 
a group for boys who otherwise would be known as incorrigible hoodlums and thieves. 
Through the club they can find a new way of life, can help themselves,” Coby Smith 
explained.65  Membership applications circulated soliciting any young African American 
that might “believe in building black in your community and the total liberation of Black 
people” to sign up.66 In opposition to military veteran John Smith’s former “all-
American” attitude, the recruitment slogan read: “Damn the Army, Join the Invaders.”67
                                                                                                                                                              
61Black Organizing Project, Container 5, Folder 21,Sanitation Strike Archival Project, 
Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis, Memphis Root, Vol. 1, No. 2, Memphis, 
TN; Coby Smith, interview; “Two Ignore Order to Quit Job,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, August 9, 
1967.   
 
 
62Branch, At Caanan's Edge, 737.  
 
63Charles Cabbage, interview; Cabbage describes the early days of organizing in South 
Memphis. “The core of the organization was formed right out of that community, out of gang 
membership,” Cabbage recalled.  
 
64Ogbar, Black Power, 94.  
 




With a slogan so bold, it did not take long for the FBI to take notice of the Black 
Power element forming in the city. They began targeting BOP and its leadership in late 
1967. “If you said ‘Black Power,’ you were an immediate threat. And we were saying it,” 
remarked Coby Smith.68 The Memphis Police Department organized the Domestic 
Intelligence Unit (DIU), or Red Squad, to specifically monitor the movement of BOP and 
the Invaders. Policemen “enrolled” as students at the local college campuses, and an 
agent, Marrell McCollough, even infiltrated the Invaders.69 In a memo profiling the 
origins and set-up of the organization, Agent Burl F. Johnson reported that BOP’s  
“ostensible purpose was to create pride in black identity, to teach black culture and black 
history, and to obtain employment for young blacks.”70 The rise of the Invaders forced 
DIU to closely monitor the young radicals. Organized in the wake of the “long hot 
summer” of 1967, the DIU’s close surveillance of the organization showed city 
authorities’ fear of Black Power infiltrating Memphis.71
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The Invaders were certainly different than the high school and college students 
that sat-in at the city’s libraries and integrated Memphis’s public facilities almost a 
decade earlier. They argued, too, that their frustrations felt a lot different. Those earlier 
students had been inspired by the passage of Brown, emboldened by the desegregation of 
Memphis State University, and moved to action in the early 1960s; they remained 
optimistic about their ability to change the future course of race relations. Black Power 
advocates such as the Invaders were pessimistic about America’s ability to fulfill the 
promises of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. The civil rights 
struggle and passage of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts in the early part of the 
decade raised expectations. Organizations like the BPP routinely used phrases from the 
two documents in their speeches and carried around pocket versions for reference. 
Invader Lance Watson, also known as “Sweet Willie Wine,” argued that the Founding 
Fathers would approve of their revolutionary stance. “Anytime a government does not 
fulfill the needs of the people you have a right to overthrow the government,” Watson 
suggested. “So we are doing what the founding fathers said that we could do. Every time 
we turn around we been told that the white man said this and we been taught that the 
white man’s always right so we’re going to use the Declaration of Independence as our 
guideline.” 72
The FBI, however, read the BOP and the Invaders as a threat. The FBI’s National 
Bureau warned the local division about the developing new organization. A memo dated 
January 15, 1968, noted the incipient movement: “A Black Power Movement known as 
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The Invaders, is in the Memphis Division, Keep the Bureau informed concerning the 
progress of this organization.”73
 
  
The antics of the Invaders and persecution by law enforcement began to eclipse 
Cabbage and Smith’s intentions to promote a program to organize the black community 
and instill political and cultural awareness. Not everyone under the BOP umbrella 
considered themselves, or their organization, a part of the Invaders. Once clearly 
established on Memphis State’s campus, members of the BSA, though still affiliated with 
BOP, began to maintain an autonomy that separated their activities from those of the 
Invaders. The merger of LeMoyne College and Owen Junior College placed the two cells 
associated with BOP in limbo, and consequently the Owen cell folded in the merger. 
Eddie Jenkins, a BSA member at Memphis State, recalled some tension between black 
Memphis State students and Invaders because of their choice to attend Memphis State 
and not LeMoyne. “I remember Charles Cabbage and John Smith gave us hard time, ya’ll 
down here in East Memphis with these white folks, ya’ll uncle toms and house niggers,” 
Jenkins recalled.74
However, membership did overlap in many instances. Members of the other 
organizations under the BOP banner claimed Invader membership, but many of the 
younger Invaders did not participate in the organizing aspect of BOP. The Invader arm of 
BOP allowed for different recruitment opportunities since the organization did not have 
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ties to any particular campus or student organization. The Invaders component also 
allowed the organization the ability to operate under different auspices.  
However, the open enrollment opportunities that the Invaders provided the city’s 
lumpenproletariat became a weakness for the organization. Since anybody could be an 
Invader, membership became hard to control, especially the more radical members. 
Because of the relaxed requirements, anybody wearing an Invader jacket, tiki necklace, 
and anything considered militant garb could claim to belong to the group. The 
organization’s heightened visibility, enhanced by their actions and the popularity of the 
Invader jackets, broke away from the group’s original cloak and dagger intent. There was 
no system of checks and balances, nor did efforts to curtail the violence by reining in the 
young members always succeed. “Yeah, all you had to do was be in your late teens and 
early twenties, have a tiki on your neck, and have more hair than you should have from 
your last haircut,” recalled Coby Smith, “And our guys wore some little old blue jean 
jackets with Invaders on it.  So anybody could be an Invader overnight. Didn’t have a 
membership card, no initiation, no discipline, no function.”75
  
   
Politically, 1967 proved to be an important year in Memphis. Black Power in the 
form of electoral politics arrived in the city when Attorney A.W. Willis formally 
announced his plans to run for city mayor. The same year Cleveland’s Carl Stokes made 
history as well when he became the first African American mayor of a major U.S. city. A 
year before the election of Stokes, the citizens of Springfield, Ohio, made Robert C. 
Henry the first African American mayor in the history of the United States.76
                                                     





hoped to duplicate the feat in Memphis. He believed that he had an especially good 
chance since African Americans comprised forty percent of the city’s population. Willis, 
the first black candidate to officially run for mayor, campaigned under the city’s new 
Mayor-Council form of government. In 1966 voters approved a referendum that changed 
the form of City Government. Instead of a Mayor and five Commissioners, a Mayor and 
thirteen City Council members elected to serve four-year terms would now run the city. 
Many black Memphians saw this as an upgrade because of the districting, which ensured 
that at least three African Americans would serve on the City Council. 77
According to Taylor, BOP leadership offered their services to the Willis 
campaign. Having already created an organizing base, Taylor and other BOP leaders 
believed that they could use their influence to rally Willis’s grassroots base. “So we 
pooled our resources, and we got down to Willis’s office, and told him ‘look, you got 
some campaign workers right here, you can pay us if you want to pay us or pay us if you 
don’t want to pay us.’”
 With this new 
change, Willis believed 1967 was an ideal time to run for mayor. He hoped the new 
system would encourage African Americans to think positively about their potential 
voting power and the effect it could have in changing the city’s political landscape.  
78
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election to Henry Loeb. Rumors circulated that Loeb paid Willis $35,000 dollars to run in 
order to split the black vote between Willis and white moderate William B. Ingram.79 
Despite Stokes’ success in winning the Mayoral race in Cleveland, many BOP members 
felt that Memphis was not quite ready for a black Mayor. African Americans, they 
argued, were so intrinsically used to white leadership that they were not fully ready to 
embrace the idea of the a black person governing the city, even someone as capable and 
respected in the black community as Willis. It also did not help Willis’s cause that the 
media portrayed him as being in “cahoots with the Black Power Boys.”80 BOP promised 
Willis’s constituency that he would win the race, and after the backlash, Willis began to 
regret the alliance. So did BOP. “It was just a bad political move on our part,” said 
Taylor, “he cut us loose, the city cut us loose, the community cut us loose…you just 
don’t lose with black people.”81
Willis’s campaign for mayor spoke to the boom-bust relationship between the 
black leadership and the Black Power Boys. Many acknowledged the Invaders’ ability to 
relate to black residents in the lower income neighborhoods of the city. Controlling that 
element remained another matter altogether. However, soliciting help from the Invaders 
and then dismissing the youth became a constant trend throughout the organization’s 
existence, brought on in part by the rogue element of the organization, but also by the 
black leadership’s refusal to view Black Power as articulated by BOP and the Invaders as 
a viable way to organize the black community.  
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BOP derived the plan to divide the communities into districts with satellite offices 
and personnel in each section of the city. Each community, the leadership argued, had its 
own particular set of problems and needed people available to respond those 
particularities.82 Their grand plans included the creation of “Liberation Schools” to teach 
black history, art, and culture, but they initially lacked the funding to get the project 
started. The organization’s membership base hailed primarily from South Memphis, the 
area where Cabbage grew up. Coby Smith spent his childhood days in North Memphis. 
Both men took the lead in organizing those respective communities. Skill sets became 
important to the growth of group. Coby Smith did the majority of public speaking on 
BOP’s behalf, while Cabbage and John Smith handled the majority of the field 
organizing and recruiting.83
Calvin Taylor occupied a unique position in the organization. Taylor worked at 
The Commercial Appeal as a copy boy. He used his writing skills to handle the 
administrative and public relations responsibilities. Also, because the paper employed a 
police scanner to stay abreast of the events happening in the city, Taylor used the same 
information from the scanner to inform and warn members of possible police 
crackdowns.
  
84 Taylor and Coby Smith provided a counterbalance to Cabbage and John 
Smith’s more rugged personas. “Coby and I sort of talked a little differently from 
them.”85 Taylor suggested that the rank and file related more closely to Cabbage and 
John B. Smith and were less apt to “move” for others in the leadership.86
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And move they did. Disaffected youth from the different communities in the city 
flocked to join the Invaders. Invader Minister of Defense John Smith started wearing a 
military-style jacket with “Invaders” sewn onto the back that soon became popular 
among the membership and non-membership alike. Any study of the Black Power 
Movement cannot overlook the impact of the dress, style, and music and culture during 
this era. Many black youth connected more to the Movement’s cultural flourishes than 
they did to the ideological framework.87
Controversy followed the Invaders, and yet the Invaders did not shy away from 
the attention, negative or positive, that they received. Leaders openly touted their disdain 
for nonviolence and its tactician. They proclaimed that Memphis needed a “good riot” in 
order for the city to understand the seriousness of the racial dilemma.
 Likewise, the jackets, the clenched fists, the afro 
hairstyles, and berets like those worn by the BPP attracted many of Memphis’s black 
youth to the Invaders in ways that Smith or Cabbage’s message did not, despite their 
charisma. Leadership targeted local high school campuses to promote the organization 
and push the school administration to offer black history courses.  
88
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him…see, but now the physical violence that could take place – that worries people, you 
see, and we use it as a threat.”89 An unidentified South Memphis merchant wrote a letter 
to Memphis’s Director of Fire and Police Frank Holloman in which he described a threat 
he received from the “Black Invaders,” to “hire all negro management or vacate premise 
or they will burn him out,” an example of the Invaders attempts to institute the Ghetto 
Tax.90
 
 On one hand, the organization desperately needed money to operate; on the other, 
they reveled in their sullied reputation and ability to scare both the white and black 
establishment. 
On a rainy February day in 1968, two Memphis sanitation workers huddled inside 
a garbage truck to avoid the wet conditions. Faulty mechanical equipment set off the 
truck’s compactor before the men could escape their dry reprieve. The deaths of Echol 
Cole and Robert Walker sparked the beginning of the Memphis Sanitation Strike, the 
most empowering, yet ultimately tragic, civil rights and labor campaign in the history of 
the city. Memphis’s sanitation department was overwhelmingly black, with the exception 
of management.91 Once the workers decided to officially walk off the job, labor and 
community leaders rallied around the workers. At the chance to become involved in a 
real grassroots campaign led by the rank-and-file, BOP leaders responded, “O.K., here 
we go. Now we’ve got us something to be demonstrating for.”92
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organizing in late 1967 and early 1968 Phase One. The sanitation strike provided the 
organization to step up and initiate Phase Two.93
As the resolve of the workers strengthened, so did Mayor Loeb’s. No one 
anticipated that the “wildcat” strike would become a two-and-a-half month work 
stoppage and ultimately a civil rights struggle, though the horrible working conditions, 
poor pay, and past attempts at a strike hinted at the possibility that something larger could 
happen. BOP leaders claimed that they understood more than any other leadership faction 
in the city that Memphis could explode at any moment. The FBI took notice of the 
dispute as soon as the local NAACP sided with the workers. The Bureau also watched out 
for any “black nationalist infiltration” or influence on the striking workers, though they 
did not detect such infiltration in the early stages of the strike.
  
94 While bracing for any 
influence of Black Power, law enforcement officials could not account for the impact of 
the strike on the black community and the power derived from the workers’ courageous 
stand. “Black people all over the city…wasn’t nothing going on but the sanitation strike. 
They didn’t care if you were a Black Power militant, if you were an Uncle Tom, but if 
you were behind the sanitation strike you were a brother,” recalled Taylor.95
In early March, with the Mayor and the American Federation of State County and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) union officials gridlocked, the ministerial alliance took 
the lead in supporting the sanitation workers and organizing the marches and meetings 
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with the sanitation workers.96 Soon the unofficial coalition of ministers and other 
community leaders coalesced into the more formal Community on the Move for Equality 
(COME). Reverend James Lawson, pastor of Centenary Methodist Church and a man 
Martin Luther King considered “the leading theoretician of nonviolent protest in the 
United States,” headed the newly formed coalition.97 With COME involved, the work 
stoppage became a full-fledged civil rights issue, despite the newspapers’ 
characterization of the ministers’ approach as a “racial pitch.”98 The organization began 
to employ economic boycotts of downtown businesses and the city’s two dailies, 
Commercial Appeal and Press-Scimitar. It further demanded better jobs, better housing, 
and an end to discrimination and brutality of African Americans by police.99
Youth also became an essential component of the strike. After the sanitation 
workers, high school and college students were constant fixtures at the downtown 
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doing here, but we know this is a cause, in that it involves black people and we are 
black,” expressed one student.101 Some adults, however, questioned whether or not the 
students should participate in the marches or concentrate solely on school. Some adults 
suggested that the youth were “too immature emotionally to become actively involved in 
controversial social issues of the day.” Their concern as the students’ caretakers 
notwithstanding, arguing that the students should not participate because they “needed 
time to grow” underscored the disconnect between the adults and the youth’s desire to 
contribute the “black cause.”102
From the start, there existed a shaky marriage between the “Black Power Boys” 
and COME. Neither side totally trusted the other. Invader Charles Ballard accused the 
“so-called big preachers” of grandstanding and taking over the strike for the sanitation 
workers, a move he labeled as “worse than Mayor Loeb,” for its paternalistic behavior 
toward the workers.
 Lawson, who helped organize the Nashville Sit-In 
Movement and SNCC, understood the power that youth brought to the Movement. To 
capitalize on the youth presence, present a united front, and to bridge the divide with the 
“militants,” Lawson invited Charles Cabbage as a BOP representative to participate in the 
COME strike strategy sessions.  
103 The workers, Ballard and other Invaders suggested, did not have 
their own voice represented in the negotiations and that “civil rights tactics of ‘63’ are not 
sufficient in the form of pressure on political structures.”104
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guard was out of touch with the reality of the situation, John B. Smith told members of 
the ministerial alliance, “You preachers do the praying and we’ll do the other work.” 
Cabbage also criticized the ministers. Cabbage’s criticism stemmed partly from the 
ministers’ position of authority and adulation among the black community, but he 
insisted despite the power they held they still could “get nothin’ done.”105
Without power and a significant role in COME, BOP felt marginalized as well, 
despite FBI reports that Cabbage had gained more influence in COME meetings. The FBI 
also accused him of using the strike “as a vehicle to stimulate interest on the part of 
Negro youths in his Black Power Movement.”
 Cabbage’s 
comments showed the premium that he and his cohorts placed on having power.  
106 Cabbage acknowledged that the strike 
brought the black community together in support of the workers, but it irritated him that 
he and his organization had little involvement.107 The ministers, BOP suggested were too 
busy turning the strike into “one big revival,” and with all the singing, praying, and 
marching, they ignored the real issues.108
                                                                                                                                                              
104"Invaders,” FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067,”Afro-American Brotherhood 
Speaks: Black Thesis Black Power!!!" (Memphis, Tennessee, 1968). 
 Cabbage’s appraisal ignored that the ministers 
initiated and supported COME’s civil rights plank, although he argued that the issues 
COME supported were issues that BOP had tried to make priorities in the first place. 
Although many of the ministers took a more militant stance than they normally conveyed 
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and the Invaders. Lawson characterized the Invaders’ militant flourishes as “rhetorical 
radicalism,” while other ministers argued that for all the talk of revolution, the group did 
little to actually personally help the cause of the workers.109
As negotiations between the mayor and AFSCME broke down, Lawson decided 
that the strike needed the attention of nationally recognized civil rights leaders. Even 
when police sprayed mace in the crowd during an impromptu February march, the strike 
still failed to garner much attention from national media outlets. In March, Executive 
Secretary of the national NAACP, Roy Wilkins and civil rights veteran Bayard Rustin 
visited Memphis to show their support for the strike. Lawson promised that Wilkins and 
Rustin would be “the first in a whole series of people coming in from all over the country 
to help you march and lead you to victory.”
   
110 BOP leaders, however, wondered why 
COME enlisted help from outsiders instead of utilizing their services. Wilkins and 
Rustin’s visit to Memphis served as a prelude to Lawson’s promise to bring the national 
spotlight to Memphis and the struggle of the sanitation workers. Lawson managed an 
even larger coup when he convinced Martin Luther King, Jr. to come to Memphis. On 
March 18, King addressed a large crowd at Mason Temple and promised to return to 
Memphis to lead a march.111
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Campaign to address the nation’s economic disparities, pledged to the workers that their 
struggle in Memphis would mark the beginning of the campaign.112
King did not return to Memphis triumphantly. An unexpected snowfall forced 
COME to postpone a March 22 date for protest for March 28. The subsequent Beale 
Street riot on March 28 placed a dark cloud over King’s decision to use the sanitation 
workers’ strike as the preface to the Poor People’s Campaign. King and his staff 
scrambled to find out what exactly happened and talk to the parties they believed started 
the fracas. BOP leadership disagreed with inviting King and, strategically, they never 
really supported the march. In protest and simply in an effort to avoid being targeted and 
personally blamed, the leadership decided to stay away from the march altogether. “We 
[the leadership] were getting the blame for everything and we were nowhere near the 
place…the next morning when we read the newspapers and the Invaders were taking the 




The absence of BOP leadership did not stop anyone from pointing the finger at 
the organization. City Councilman Fred Davis succinctly called the riot “a damn shame,” 
and without naming names, The Commercial Appeal blamed the disturbance on “angry 
young people who wanted an incident in Memphis.” 
  
114
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Kyles suggested that the Invaders’ reluctance to conform caused the riot. “The Invaders, 
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that young group started the breakup of the march. They were always pulling away from 
what we were doing, trying to establish their own identity,” recalled Reverend Kyles.115
Reverend Dick Moon, Pastor of the Presbyterian University Church at Memphis 
State University and member of COME, insisted that the marginalization of BOP in the 
strike strategy sessions led to the disturbance. “Well I think it occurred because…the 
young people in the black community were not given enough say – were not given any 
representation. And Ralph Jackson and Jim Lawson pretty well held them down and even 
though they were willing to listen to them, they weren’t willing to involve them into the 
actual strategy committee…if we don’t involve them in what we’re doing, they are just 
going to continue to bust us up,” Moon suggested.
  
116 Lawson disagreed with Moon’s 
observation and BOP’s belief that they had been excluded from the strategy sessions. 
“There has been communication. I don’t accept that,” Lawson responded when asked 
about COME’s rejection of BOP.117 Others looking to combat criticism leveled at King 
argued  “for weeks [Memphis] has been a smoldering cauldron waiting for the occasion 
to boil over into a racial outburst,” and that the riot “could have happened even if the 
marchers had been Sunday School children on their way to a picnic ground.”118
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Yet Cabbage admitted that BOP and as an extension, the Invaders, needed to 
challenge nonviolence as a tactic, and the march did just that.119
We had been working for two-and-a-half years trying to get ourselves established 
and trying to organize, trying to build the organization, and all of the sudden he 
comes in. The ministers hadn’t been doing nothin’ during all that time and all of 
the sudden King comes in and pulls up this fantastic mob, gets the sanitation 
workers the right to have a recognized union, and moves the ministers to the front 
of the leadership.
 They reiterated their 
opposition to King’s presence, and like other critics of King, feared that a successful 
outcome for the civil rights leader would undermine their work. Cabbage recalled the 




Cabbage also insisted that in the haste to bring in King, Lawson and COME leadership 
did not properly prepare people for the march. Memphis, Cabbage argued, “hadn’t had a 
nonviolent demonstration in years and years,” prior to the planned March 28th protest.121
                                                     
119Charles Cabbage, interview. 
 
According to Cabbage, he begged Lawson to hold off on inviting King to allow BOP to 
work with the community and instruct the citizens in nonviolent protest tactics, or at least 
send in SCLC representatives ahead of King to conduct nonviolent workshops. Cabbage 
and his organization remained uncommitted to nonviolence in principle, but realized that 
to even entertain the use of nonviolence as a tactic required a certain know-how and 
discipline that many black Memphians simply did not have. For all the controversy 
surrounding BOP and the Invaders, Coby Smith and Charles Cabbage possessed a 
background in civil rights organizing and could speak with some authority to those 
issues. “People are not automatically in tune to being able to adjust to a nonviolent 
 
120Ibid. 
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political position,” Cabbage argued, “especially in the middle of a hatred that was going 
on in Memphis during that particular time.”122
 
 
After the melee, King summoned Cabbage, a fellow Morehouse man, for a 
meeting at his hotel room at the downtown Holiday Inn-Rivermont. Along with Cabbage, 
Charles “Izzy” Harrington and Calvin Taylor attended the meeting. King’s second in 
command, Ralph Abernathy, immediately blamed the Invaders for the breaking up the 
march. Abernathy’s accusations placed them on the defensive. Cabbage told Abernathy 
that his organization had nothing to do with disrupting the march. Before things became 
too heated, King appeared out of the shower and began his own inquiry. King questioned 
the young men about their involvement in the disruption of the march and asked, “why 
would you resort to violence, anyway when you know that violence hasn’t worked for 
white people, why would you do that?”123
Naively, Cabbage believed that he could secure a three million dollar commitment 
from King. If King could indeed secure three million dollars, on the cusp of the Poor 
People’s Campaign, he had no intention of committing that amount of money to BOP. 
 Cabbage, the group’s spokesman, continued to 
deny any culpability and the conversation soon changed. Cabbage informed King about 
BOP’s platform, the trouble he and the organization had with Lawson and the other 
ministers, their alienation from the actual strike organizing, and how a lack of financial 
support hindered their attempts to truly implement the programs necessary to achieve 
anything substantial for black Memphians. Cabbage talked up the organization’s 
Community Unification Program.  
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King instead listened to their concerns, agreed that BOP should have a voice in COME 
leadership, and promised to help the group get financial backing if they assured no 
violence on King’s next attempt to march with the sanitation workers. King also asked 
Cabbage to pledge to serve as marshals for the march, or “parade,” as Cabbage referred 
to the demonstration. King’s very aura calmed the highly excitable young men. “I had 
never seen a man that looked like peace…this man actually lived and believed in 
nonviolence,” Taylor replied in awe.124 Cabbage, John Smith, and a group of Invaders 
met with King again on April 3, this time at the Lorraine Motel. King and the young men 
again debated the merits of nonviolence. According to Cabbage, SCLC staff wrote the 
organization a check for ten thousand dollars, with the promise of more to come, in 
exchange for guaranteeing a peaceful march.125
Before King could fulfill any of the promises made to Cabbage, the BOP, or even 
the sanitation workers, an assassin’s bullet struck King down on April 4 on the balcony of 
the Lorraine Motel. In the aftermath, King’s widow, Coretta Scott King returned to 
Memphis on April 8 to lead the march that her husband had pledged to lead before his 
assassination. As peace marshals, the Invaders made sure that they kept their pledge of no 
violence to Dr. King. Calvin Taylor, normally just a copy boy, had the opportunity to 
actually report on the march. He interviewed fellow Invader and march marshal, John 
Henry Ferguson. Ferguson told Taylor “he’d rather be out raising hell…burning the city 
down…but that he had made a commitment to Dr. King, and he wasn’t about to break it 
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 In death, Dr. King brought the organization stability – even 
if only temporarily.  
In the months following the march, SCLC officials continued King’s work in 
Washington, D.C. for the Poor People’s Campaign. The Invaders proved during the 
national march in Memphis that they could remain nonviolent. That fact, coupled with 
King’s attempt to reach out to the group before he died, earned the Invaders an invitation 
to work security in Resurrection City, the makeshift living quarters for the Poor People’s 
Campaign. On the surface, the new relationship between SCLC and the Invaders fulfilled 
King’s prophesy: “black youth attracted to Black Power and armed self-defense could 
also be brought into the nonviolent movement.”127
Back from the Poor People’s Campaign, SCLC held their annual convention in 
Memphis in the August of 1968.
  
128
                                                     
126Calvin Taylor, inteview. 
 SCLC, the Invaders, and black Memphians hoped that 
the convention could serve as a cathartic event. SCLC made the conscious decision to 
hold the convention in Memphis only four months after the death of King. However, like 
the Poor People’s Campaign itself, things did not go according to plan for other the 
SCLC – the Invaders. Many in Memphis considered Lance “Sweet Willie Wine” Watson 
the most controversial of all the Invaders. An upperclassman at Manassas High School 
 
127Honey, Going Down Jericho Road, 477; “SCLC Calling Students to May 27 March 
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said Abernathy.  
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when Coby Smith attended the school, Watson headed up the organization’s effort in 
Washington. Certain members of SCLC harbored ill feelings toward the Invaders over 
their supposed responsibility for King’s death, despite the strides made between the two 
organizations in the immediate aftermath of King’s death. Watson and other Invaders 
approached Andrew Young in hopes that he and Ralph Abernathy would help to 
exonerate the organization against charges that their actions precipitated King’s death. 
Watson regarded the organization’s work in Washington as successful and integral to 
SCLC’s campaign; and he hoped that SCLC felt the same way and would convey that 
same sentiment to the Memphis community.  
Allegedly, when Watson asked Young if SCLC planned to make good on King’s 
promise to help fund the organization’s programs, Young “got a little bit upset because 
we had the nerve to come to him and ask him to make good on the commitments.”129 
Those commitments, according to the Invaders, included six cars and 300,000 dollars in 
financial aid.130 According to some of the Invaders, Andrew Young, in anger and grief 
over King’s death, blamed Memphis for contributing to the conditions that caused the 
King’s murder. Young alleged, “the niggers in this town got Dr. King killed.”131
                                                     
129Calvin Taylor, interview; "Memphis Street Gang Threatens SCLC, Young," The 
Washington Evening Star, August 17, 1968. Young admitted that King had promised to help the 
Invaders raise money, but not 300,000 dollars that the group claimed.  
 
Obviously upset at the accusation, Invaders circulated flyers that condemned the 
Memphis ministers who brought King to Memphis, and they denounced the Poor 
People’s Campaign and Resurrection City as failures. They also accused SCLC of 
 
130"SCLC to Fulfill MLK's Promise; Militants Blast SCLC for Campaign Conduct," Tri-
State Defender, August 24, 1968. 
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languishing in “air-conditioned comfort at a Washington D.C. motel…sleeping with 
white girls, feasting on steaks, and enjoying an unaccustomed social schedule” while they 
ate bologna and cheese sandwiches and built Resurrection City.132 The flyer also charged 
SCLC with not doing enough to help the Invaders’ reputation in the community: “The 
Invaders are having their lives threatened because of their work in the Black Community 
and SCLC could clear their name, but refuse to do so.”133
 
 
The incident happened during a difficult and critical period for SCLC. King’s 
death left the organization without a charismatic spokesman to “compete” with fiery 
Black Power leaders such as Eldridge Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown. 
The Poor People’s Campaign did not have the impact or yield the results that they hoped. 
At a time when the organization needed to exude strength, the controversy with the 
Invaders came at an inopportune time, especially at the first convention since King’s 
death. Several Invaders stormed the convention and charged Ralph Abernathy and 
Andrew Young with “reneging on [financial] promises made to the group by the late Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.”134
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 Angry at the failure to secure funding and Young’s 
accusation, they gave the SCLC Vice President two hours to get out of Memphis. Partly 
under duress, Young admitted, “he probably said some things he shouldn’t have said.” 
Young confessed that anger fueled his attack, but that “the Invaders did do quite a bit to 
make the Poor People’s Campaign a success. They are probably mad at me because I 
neglected them. That’s what happens – as soon as we begin to neglect them, they begin to 
 





resent us.”135 He apologized to the Invaders as he credited their efforts with the Poor 
People’s Campaign.136 Young’s mea culpa echoed his mentor King’s belief that 
alienating young Black Power activists did more harm than good. However, Young’s 
statement, while patronizing in some respects, suggested that the older generation needed 
to have a certain level of tolerance and patience for the wayward thinking youth instead 
of engaging in meaningful dialogue. Abernathy agreed to fulfill King’s pledge, although 
the organization never received any funding from SCLC.137 The Invader confrontation 
aside, the local black press praised the convention and Abernathy, even as many 
questioned how successful he could be as the SCLC head.138
  
 
Once back in Memphis, the unity that SCLC and the Invaders created after Martin 
Luther King’s death dissolved. Not everybody in SCLC committed to providing BOP 
with financial resources, but King had wanted to make sure that the young men would not 
make trouble. The fallen leader had wanted to channel what he deemed as negative 
behavior into positive energy, so that Memphis and SCLC could use for the betterment of 
the community. With King’s death, the prospect of national recognition and respect 
eluded BOP; they never escaped the stigma associated with the March 28 disturbance, 
which led to King’s return and ultimately his death. Cabbage and Coby Smith had 
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returned to Memphis in the summer of 1967 with the goal of redeeming the soul of the 
city and replacing black fear with a new, more assertive political posture. However, 
controversy began to obscure their purpose, placing the organization’s Black Power 
ambitions in jeopardy. Then, in the summer of 1968, an opportunity to run the federally 
funded War on Poverty program called the Neighborhood Organizing Project (NOP) 
gave BOP and the Invaders another chance to implement their platform. Their 
involvement with the federally funded programs created a controversy that placed the 





 “Make the Scene Better”: The Neighborhood Organizing Project, The Decline of 
the Invaders, and the Promise and Limits of Black Power in Memphis 
 
“The N.O.P is going to do all it can to try and solve the many problems that exist 
between the two races. The solving of these problems can’t be done by the people of 
N.O.P. alone but they must be solved by the two races working together on a man to man 
basis.”1
 
 – Black Organizing Project, Neighborhood Organizing Project  
 
“They [the Invaders] are the black youth who have felt the sting of white racism, 
the frustration of inadequate employment, the injury of social rejection, the despair of 
hopelessness, the desperation of a loss of faith in anything but their own strength” 2
 
 – 
Nat D. Williams, WDIA Disc Jockey 
 
“Are you white?” Joan Crawford, a field worker with the Neighborhood 
Organizing Project (NOP), asked a group of young African American students. When a 
young girl answered, “no, I’m colored,” Crawford quickly corrected her. “You’re not 
colored,” she said. Another student instead answered, “Black” and Crawford followed the 
students’ response by asking if they were proud to be black. When the students answered 
“Yeah,” Crawford pushed again and asked, “Do you all want to be white?” This time the 
entire group of students said no. “If somebody asks you what nationally you are, you tell 
them black Afro-American,” Crawford continued, “Black for beauty.” Crawford’s and 
the students’ lively discussion typified a usual exchange at one of the five designated 
sites of the controversial NOP. The NOP was a War on Poverty Committee (WOPC) 
summer program that began in 1968. It was primarily staffed and operated by members 
of the Black Organizing Project (BOP) and the Invaders. Invader and NOP project 
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director Charles Ballard formally articulated Crawford’s informal dialogue with the 
students into the organization’s and the project’s mission. “We want to teach these people 
where they stand in the black man’s struggle for liberation,” Ballard said.3
 
  
 According to Ballard, the NOP sought to improve the quality of life for 
Memphis’s black citizens by teaching black history, black arts, and black politics 
including, “voter registration drives, teaching people how to use voter registration 
machines, how to vote, how to relate to politics, city politics, national politics, and how to 
make up their own minds about things.”4
                                                     
3“A Report on the Controversial NOP; Black Pride Stressed in Memphis Project,” 
Memphis Press-Scimitar, July 11, 1968.   
 Amidst accusations that BOP, and the Invaders 
specifically, bore responsibility for the events that led to Martin Luther King’s 
assassination, the creation of the NOP represented a legitimate opportunity to advance the 
organization’s platform and turn their rhetoric into results. BOP leadership fought against 
the derogatory labels as well as the implication that they were simply nothing but 
militants with no real purpose or agenda. They attempted to change this perception by 
organizing a community outreach program aimed at instilling black pride, educating the 
poor and disadvantaged, and fostering black empowerment. For the liberal establishment, 
NOP represented in part a way to institutionalize the local Black Power Movement by 
adopting components of the organization’s program into a government program 
framework. By integrally involving BOP and the Invaders in the operation of the War On 
Poverty program, liberals sought to tame the organization and ward off the possibility of 
racial unrest in Memphis. However, those reluctant to endorse the WOPC program called 
 
4Charles Ballard, interview. 
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it an expensive, unnecessary, and unproductive attempt to placate so-called unredeemable 
segments of the society.5
 
 
 How far could Black Power penetrate? If supported and cultivated, could it be 
effective? Could institutions operate autonomously and independently if funded and 
guided by the hand of the federal government? As a test case for those questions, the 
NOP in the end achieved only marginal success, not the lasting impact the activists 
envisioned. The program’s limited budget, a limited faith in the program’s efficacy from 
conservatives, and resistance to the involvement of Black Power radicals in a federally 
funded program contributed to the NOP’s lack of long-term success. The actions of the 
Invaders compounded those issues. Repeated arrests, infighting, and a lack of 
organizational structure, not only factored into the program’s insolvency, but also 
scripted the decline of the organization. The NOP exposed the limits of Black Power’s 
reach into the Memphis community.    
 
As President Lyndon Johnson stood on the podium and addressed the graduating 
class of 1965 at Howard University in Washington, D.C., he “promised bold, new efforts 
in housing, employment, welfare, and education to assist the Blacks’ struggle to move 
beyond the goal of equality of opportunity to racial equality as a reality.”6
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Point of View, outlines the issues that many in Memphis society (black and white) had of the 
Invaders.  “Too many in Memphians, black and white are too quick to dismiss these youths as 
thugs, criminals, drop-outs, and lunatic fringe fools.” 
 Johnson 
proclaimed it was not “just enough to open the gates of opportunity,” but that “all citizens 
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must have the ability to walk through those gates.”7 As a Texas Senator and Senate 
Majority leader, Johnson guided the first civil rights legislation through Congress since 
the Reconstruction period. As President of the United States, he signed into law two 
monumental pieces of legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965. President Johnson’s promises meshed with his track record, and his 
commencement address was generally well received.8 However, five days after his 
address at Howard, a confrontation between a young African American male and a white 
police officer erupted in the Watts section of Los Angeles into what one historian called, 
“the most destructive race riot in more than two decades.”9
The country stood at a crossroads. Johnson’s speech, which many in the African 
American civil rights establishment praised, served to “dissipate the storm that was 
gathering in America’s ghettoes before it burst upon the nation.”
   
10 But storm clouds had 
been in the horizon for some time, and the Watts uprising put Johnson and the nation on 
notice that African Americans could no longer serve as bystanders in the operation of 
their own communities.11
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stifled dreams.”12 The unrest, which many also considered a revolt against the moderate 
black leadership that characterized much of the early modern civil rights movement, 
prompted leaders who previously focused so much of their attention on legal battles, 
direct action protests, and voting rights issues to finally deal with the “heirs of Malcolm 
X.”13
According to President Johnson’s biographer Randall Woods, his answer to the 
Watts riot was to get “at the roots of the rioting, lest other American cities go up in 
flames.”
  
14 In the riot’s aftermath, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Johnson talked at length 
about the crisis. King implored Johnson to get the “poverty programs going.” In his first 
State of the Union address as President after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, 
Johnson had promised to wage a full-scale war on poverty. An element of his Great 
Society platform, the War on Poverty programs aimed to eliminate “poverty in the 
country’s two most publicized deindustrialized spaces: central cities and the rural 
counties of Appalachia.”15 Robert O. Self argues in American Babylon: Race and the 
Struggle for Postwar Oakland that Johnson’s Great Society and the advent of federal War 
on Poverty program in 1964 was responsible for ushering in a second wave of civil rights 
and Black Power organizing.16
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 King and other African American leaders viewed the passage of the legislation 
and War on Poverty funding into African American communities as an opportunity to 
stimulate economic growth, as well as to provide African Americans with opportunities 
to control their own financial destinies. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created 
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). As the administrator of War on Poverty 
funding, the OEO oversaw the antipoverty programs designed to assist urban and rural 
areas with problems of indigence and the areas afflicted with perpetual poverty and 
unemployment. Watts provided the government with a blueprint on ways to ward off 
urban violence and redirect the attention of so-called militant organizations, all while 
using government-controlled programs to keep tabs on their movements. In the interim, 
however, “the daunting long term challenge Johnson faced was designing a combined 
civil rights and antipoverty strategy that would fulfill the promises he made at Howard 
University, but also defuse the anger of the ghetto, while at the same time remain faithful 
to the values of an increasingly skeptical Middle America.” Grants began to flood volatile 
inner-city areas considered only an explosive incident away from a repeat of the violence 
and destruction that occurred on that hot August day in Los Angeles.17
In “Black Power, White Resistance, and Public Policy: Political Power and 
Poverty Program Grants in Mississippi,” political scientist David C. Colby assesses the 
relationship between Black Power organizations and their ability to secure poverty grants. 
Colby argues that tactically Black Power advocates, notwithstanding their more radical 
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philosophy, influenced the distribution of poverty grants.18 Colby also suggests that 
Johnson’s War on Poverty initiatives and his focus on eradicating poverty were more 
politically than socially motivated.19 With his Dixiecrat constituency slipping away, 
Colby contends that Johnson tried to compensate for those losses by liberally doling out 
grants to civil rights organizations and Black Power advocates. James Button’s analysis 
of the urban unrest in the 1960s, “Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960’s Riots,” 
suggests that the OEO increased the number of poverty grants in the 1967-1969 period in 
response to the rising violence and uprisings in urban areas.20
 
 With the Black Power 
Movement at its arguable zenith in the late 1960s, and despite what Colby refers to as the 
“counter movements” attempt to discredit black militant organizations, organizations 
such as BOP secured government funding to advance their political platform.   
No one mistook Memphis for Watts. Yet black poverty, poor education and 
limited employment opportunities, united inner-city Watts with other centers of African 
American population around the country. In 1965 Memphis’s rate of poverty exploded as 
the city become the “largest single pocket of poverty in Tennessee,” at 27.5 percent. The 
high percentage even trumped the rural sections of Western and Eastern Tennessee.21
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and those encompassing the 27.5 percent earned less than $3,000 per year.22 Many 
dwelling in abject poverty had to take extreme measures to survive. A sixteen-year-old 
African American young man arrested on charges of theft explained to the judge he stole 
a pair of shoes from a local store just so he “could go to school.”23 Beyond a lack of the 
necessary material possessions, Memphis also suffered from high rates of malnutrition 
among children. “If every undernourished child in Memphis were hospitalized there 
wouldn’t be room for them,” remarked a Memphis doctor.24 In Memphis’s case, unlike 
Watts, the target of the city’s first flood of poverty grants did not target rooting out the 
causes of inner-city conflict. Instead they addressed the sources of poverty in a city that 
the OEO described as having the “some of the worst urban poverty in the nation.”25
 
  
In March of 1966, a year after its formal incorporation, the Memphis Area Project 
South (MAP-South) submitted an application for $234,000 in federal funding for its 
“proposed broad-scale attack on problems of the poor in Shelby’s County largest poverty 
area.”26
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 MAP-South “addressed problems of unemployment, job training, and 
supplemental food distribution; organized summer youth programs; and coordinated 
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efforts of block clubs, public housing resident associations, and other groups.”27 MAP-
South’s grassroots organizing emanated from several South Memphis neighborhoods, 
which formed the nucleus of the newly created organization.28
 
 WOP programs, and 
particularly MAP-South, placed the decision-making power in the hands of those whom 
the programs would impact the most. The same South Memphis neighborhood where 
LeMoyne College trained the future black middle class was also classified as the poorest 
area in the county. The election of Reverend James Lawson as president of the 
organization showed MAP-South’s commitment to the revitalization of the South 
Memphis community. His election also signaled a connection between the issues of civil 
rights and economic justice.  
“We have some information on some people in Memphis,” Mississippi Senator 
James O. Eastland told a Senate Judiciary Committee. After a long, hot summer of riots 
in cities across the country in 1967, most notably in Cleveland, Detroit, and Newark, the 
United States Congress held special hearings to consider passing an antiriot bill that 
would make crossing the state lines with the purpose of starting a riot a federal offense.29 
The Committee’s inquiry included exploring the possibility that the War on Poverty 
programs subsidized rioters.30
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Memphis’s young Black Power activists Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith. “I don’t 
know whether they will be called to testify or not. We’ll have to study the information 
and see,” Eastland explained. As field workers for MAP-South, Cabbage and Smith 
caught the committee’s wrath for their affiliations with the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC). According to the committee and some Memphis 
WOPC and MAP-South officials, anyone employed by the federal government could not 
hold a position in any federally funded program if they held membership in any 
organization classified as subversive by the government. SNCC’s objectives, WOPC 
officials argued, did not “coincide with those of the anti-poverty effort.” Yet SNCC’s 
belief in participatory democracy and allowing the people most affected to control the 
decision-making process aligned with the WOPC’s commitment to same ideals.31
Months before the Congressional inquiry, the controversial Black Power activist 
Stokely Carmichael resigned his post as the chairman of SNCC. His tenure as head of the 
civil rights organization ushered in a new period of radicalization for SNCC. In April of 
1967 violence erupted in Nashville in the wake of an appearance by Carmichael at 
Vanderbilt University. It did not matter that Carmichael left the city prior to the violent 
episode; Nashville police chief John Sorace believed that there was “no doubt” that the 
outside agitators shouldered the blame for the disturbance. In fact, Sorace accused the 
local SNCC branch of encouraging Nashville black youth to “hate all whites…and make 
Molotov cocktails,” in Liberation Schools funded partially with federal funds.
    
32
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Tennessee House of Representatives demanded Carmichael’s deportation back to his 
native Trinidad, and it asked the federal government for help in doing so since no 
provision in the Tennessee state statutes outlawed individuals or organizations from 
inciting a riot.33 With Black Power and the violence associated with the Movement so 
close to home, Memphis WOPC officials called for the dismissal of Cabbage and Smith. 
A fear developed that Nashville’s “problems” could happen in Memphis. The young 
activists, with ties to same organization that Carmichael once led, could be catalysts for 
such a raucous episode.34
  Cabbage and Smith’s association with MAP-South came via their relationship 
with James Lawson. Lawson recruited Smith and Cabbage to aid in MAP-South’s efforts 
to reinvigorate the South Memphis community and educate its residents on ways to 
improve their living conditions. According to Lawson, MAP-South had done a poor job 
of dealing with the youth. Unemployment among South Memphis’s youth remained high, 
and that demographic, Lawson suggested, constituted the largest segment of poverty in 
South Memphis. Lawson appreciated the young men’s organizing experience, familiarity 
with the community, and youthful exuberance.
 
35
But in Cabbage and Smith, Lawson also saw an opportunity to mentor the two 
and channel their energies into positive endeavors. As MAP-South employees, Cabbage 
and Smith canvassed South Memphis neighborhoods; they knocked on doors and talked 
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to residents about their rights as tenants. Cabbage and Smith believed that the residents 
had the right to organize rent strikes to protest inhabitable living conditions. Although a 
component of the MAP-South’s mission included informing and empowering residents to 
work on their own behalf to better their circumstance and build up the community, 
antipoverty workers could not encourage tenants in federally subsidized housing to 
withhold rent. Another problem also surfaced: WOPC officials suspected that the young 
men promoted their Black Power agenda during working hours. 
 MAP-South board members called a policy meeting in early August 1967 at 
Lawson’s pastorate, Centenary Methodist Church, to discuss concern over Cabbage and 
Smith’s activities and employment with the organization. The two men, board members 
claimed, were either members of SNCC or SNCC sympathizers. Either way, the members 
argued, their employment threatened the program’s federal funding. Although the MAP-
South was not a federal program, it was tied to the WOP as a third-party program that 
received antipoverty funds for many of its initiatives. To head off any controversy, some 
members called for their dismissal. Lawson disagreed with the dissenters and contended 
that Cabbage and Smith’s participation was necessary. “You can’t do anything with a 
poverty organization unless you use the type of people who can communicate with all 
elements of the community,” Lawson explained. In the interim, while the board sorted 
out the confusion, they voted not to immediately dismiss Cabbage and Smith because 
“we have an obligation not to act on the basis of alleged remarks.”36
Lawson’s decision to hire Cabbage and Smith, despite their fundamental 
differences about the use of nonviolence in the civil rights movement, spoke to the 
 
                                                     
36“Two Names Cause Stir,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, August 4, 1967.   
107 
 
minister’s conviction for nonviolence and the strength of redemption.37 His belief in 
nonviolence extended beyond an effective tactical approach in combating injustice.38 
Cabbage and Smith, like Carmichael, believed in nonviolence as simply a tactic, and they 
would abandon the strategy if the situation called for more extreme measures. By 1967 
the two young men were arguing the inevitability of armed struggle. “Nonviolence, as a 
strategy, was doomed to fail,” they concluded. Lawson balked at the young men’s 
attitudes and attributed their revolutionary rhetoric to “nihilistic romanticism.” He also 
believed that “eventually once brought into the fold that he [Cabbage] would change.”39
Few besides the Methodist minister had faith. Many began to label Cabbage and 
Smith as detrimental to the long-term success of MAP-South. Amidst threats that OEO 
would pull the project’s funding, Memphis WOPC officials reversed the initial decision 
to keep the two on staff. Attorney and WOPC Chairman Herschel Feibelman reiterated 
the Senate Judiciary Committee’s position – Cabbage and Smith’s affiliation with SNCC 
and promulgation of Black Power precluded their employment with MAP-South.
  
40
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Others associated with MAP-South argued that since the organization was an 
independent entity that happened to receive federal funding, it should make its own 
decision regarding Cabbage and Smith. Washington Butler, Memphis’s WOPC Director, 
had ironically revealed his own prior ties to SNCC, although he confessed “he didn’t 
have time for it now.” Butler stated that the WOPC would withhold paychecks until 
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someone could prove that neither young man belonged to any subversive organization or 
one that advocated rioting.41
Lawson, who took the accusations against Cabbage and Smith personally, struck 
back at the charge and the WOPC Executive Committee’s mandate for weekly reports. 
“They want to check and see if we are teaching hate…they are not concerned with trying 
to wage an effective war. If this is their attitude, they might as well close up,” Lawson 
responded. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s investigation had led to a discovery of 
alleged “hate schools” in the Nashville WOP program operated by Black Power 
advocates with ties to SNCC. They accused local SNCC members of promoting Black 
Power, excluding whites, teaching the students to “hate whitey.” The reenactment of 
slave insurrections also shocked the Judiciary Committee. Fred Brooks, Chairman of the 
Nashville SNCC chapter, did not completely deny the accusations. “We teach the 
historical facts that whites came to Africa and viciously enslaved many of the great 
African people. If the history of their Negroes’ past leads them to hate white people, 
that’s not our responsibility,” Brooks replied.
    
42 In fact Brooks declared that the program 
would continue to operate with or without federal funding.43
 The activities of the Nashville antipoverty program and Fred Brooks’s stance 
opened MAP-South up for scrutiny. Officials worried that Cabbage and Smith would 
influence MAP-South the same way that Brooks did the program in Nashville. WOPC 
abandoned their prudent, wait-and-see approach. On August 8, the Memphis Press-
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Scimitar revealed that the WOPC officially relieved Cabbage and Smith of their positions 
only a week after agreeing to wait. Despite his show of support against the firing, 
Lawson’s characterization of the youth did little to change the mind of the Judiciary 
Committee in Washington, or regional, state, and local WOPC officials. “Both men fired 
are angry guys…they have been taught by society which gives credence to war. They are 
fairly typical of this generation of students,” Lawson explained.  He acknowledged the 
disconnect between the Black Power activists’ views and his own, but suggested that 
their employment provided an opportunity to reach out to the “angry guys” who were 
“searching for direction.”44
“Somebody is definitely out to get my job…maybe I should say somebody is out 
to get me…this is not just something that happens. It is well planned, they have been 
working on it a long time…it has been clear that someone has been out to get me since 
the first day I arrived at MAP-South,” remarked Coby Smith, displaying the paranoia that 
many in the Movement felt toward the government.
  
45 Smith accused the WOPC of trying 
to discredit the entire MAP-South organization. Both men rejected Feibelman’s claim 
that the “firings were not intended to reflect on the character or the activities of the two 
young men.”46
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 On the contrary, because they were so connected to their work as MAP-
South employees and community organizers, they viewed the attacks as personal. In 
protest both men ignored the order to leave their positions and argued that an affiliation 
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community organizing work.47 “If a man is dealing with a problem as it is, what matter if 
he is a member of SNICK, is a Communist, is a Black Nationalist, or whatever,” said 
Cabbage.48 Both men believed that their actions helped to empower African Americans 
to take control of their communities. By organizing young black males, many of whom 
eventually became the Invaders, they were helping to curb gang violence.49
Increased pressure from inside and outside of the organization mounted, as 
government and some WOPC officials demanded that the activists comply with the order 
to leave their posts. Cabbage and Smith argued that the daily articles in the Commercial 
Appeal and Press Scimitar only presented one side of the story, which did not present 
them in the best light. Despite the demand by WOPC that both men stay away, the young 
men continued to report to work. Smith urged the public to consider both sides of the 
story and “not be fooled by these attempts to turn this into a newspaper lynching. He also 
threatened that BOP would have to “burn it [the city] down” in order to expose South 
Memphis’s poverty plight .
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 Such provocative statements did not help their cause in the 
public eye. Critics wondered why the young men would not reveal or deny their 
affiliation with SNCC. “It’s inconsequential,” explained Cabbage, who had no official 
standing in SNCC, only relationships with SNCC members. “If Stokely [Carmichael] was 
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to come in here, if he was the best man to do the job of fighting poverty, then he ought to 
have the job…but they say he’s black fire him, he’s SNICK fire him.”51
What began as inquiries soon took on the tenor of a witch hunt. On the House 
floor, Congressman Dan Kuykendall called for a thorough investigation of the OEO, “its 
personnel and especially subordinate organizations such as the one involved now in the 
controversy in Memphis.”
 
52 The conservative Republican Congressman won his seat 
partially by campaigning against President Johnson’s Great Society programs and the 
excessive government spending attached to them.53 Kuykendall’s congressional inquiry 
on the two workers simultaneously attacked Johnson’s programs while showing his 
commitment to law and order by rooting out the Black Power element. “The dismissal of 
the two was ordered because of their alleged affiliation with organizations advocating 
black power and the use of violence to obtain their end,” said Kuykendall.54
Kuykendall, a conservative Memphis businessman, won Memphis’s Ninth 
Congressional Seat by defeating the Democratic incumbent and “Great Society liberal” 
George Grider.
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 By the end of the 1960s many white Americans had grown frustrated 
with President Johnson’s Great Society and what they considered an increasingly more 
and more intrusive federal government, the civil rights and student movements, the 
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counterculture and urban rioting.56 Kuykendall’s win unmasked the frustrations of white 
Memphians with the liberal policies and legislation of the Johnson administration. 
According to G. Wayne Dowdy’s account of the campaign, Kuykendall accused Grider 
of being the President’s puppet and “rubber stamping what the federal extremists back in 
Washington want because it is politically expedient.” Despite his best efforts and 
aggressive courting of the African American community, the conservative evening daily 
the Memphis Press-Scimitar endorsed Kuykendall instead of Grider, citing the 
Congressman’s support of Johnson’s excessive government spending.57
Kuykendall, openly “anti-civil rights,” and in Lawson’s view unconcerned with 
the welfare of the impoverished people living in his district, was a World War II veteran 
who moved to Memphis in 1955 to work for Proctor and Gamble. Kuykendall rose to 
local political prominence in the early 1960s as one of the “architects of the Shelby 





  When he defeated Grider in 1966, he became the first Republican to win 
election to the House of Representatives from West Tennessee since 1883. The staunch 
conservative’s election and “McCarthy-esque” attacks on the OEO, on MAP-South, and 
on Cabbage and Smith revealed the contempt and the disillusionment of conservatives 
against the liberal agenda of the left.  
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In Devin Fergus’s work Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American 
Politics, 1965-1980 he argues that the liberal agenda and the relationship between 
liberalism and Black Power helped engender conservatives of the New Right like 
Kuykendall. As liberalism created an “operational space” for Black Power radicals, 
conservatives like those in Memphis bristled at the government’s support of those they 
considered among society’s most dangerous elements. In fact, Kuykendall warned that 
MAP-South’s refusal to deal with Cabbage and Smith would lead to the “federal 
financing of agitators.”59 Certainly, in his estimation, the employment of the young men 
confirmed his belief. However, through his paranoia and myopic focus on the SNCC 
affiliation and Black Power advocacy of Cabbage and Smith, Kuykendall ignored their 
positive impact on the youth in the South Memphis community. Despite his ideological 
differences, even Lawson respected their commitment to organizing the community. 
Kuykendall was fixated on weeding out Black Power radicals from an organization that 
Cabbage, Smith, and Lawson all agreed he found to have little merit anyway.60
 
 
Two days after Archie Walter (A.W.) Willis, a prominent Memphis attorney, 
announced his candidacy for Memphis Mayor at Centenary Methodist Church, becoming 
the first African American to run for the position, members of the MAP-South policy 
committee held a closed door meeting, also at Centenary, to decide Cabbage and Smith’s 
fate.61
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 They barred the media from the meeting, prompting Representative Kuykendall to 
 




question the legality of such an action. Kuykendall was not the only person concerned 
with the outcome of the meeting. About thirty minutes after the start of the proceedings, a 
group of Invaders interrupted the meeting. “We came up to tell these people what we 
want. We want to show our support.” Lawson calmed the group down and explained that 
since he hired Cabbage and Smith he would make sure that they would be treated fairly. 
“Who hired Coby? I did. And I hired Cabbage. As long as I’m there, you know the 
battle’s being fought. I’ve been marching since before you even thought about it,” said 
Lawson, touting his credentials to the youth. One youth suggested that if they were in the 
meeting discussing the issue of poverty that they should be included in the discussion as 
well. Many residing in the LeMoyne Garden housing project complained of a lack of 
recreational facilities as well as poor treatment from police officers. “We pay our rent but 
can’t sit in our yard,” complained one youth. Lawson suggested that instead of 
complaining, the group should get organized and protest their complaints nonviolently.62
Although Lawson publicly supported Cabbage and Smith, privately the three men 
remained at odds over their ideological differences. “They were taking a line that I didn’t 
particularly care for,” Lawson recalled. He still insisted, however, that they needed the 
constructive outlet MAP-South provided. As a civil rights veteran with an extensive track 
record, it angered Lawson that Cabbage and Smith dismissed leaders such as Martin 
Luther King as reactionary. “They didn’t really know what was going on,” said Lawson, 
but “if you are not going to try to work with this element of people in the community, 
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then you are just playing games.” In Lawson’s estimation, it became clear that Cabbage 
and Smith’s militant stance was more rhetoric than anything else, but he disagreed with 
the WOPC’s attempts to dismiss them without a fair hearing.63
While not explicitly saying it, Lawson felt disrespected by the two young men 
with little organizing experience who questioned his commitment to the movement and to 
the work that he had done throughout the years. Lawson viewed himself as a 
revolutionary and had the resume to prove it. He had been imprisoned for four years for 
refusing induction into the military during the Korean War. By telling the gathering of 
young Cabbage and Smith supporters that he had been battling against racial injustice 
longer than they had, he revealed his frustration with the youth and their rebellion against 
the older black leadership. In his estimation, pacifism and nonviolence were militant 
actions, but it was difficult to convince Cabbage, Smith, and their supporters otherwise.
  
64
The OEO’s refusal to order MAP-South to release the transcripts from the closed 
door meeting angered Kuykendall. “They [OEO] exert independence which borders on 
arrogance. This is a dangerous situation because it leads to federal financing of agitators 
who use the prestige of the federal office…to initiate race hatred which in turns leads to 
violence, rioting and the burning and looting which we have so recently witnessed in 
cities across the land,” admonished Kuykendall.
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 The Congressman blamed President 
Johnson, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and Attorney General Ramsay Clark for their 
presumed failure to maintain law and order, another indicator of a continued 
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dissidents.66 Smith responded by accusing Kuykendall of worrying more about possible 
connections with Stokely Carmichael and less with the issues of poverty in the city’s 
black community. He also argued that Kuykendall’s portrayal of him and Cabbage as 
extremists and pariahs left them unable to penetrate the power structure, thereby 
eliminating their effectiveness in solving problems in the community.67
Cabbage and Smith continued to fight their dismissal. White attorney Lucius 
Burch agreed to represent them at the MAP-South board meeting on August 23.
  
68 Burch, 
a member of the MCCR, did not subscribe to any of Cabbage or Smith’s rhetoric; 
however, he did not believe that they should have not been fired on the basis of 
unfounded allegations. At this meeting the board gave them one last opportunity to speak 
on their own behalf. This time, however, they invited Congressman Kuykendall to attend 
the meeting. The congressman, who stayed in Washington to attend legislative sessions, 
did not attend.69 Lawson suggested that his fascination with the MAP-South controversy 
was the first time he had shown any interest in any organization of any kind that dealt 
with the issue of poverty in Memphis.70
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Brown who yell a lot about violence usually aren’t the ones who do it. The real source of 
violence in America is going to come from guys who aren’t doing the yelling,” countered 
Lawson.71
Mayoral Candidate Willis backed Cabbage and Smith and called the proceedings 
a “Kangaroo trial.” “I asked Coby if he was out trying to start trouble. He said no, that 
was good enough for me,” remarked Willis. He continued, “We need more people 
concerned with the ghetto. I didn’t ask if he was a member of SNCC, and I don’t care. I 
am a member of some organizations I am ashamed of one of them is the Chamber of 
Commerce.”
 
72 Willis’s comment shocked NAACP President and WOPC Executive 
Committee Director Jesse Turner, but his endorsement, Burch’s representation, or the 
testimony of the two dismissed employees did little to sway the committee’s decision. 
The issue of the legality of encouraging rent strikes resurfaced, and both men did not 
deny that charge. When asked about the legality of WOPC workers organizing rent 
strikes, Cabbage answered, “I am part of the black poverty community. I work seven 
hours for MAP-South, but I live in poverty 24 hours a day.”73 In the end, the committee 
allowed the men to stay on the payroll for the remainder of the month until their 
termination of August 31.74
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The impassioned pleas did not salvage Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith’s 
positions with MAP-South. Nor did their refusal to kowtow to the demands of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Congressman Kuykendall, the OEO, or the WOPC elevate their 
status with larger segments of the community. In fact, in October of 1967 the WOPC 
committee took more control over MAP-South’s hiring practices in an effort to avoid a 
similar episode in the future.75 Even with the new, firmer policy, MAP-South continued 
to be a lightning rod for criticism. Some City Council members questioned its merit of 
the program and the “usefulness” of Lawson as the chairman. The Council disapproved 
of his support of Cabbage and Smith, as well as his own incendiary comments regarding 
the city’s race relations. They threatened to withhold funding if MAP-South kept Lawson 
as chairman, but the organization’s status as a citizen-controlled body barred the WOPC 
or the City Council from firing Lawson, who remained chairman until 1969.76
Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith left their first experience with a WOPC-
sponsored program with feelings of disillusionment and anger.
  
77 Despite the 
unceremonious ending of their tenure with MAP-South, Cabbage credited Lawson, who 
hired the two for their positions with MAP-South for indirectly helping to keep BOP in 
existence, illustrating Devin Fergus’s argument  that liberalism created operational space 
for Black Power activist and their programs.78
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because we would not have been able to live,” recalled Cabbage, “We would have had to 
take jobs, but we had jobs working for MAP-South.”79
 
 Though Cabbage and Smith no 
longer worked with MAP-South, the incident heighted the concern among white 
Memphians. The threat of urban unrest, the rise of a local Black Power Movement, and 
the relationship between War on Poverty initiatives and the radical activists occupying 
the positions in the programs were all issues that caused concern for Memphians.  
After the MAP-South controversy in 1967 there was little chance that anyone 
associated with Black Power would work with the organization again. However, in 1968, 
nine months after the organization’s founding, BOP proposed its Community Unification 
Program (CUP). “We have our program for community development which we call the 
Community Unification Program, which should be everybody’s concern…the unification 
of the Black community, which is the only way we’ll be able to get things that we need in 
terms of…survival, existence and things of this nature – period,” commented Charles 
Cabbage.80
As with many of BOP’s programmatic ambitions, they lacked the necessary 
funding to make the program a reality, although they did not shy away from soliciting 
financing from the very power structures that they repudiated.
 BOP envisioned the program reaching the “Black ghetto dwellers,” the 
neglected and invisible constituency of the Memphis’s community.  
81
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 “We have attempted to 
get our program funded through…the existing agencies like War on Poverty Committee 
and of this nature,” continued Cabbage. Request for financing from outside entities 
 





placed the organization in a precarious situation. In order to implement any of their ideas, 
they needed money, but they feared being co-opted. An FBI report noted that at an April 
30, 1968, meeting at Clayborne Temple, Invader Oree McKenzie spoke of their intent to 
start Liberation Schools as well as black arts and culture classes that would be “sponsored 
and financed by the War on Poverty Committee.”82
A revolutionary and innovative agenda, but also something foreign to the 
Memphis community, CUP united common threads of Black Power thought – black 
empowerment, self determination, cultural awareness, and economic self-sufficiency –
into one extensive platform. One could not address the issue of poverty, BOP argued, 
unless the black community united around the general direction that the community 
should take to alleviate poverty, unemployment, and educational discrepancies. Stressing 
the importance of involving Memphis’s black community and specifically the poor in the 
restructuring and revitalization of their own community, the proposal suggested that “in 
order for the community to be responsible to and feel responsible for the anti-poverty 
organization programs, the community must produce the initial structure…inhabitants of 
community must control and operate the organization.” Advancing their adaptation of the 
Black Panther Party’s lumpen ideology, the program could only succeed and the 
community would only improve if the program involved “the most unstable, unreliable 
and uncommitted element of the community.”
 BOP’s plan integrated elements of 
the emerging Black Arts Movement with practical ideals to restore race pride into the 
community.   
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Under the umbrella of CUP, BOP proposed a diverse set of initiatives that the 
organization estimated would only take “minimum cost and overhead expenditure” to 
operate. The program included several components targeted toward improving and 
uplifting the black community. A key aspect of the proposal, Intra-City Pride 
Incorporated, aimed to develop black pride on the local level and “teach community 
organization techniques to the neighborhood representative.” Upon establishing 
neighborhood chapters of Intra-City, Inc., trained staff would hold workshops and direct 
the neighborhood chapter representatives in a “physical clean-up and improvement 
campaign within its own neighborhood.” Ambitious in its goal, BOP planned to house the 
recruits from every predominately African American neighborhood in Memphis in 
outside facilities while they trained. They would then move back into their respective 
neighborhoods upon completion of the program to organize within the community 
“around the issues of Black Pride and Identification.” In addition to community 
beautification, CUP proposed a Black Arts program, a liberation school to teach black 
history, neighborhood cooperatives, a physical fitness program, and newsletters and radio 
programs to service the black community. 84
BOP leadership imagined a project where under their leadership, a board of 
directors would manage the operation of activities centers catering to the needs of young 
adults in the areas of social and athletic activities, tutoring, counseling services, and 
employment training. Employing all-black personnel, BOP estimated that they needed 
$2,000,000 dollars per year to keep the program operating at full capacity. BOP touted 
itself as a “kind of Half Way Organization” that bridged “the gap between the ghetto and 
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the rest of society.” CUP, BOP suggested, would reach the so-called unreachable and 
those excluded from the larger community. “The community is impressed by the fact 
that, prior to BOP, there has been little success in efforts to involve the ‘guys from the 
streets,’ the semi-literate, the jobless, in programs of recreation, culture, and self-
enhancement,” a testimonial from the CUP proposal stated.85
While all the pieces were there in BOP’s detailed proposal, they lacked the 
financial means to enact such a program. The organization approached local businesses 
and civic and political organizations for support for CUP. During the sanitation strike, 
Charles Cabbage, on behalf of BOP and the Invaders, requested $200,000 from Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
  
86 While King and his top 
aides “acknowledged…the Invaders could turn out young people in large numbers,” they 
believed that the Invaders were fixated on purging Jim Lawson from leadership and 
“committed to teaching guerrilla warfare and martial arts.” Skeptical of the groups’ 
motives and Black Power militancy, Andrew Young “offered to help them translate 
militancy into a funding proposal that King could endorse, without violence.”87 
Unfortunately, King died before he could lend his help to the young radicals.88
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The Memphis Police Department’s (MPD) Community Relations Bureau noted in 
a meeting on April 25, 1968, that several Invaders met with business owner and President 
of the Memphis Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) Dan Wilkinson, Jim Dowers of 
the Youth Guidance Commission (YGC), and Detective R.H. Ferguson of the MPD to 
solicit funding for CUP. When Wilkinson asked the group why they approached the 
Jaycees for funding, Invader Oree McKenzie explained, “Most people think all teenagers 
that get in trouble associate with the Invaders, this is not true. Even though we are a 
Black Power group, we still want to help our community. What we want is this, for 
business men to give us funds so we can set up work programs and help to train the black 
youths.” Dowers explained to McKenzie and the other Invaders that his organization, the 
YGC, also helped youth to find jobs. Although he believed that the Invaders could help 
organizing, the Invaders were a “hard product to sell.”89
Dowers commented to McKenzie: “Your plans are vague. I’m afraid that people 
will say you just put the money in your pocket.” McKenzie, the spokesman of the group, 
explained that the Invaders were only trying to help their race, not profit off of donations. 
Detective Ferguson interjected and asked if the Invaders had asked any of the “colored 
businessmen” for money. McKenzie, answered no, suggesting that to do such would 
brand their organization and the program as separatist. “Oree I want to be honest with 
you,” Detective Ferguson offered. “People are leery of you and your club has a stigma. 
There are several things about your organization that are hazy to me…but I can’t help but 
feel, that perhaps you might want this money to start a ‘hate school’ such as the one 
operated in Nashville last year,” said Ferguson, referencing a WOP controversy over 
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Henry Brooks and the Nashville chapter of SNCC. After the meeting adjourned, the 
detective relayed his feelings about the Invaders to Wilkinson and Bowers. “I couldn’t 
help but feel they were up to no good,” said Ferguson.90 The March 28 riot, King’s death, 
and the smeared reputation of the city in the aftermath never strayed too far from the 
minds of many white Memphians, who blamed black leadership for inviting King and the 
militants for causing him to come back. The stigma made it almost impossible for BOP 
and the Invaders to gain any trust among community and business leaders.91
 
  
BOP’s aggressive and ambitious plan required major financial backing. The 
$2,000,000 estimated one-year budget for the CUP operating expenses appeared 
outrageous, but in an effort to reach the so-called wayward youth, gangs and militants, 
the OEO started granting funding to institute programs to avoid riots in the summer of 
1967. For example, Chicago WOPC officials proposed a grant to the OEO with the idea 
of enlisting help of the Blackstone Rangers and the Disciples, two Chicago-area gangs, to 
assist in combating poverty in the Woodlawn area of the city. By 1967, with the Black 
Power Movement at its peak, the two gangs had begun to move away from strictly gang 
activity to dabble in some Black Power political tactics. Jeff Fort, the infamous leader of 
the Blackstone Rangers, also took a leadership role in the program. As some Chicago 
community leaders suggested, if the charismatic, Mississippi-born gang leader could get 
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thousands of young men to join his gang, then it stood to reason that if given the 
opportunity, he could channel that energy and rally the youth in a positive direction.92
  The OEO gave the gangs a $927,000 grant as an operating budget. Although 
OEO director Sargent Shriver enthusiastically backed the project, no grant in the history 
of the OEO “was as complete a failure” as the one operated by the Chicago gangs.
  
93 In an 
attempt to create opportunities for warring gangs to make positive impacts in their 
respective communities, Shriver did not fully account for the bad blood between the two 
rival groups. The lack of adequate supervision and training for the gang members was 
another major reason for the program’s failure. Fort and David Barksdale, the leader of 
the Disciples, used the WOPC training centers for gang-related business, which meant 
that not only did the two men conduct illegal business on the premises, but they also 
spent less time actually executing the goals of the program and managing the finances. 
The program’s “accounting procedures were spotty,” and “no one in authority interacted” 
with the members of the gangs.”94 The program ended abruptly when three Rangers were 
arrested and charged with rape.95 City Councilman James Netters felt confident that the 
NOP would not end up like Chicago and “go the route of…bringing in militants.”96
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During his April 25 meeting with Wilkinson, Dowers, and Ferguson, McKenzie 
expressed doubts about aligning the Invaders and the CUP with MAP-South, but MAP-
South’s access to WOPC funding and the maximum feasibility mandate made the 
organization an optimal choice to work with despite past entanglements.97 Amending 
BOP’s original plan and program title, a new WOPC and MAP-South proposal for the 
Ghetto Organizing Project (GOP) and MAP-South Life Experience Project surfaced in its 
place.98 Although Charles Cabbage felt that this was a step in the right direction, he 
admitted that the GOP was “not our overall program.”99 CUP, and its scaled-down 
version GOP, both targeted the neglected youth demographic. However, the $20,000 
budget of both programs fell far short of the $2,000,000 estimate of CUP.100
The GOP agenda nevertheless showed how BOP leadership shaped the policy and 
direction of the program. MAP-South’s proposal for their version of a community 
development program was filled with references to unification, uplift, and providing 
opportunities for the most unstable and unemployable elements of Memphis society – all 
aims of BOP’s initial offering. Other objectives of the program were to organize “low-
income dwellers in black and white ghettos of Memphis and Shelby County, provide 
volunteers from both college students and community young adults, provide employment 
  
                                                     
97“Invaders, “FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067-221-157-1067-304” (Memphis, 
Tennessee, June-August 1968).   
 
98“Invaders, “FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067-166” (Memphis, Tennessee, June 19, 
1968) Ghetto Organizing Project and MAP-South Life Experiences Project.  
 
99Charles Cabbage, Interview by James Mosby, The Civil Rights Documentation Project 
Ralph J. Bunche Oral History Program, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, (Washington, D.C., 
July 13, 1968). 
 
100“Invaders, “FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067-166” (Memphis, Tennessee, June 
19, 1968) Ghetto Organizing Project and MAP-South Life Experiences Project.  
127 
 
opportunities for young adults and youth living in low-income ghetto areas, organize 
neighborhood improvement projects around issues determined to be important by the 
residents of a given area, and to respond to rapidly changing conditions on the Memphis 
scene, and assist in meeting the crucial needs identified and given priority by involved 
youth.”101
In addition to the organizations under the BOP umbrella, the proposal enlisted 
student groups from the other local predominately white college campuses, Christian 
Brothers College and Southwestern at Rhodes. WOPC officials also changed the focus of 
the venture from a program that strictly operated by African Americans, to an inter-racial 
project where BOP would share leadership, negating the group’s belief that “the ultimate 
success of the War on Poverty efforts being directed in most American cities depends 






“Neighborhood Organizing Project helps build Black Pride,” read the Soul Set 
section of the Tri-State Defender. Reportedly Memphis’s WOPC received approval from 
Washington, D.C. for funding for a total of twenty-seven youth projects, among them the 
Ghetto Organizing Project summer program, renamed to the more politically correct 
Neighborhood Organizing Project (NOP).103
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rights movement and its accomplishments. Yet the movement failed, in the paper’s 
estimation, to reach the grassroots and the poor with any kind of comprehensive 
unification program. “What has happened basically is that the movement has blundered 
around aimlessly, realizing few victories; and every effort to made to develop a solid 
foundation has been stymied by a disgruntled hierarchy that has created more divisions 
than unity.” Memphis’s elder civil rights leaders perpetuated those divisions, the paper 
continued, and the newly organized NOP and the youth in charge of the program had the 
opportunity to rectify movement leadership’s oversights by instilling pride and unity into 
the black community.  
Beginning in June 1968, the NOP offered arts, crafts, music, and discussions on 
Black Power, black pride, and black politics. The Tri-State Defender’s Soul Set called for 
support of the program and the youth involved from the entire community. “The time for 
positive action is now. Black is beautiful and unity is our salvation,” the article 
concluded.104 The program’s list of objectives included  “developing job opportunities for 
young adults, providing tutorial projects directed toward increasing self-awareness, 
providing provocative discussion groups and organizing neighborhood improving 
projects.” WOPC officials also believed that involving the Black Power activists in NOP 
would create “charismatic indigenous leadership.”105
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Title II of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act paved the way for the creation of 
the NOP as well as other federally funded WOP programs across the nation. Title II 
established Community Action Agencies (CAA) and Community Action Programs 
(CAP) whose purpose was to “provide stimulation and incentive for urban and rural 
communities to mobilize their resources to combat poverty.”106 Title II also allowed for 
flexibility in creating “Special Impact Programs” aimed at “solving critical problems that 
existed in urban communities and neighborhoods throughout the nation where especially 
large concentrations of low-income persons dwelled.”107 The CAA’s came into existence 
when the character of the civil rights movement was changing. Civil rights groups and 
Black Power organizations used CAAs as a potential base for political power. “If 
Community Action was conceived as a means to contain racial militancy, it proved to 
have just the opposite effect,” critics suggested.108
 The youth board made the majority of the major decisions for the NOP; placing 
the power in the hands of those most affected by the program’s outcome. Five of the 
board’s eleven members were BOP and the Invaders. Verdell Brooks, Oree McKenzie, 
Charles Harrington and Ben Berry Heard all held membership in the Invaders, while 
Edwina Harrell, a NOP youth board member and a self-described “political 
revolutionary,” held membership in the Memphis State University’s Black Student 
Association and affiliated with the BOP and the Invaders.
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 From the outset, controversy surrounded the program. A passage in the proposal 
angered several City Council members, Mayor Henry Loeb, the Memphis and Shelby 
County Youth Guidance Commission, and the Mayor’s Youth Coordinator Advisory 
Committee. It read:  
The Memphis community has recently been convulsed by a number of shattering 
events – a ten-week long sanitation strike, a mass march which was accompanied 
by violence, a sharp polarization of efforts between white and black communities, 
the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr. in our city, more violence and instances of 
police brutality. In the midst of these eruptions the white leadership has shifted 
from stances of slow progress, to complete paralysis, to frantic activity. 
 
Still reeling from Time magazine’s negative characterization of the city in the wake the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, the mayor and the council took exception with 
program’s characterization of the white community and the charge that they were 
somehow slow to move and unreceptive to the needs of the black community. “We have 
never been paralyzed. We have worked with you all along,” Councilman Wyeth Chandler 
told WOPC Executive Director Washington Butler, Jr. Other Council members 
questioned the proposal’s charge of police brutality. “What about the looting and firing 
not being mentioned,” remarked Councilman Billy Hyman. Hyman, referencing the 
March sanitation strike disturbance, insinuated that police did not perpetrate the violence, 
but only responded. Butler took responsibility for the language in the report, explaining 
that the candid words were meant for the regional OEO in Atlanta, which wanted a 
detailed explanation of the need for a project like the NOP.110
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“Make The Scene Better,” read the sign on the door of the 1217 Thomas Street 
NOP headquarters, one of five locations scattered throughout North and South Memphis. 
“To a child who has lived in Memphis all his life and who has never seen the Mississippi 
River, it would be a big deal to take him down and see the river,” explained James 
Phillips, NOP area coordinator, Owen Junior College student, and Invader. The reality 
that some black youths had never seen the Mississippi River despite its close proximity, 
BOP members argued, was one of several reasons why the black community needed the 
NOP. For many children who had rarely ventured outside of their neighborhood, field 
trips exposed the students to city landmarks and areas that they had never seen in their 
own hometown. Helping children overcome a “lack of culture,” Phillips suggested, was 
one of many of the goals of the NOP.111
Classroom sessions led to lively and sometimes controversial discussions of black 
history and the contributions of African Americans to American society. Explaining the 
reasons for the variance in skin colors among African Americans and the vulnerable 
position that enslaved females often found themselves in, NOP field worker Joan 
Crawford told the class, “the reason there are different shades of Negroes is that the white 
plantation owner, when his wife’s back was turned, snuck into the barn with a beautiful 
black woman. And from that we got the different colors of the black man.”
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believed that teaching the youth about their heritage and instilling pride would translate 
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background on their culture. We want to give them self-identity – who they are, what 
they are, and where they’re going,” explained Charles Ballard.  
Not everyone understood how teaching black history would benefit the 
unemployed. Councilman Wyeth Chandler questioned Butler about the efficacy of such 
an approach: he asked how could “the teaching of black history, black art, and black 
culture in this project could help the apparently unemployable.” Specifically, Chandler 
wondered how the program could help the Invaders?113 Butler answered, “There is a lot 
of frustration. We are trying to recapture these people, give them self-respect, get them 
on their feet. This program is trying to reach the proponents of violence.”114
Councilman Robert James asked Butler if the program would do more to polarize 
the Memphis community than it would to unify it. “Why all this emphasis on Black and 
negative things?” James wondered. Butler told the Councilman that he did not believe the 
program would polarize anyone, but that just the opposite would happen. Many blacks, 
Butler suggested, were not afforded the same economic advantages or opportunities of 
whites, and as a result they felt alienated from society, or at least from having 
opportunities to advance. “Now we would like to show people who are black that they 
have something in their background of which they can be proud of. We are trying to 
shake some of these people out of the alienation they have for society.”
  
115
 While the City Council questioned the need for the NOP, a program called “Let’s 
Go,” teaching black children how to use public transportation, specifically how to ride 
the city buses, received no criticism from City Council members. At a cost of $9,000, 
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Butler expressed his pride in the program. “We will not just teach them how to use 
available public transportation but show them where it will take them…this will show 
them how to get out of their ghetto and into other areas of the city, via public 
transportation,” Butler explained. James Lawson, however, did not see the same potential 
in the program as Butler, suggesting the program bordered on redundancy. “I guess they 
will teach them how to get on the bus without walking into the door and the like,” 
Lawson mocked.116
The MAP-South Chairman made a valid point. Most of the children in the lower 
income areas relied exclusively on the bus for transportation, so why would the WOPC 
need to spend $9,000 on a program to teach children to use transportation system that 
they rode on regular basis? He also suggested that other programs could benefit from that 
funding. While WOPC allocated funds to teach children how to ride the city bus, Lawson 
complained “MAP-South was criticized for spending money, giving children a stipend to 
attend schools and workshop.” While the WOPC readily handed out funds to teach 
children to ride the bus, Lawson argued that more worthwhile programs such as the fix-
up and paint-up program, which hired elderly persons as construction and paint 
supervisors, caught unwarranted criticism.
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students and music students going into the ghetto and teaching the children new and 
useful things,” Lawson offered.118
However, Butler’s comments about the NOP’s intent to reach the proponents of 
violence reinforced the concerns of the City Council, WOP officials, and other 
government entities concerned that the Nashville controversy and hot summer of 1967 
would filter down to Memphis. Rumors of the Invaders using the poverty funding to 
“teach children insurrection methods” surfaced, a charge that members vehemently 
denied.
  
119 They instead reminded the critics that the program, the staff, and the executive 
board were not completely composed of African Americans. White students from 
Christian Brothers University, the Young Democratic Club of Memphis State, and from 
Southwestern at Rhodes were on the NOP’s payroll, as well.120
 Council members, representatives from the Mayor’s Youth Coordinator Advisory 
Committee, and the Youth Guidance Council (YGC) charged Butler and the WOPC with 
“duping” the City Council into approving the summer projects. Officials accused the 
WOPC of using the names of the Mayor’s Youth Coordinator Advisory Committee and 
the YGC to make the City Council think that the two organizations had approved the 
projects. Butler took exception with the charge that he and the WOPC purposely attached 
the two organizations to the projects to ensure that that programs received funding.  
 
The City Council also argued that the $20,000 allocated for the NOP, to which the 
city and the county contributed $4,000 of the $20,000 could be used to service more than 
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the fifty or so people that programs initially targeted. Council members, as well as the 
attorney for the YGC, again broached the issue of the relevancy of a “Negro History” 
course in a poverty program designed to make low-income residents more employable. 
Suggesting that the program had a limited scope and reach, James Bower, the Executive 
Director of the YGC, said to Butler, “I think we can reach more kids than the 36 in this 
one program. We’ve got 9,600 kids between the ages of 16 and 19 in the poverty areas. 
Taking into consideration all the job opportunities, we can only reach about 50 percent of 
them. This means we are going to have about 4,000 youngsters walking around this 
summer with nothing to do.”121
 Herschel Feibelman did not agree with the Council’s criticism. Feibelman called 
the program “bold and probing,” despite the limited number of students enrolled. “We are 
going to have to take risks on a quality program which may or may not produce quality. 
If you want to water the program down to its lowest common denominator, you will join 
its enemies,” Feibelman warned. Councilman James questioned the makeup of the staff 
since “militant groups are chosen to be leaders of such groups in other cities.” George 
Hunt, Assistant Director of the Memphis Youth Opportunity Project, explained to the rest 
of the Council members: “These programs are not geared to destroy anything, but to 
build.” As Director of the Life-Experiences Program Isaac Taylor continued to explain 
the details of the project and its goal to discuss “the pressures against the Negro family 
and current events as well as Negro history,” Councilman James reversed his prior 
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stance, on the MAP-South Life Experiences Program saying it sounded worthwhile and 
he hoped to attend a session.122
BOP understood what critics of the program did not: teaching black history, and 
emphasizing the legacies of people of African descent would help destroy the 
psychological barriers of inferiority and in turn would foster pride. For all of its political 
dimensions, the Black Power Movement’s focus on building positive self-worth through 
a renewed emphasis on black culture and consciousness was just as important to the 
success and legacy of the movement as its political focus. As the “central thrust of the 
Black Power Movement,” cultural nationalists sometimes clashed with advocates of 
revolutionary nationalism who promoted armed resistance and class struggle.
 
123 The 
Black Panther Party and the Black Cultural Nationalist organization US stood at the 
forefront of the debate. In spite of the characterization as “pork chop nationalists,” by the 
Black Panther Party, Maulana Karenga, the leader of US, insisted, “you must have a 
cultural revolution before the violent revolution.” “The cultural revolution,” Karenga 
offered,  “gives identity, purpose, and direction.“124
Teaching black history, black arts, and black music, ultimately reshaping the way 
the black community viewed itself, would ensure the program’s long-term success BOP 
members argued. William Van DeBurg‘s New Day in Babylon: The Black Power 
Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975, contends that cultural nationalists believed 
that by “nurturing a ‘significant sense of self,’ an individual could hope to become self-
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reliant, highly motivated, and goal oriented, no longer in doubt as to their worth as human 
beings, race-conscious blacks felt comfortable in ‘speaking up, standing tall, and thinking 
big.’”125 The program’s goal of teaching job skills in addition to the classes and 
workshops on black history, music, and art bridged both the economic and the cultural 
needs of the community.126
African American labor activist James Boggs critically assessed federally funded 
programs like the NOP that operated on limited resources, but under much scrutiny and 
with the expectation of failure. Both instrumental in local black radical organizing in 
Detroit in the 1960s, the auto worker and his wife Grace Lee, who held a Ph.D. in 
English, were both “Marxist theoretician,” whose “analysis of race, class, and revolution 
influenced young activists increasingly committed to both black nationalism and 
anticaptialist struggles.”
 
127 “The Black community cannot be developed unless Black 
youth, in particular, are given real and not just rhetorical opportunities to participate in 
the actual planning and development of the Black community,” Boggs argued.128
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for developing new social institutions or for resolving the basic issues and grievances 
which affect the largest section of the Black community.”129
 
   
Despite Herschel Feibelman’s proclamation that the effort to reach out and 
include the city’s Black Power element in the planning, implementation and oversight of 
the NOP constituted an “imaginative, bold concept,” the NOP followed the “One Hot 
Summer” structure that Boggs warned against. By the conclusion of the program in 
August, Feibelman did not deliver on his assurances of a groundbreaking program. 
Despite the program’s promise, by summer’s end the long-term health of the NOP, BOP, 
and the Invaders were in jeopardy. Directly tied to the fortunes of BOP as the 
organization’s ability to successfully manage the poverty program and end its ties to 
criminal and violent activity.130
“These boys in the Neighborhood Organizing Project are not going to stir up 
trouble because they know how much is riding on it,” Feibleman suggested.
  
131
A month before the official launch of the NOP, in May 1968, MPD accused 
several Invaders of starting a riot at Carver High School in South Memphis. Members of 
the Invaders, police and school officials suggested, encouraged Carver students to hurl 
 Yet the 
loose organizational structure of BOP, the lumpen element in the Invaders membership, 
and the subsidiary groups within the organization made it difficult to predict the actions 
of members directly involved with the NOP and even those who were not.  
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bricks through windows to protest the poor food in the cafeteria, lack of black history and 
art classes, and the school administration’s refusal to allow an official chapter of the 
Invaders at the school. Some students stood outside of the school’s auditorium chanting, 
“black power, black power,” an action school officials directly attributed to the Invaders. 
In an account of their version of the events, entitled “How It Was and How It Is,” the 
letter outlined the students’ motivations, frustrations with the Carver administration and 
the school board, and pride in their stand against the school. For the “first time many of 
us knew how it really felt to truly be an Invader and how it felt to be on the front lines 
fighting as a Black man against the enemy of our people,” read the letter.132
The Carver situation caused concern among city and community leadership with 
the “trend of black power militants, who call themselves the Invaders, of using the city 
high schools to campuses, primarily Carver High as a base for organizing activity.”
  
133 
Invaders warned that if the school board and school administration did not act on the 
students’ demands, then they could expect to “feel the full weight of the black 
community.” They also criticized the outdated curriculum, and the black principals, who, 
they suggested, were condemning the Invaders and the students’ demands did so out of 
fear of reprisals from the school board. They also condemned the school board for its 
control over the black schools. “This is not a threat from the Invaders,” said John Smith, 
“but a demand from the housewives, factory workers, garbage men, postmen, winos, 
pimps, prostitutes – the entire black community.”134
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Ferguson, Oree McKenzie, and John B. Smith, all members of the Invaders, were arrested 
in the disturbance. McKenzie and Smith worked with the NOP.135
Police accused the organization of using the incident to recruit and organize at 
Carver, but also to generate publicity and fear. In fact, Lance “Sweet Willie Wine” 
Watson and several students from Memphis attending the Poor People’s March “were 
accused of creating a disturbance in a Washington, D.C. high school,” in an effort to 
organize and inform the students about the Poor People’s Campaign, but others believed 
that it was another attempt to gain national notoriety.
   
136 Davis, Ferguson, McKenzie, and 
Smith all received the maximum penalty, up to five years in prison, and all of the young 
men except Davis received a $1,000 fine.137
WDIA General Manager Bert Ferguson released an editorial condemning the 
Invaders for the Carver High situation. Ferguson referred to the Invaders as outsiders and 
troublemakers who had “thrown a shadow over that area in South Memphis.” Although 
he gave credence to the demands for more black history instruction, he doubted the 
sincerity of the organization’s request. “WDIA believes that those who are making these 
demands are motivated mostly by a desire to put themselves in the public spotlight.” The 
editorial continually dismissed the motivations of the Invaders and suggested the NAACP 
should handle the matter. “We suspect that very few of have any personal knowledge of 
   
                                                                                                                                                              
134“Mr. Hollowman Where Are You,” Tri-State Defender, June 1, 1968.     
 




137“Carver Rioting Brings Terms,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 1, 1969.   
141 
 
Negro history that they are willing to break windows about,” the editorial opined.138 Yet 
Ferguson’s harsh critique of the Black Power activists did not stop him from using the 
organization to boost the sagging rating among the sixteen to twenty-one year old 
demographic by featuring Charles Cabbage and John B. Smith on the station’s program, 
“Young American Speaks.”139
“To say that vandalism at 12 city schools is directly attributed to the leadership 
element of the Invaders is absurd as having a condemned man on death row to believe 
that everything will be alright,” read BOP’s mimeographed response to the WDIA 
editorial. Calling Ferguson out of touch with the black community, BOP argued that 
Ferguson had no right to speak for the black community because he lacked the “right and 
the emotional capacity,” to do so and unlike African Americans he as a white man had 
“always been free.”
 
140 BOP asked Ferguson, “What about our history?” and “When did 
WDIA become the pulse of the black populace?” That WDIA was the first radio station 
in the South to switch to an all-black programming format did not give the Ferguson the 
right to speak on behalf of African Americans in the city. Invader head, John B. Smith 
took exception with Ferguson’s use of the phrase, “We at WDIA.” “If he really had 
feeling for the black community he should give his job to one of the black DJ’s who 
knows the black community.”141
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A year later, in 1969, as members of the Steering Committee for Operation 
Boycott WDIA, many of the issues that BOP confronted in their 1968 rebuttal to 
Ferguson became the demands of the steering committee. The committee, which included 
prominent black Memphians such as Bishop G.E. Patterson of the Church Of God In 
Christ, demanded the station hire more black personnel at the station and place more 
money into the black community. The committee insisted that Ferguson discontinue his 
editorials. “Bert Ferguson cannot speak and think for the black community,” read an item 
on the list of demands.142 Operation Boycott successfully pushed WDIA to make changes 
in its broadcasting, hiring, and business practices, but the impetus of the movement began 
a year earlier with BOP’s stance against Ferguson.143
 
  
Despite claims of an integrated staff, BOP members or affiliates occupied 
seventeen of the twenty paid NOP staff positions. A Memphis Intelligence Bureau report 
claimed, “BOP completely dominates and controls the federally-financed NOP.”144
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 The 
report also accused BOP members of not working. As with the Rangers and Disciples in 
Chicago, no one interacted with the workers, nor did any anyone care about their alleged 
lack of work ethic. The report charged that Charles L. Cabbage and John B. Smith, whom 
the WOPC had banned from the NOP, were actually in charge of the program and 
instructed the Director Charles Ballard in what to do. The intelligence report also 
suggested that NOP employees kicked back portions of their earnings to Smith and 
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Cabbage. James Philips allegedly admitted that NOP field workers “shook down” white 
businessmen in black neighborhoods, with the purpose of raising funds and merchandise 
for NOP, but instead keeping portions of the money for themselves.145
But members of BOP would not allow detractors to paint the entire program as 
unsuccessful. Cabbage admitted that possibly the “overall broad scope” of CUP scared 
some people away from fully supporting the program.
     
146 BOP released a memo 
highlighting the positive impact of the NOP despite budgetary constraints, limited 
resources, and accusations that the organization “bragged about teaching Black 
supremacy and Black separatism.”147
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 Of the $20,000 allocated for the program, $17,000 
went to salaries for the staff and BOP members and affiliates. WOPC also allocated $175 
per month of for the rental of a Ford Mustang for Project Director Charles Ballard to use 
to drive to and from the different neighborhood centers.  In spite of that, BOP believed 
the organization had “made some significant gains in the way of helping poverty stricken 
people of Memphis.” It also outlined the mission for Operation Shoes, Operation 
Clothing, and Operation Culture, three programs the organization created under the 
banner of the NOP to assist in eliminating poverty. Operation Shoes and Clothing 
distributed shoes and clothing to poor children. Operation Culture, “designed to acquaint 
young black children and adults with their heritage and culture,” featured guest speakers 
and black history courses. “The Black man must begin to help himself,” read the memo.  
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“With some financial support from the white community and self-help from the Black 
community the problem and the tension exist[ing] between them could be eased.”148
Many white Memphians still felt uncomfortable with a program funded by their 
tax dollars and operated by Black Power radicals. Technically, the WOPC did not pay for 
office space for the organization, but a Press-Scimitar article titled “WOPC Pays Rent at 
Invaders’ Building,” embellished the relationship between the WOPC and the Invaders. 
The building in question, an old tire shop on 1310 Florida Street, was NOP headquarters 
and doubled as office space for the Invaders. WOPC officials sanctioned the building as 
an office space for the NOP, not as an Invaders headquarters. WOPC officials soon 
discovered membership applications for the Invaders that listed Florida Street as the 
return address. The application encouraged anyone believing in “building Black in your 
community and the total liberation of Black People” to join the Invaders. “There is no age 
group, anyone can join,” the membership application read. Herschel Feibelman 
responded that a person can work for the WOPC and also be “a member of the Invaders,” 
but he insisted that the “NOP is certainly not to be used as headquarters for the 
Invaders.”
  
149  Then, the MPD accused Invaders and NOP employees Oree McKenzie and 
Womax Stevenson of ambushing a police squad car, shooting a police officer, and using 
the building as a meeting place to plan the attack. The claim further complicated the 
perceived relationship between the WOPC and Invaders’ elicit activities.150
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As the late 1960s progressed, tension between the Invaders and the Memphis 
community increased. Invader leadership fluctuated, and organizations under the BOP 
umbrella, such as the Memphis State University Black Student Association, the LeMoyne 
College Intercollegiate chapter of the NAACP, and the City Organizers discontinued their 
affiliations with BOP.151 An  FBI report described the Invaders as “not as communists 
per se, but ‘conniving,’ ‘criminal minded,’ ‘monkey-like,’ ‘sullen,’ ‘loud-mouth’ 
collection of teenage dope heads, ‘movement pimps,’ and ‘Beale Street bums’ who were 
also serious readers of Afro-American literature.”152
 
 The Invaders were Memphis’s 
representation of Black Power in action. To many the Invaders resembled the “Black 
Panthers in California and the Blackstone Rangers in Chicago,” than they did dope heads.  
By 1969 the Invaders promised that the community would see a different side of 
the organization. What started as a subsidiary of BOP became the primary fascination of 
the community. Some in the organization felt as though BOP could never escape the 
stigma of the sanitation strike disturbance. “We were asked to support the sanitation 
strike, and when we did this, we were branded and blown up in print as militants. The 
death of Dr. King didn’t help the morale of the group at all. We had been branded as 
militants, and then we became what they wanted us to be, but that was not our original 
purpose,” an Invader explained.153
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 After the NOP, there was not much investment by the 
white or black community in helping the organization advance its platform. Both the 
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mass-circulation and black press rarely referenced BOP, instead focusing on the Invaders. 
According to FBI intelligence reports, by the spring of 1968, BOP had “degenerated into 
a group of approximately 30 to 35 young Memphis blacks.”154
Paranoid about possible infiltration, especially during leadership voids created by 
arrests or assassination attempts, the organization had always publicly taken the stance 
that the Invaders did not have a leader. “There’s no one leader,” Sweet Willie Wine 
reasoned. “We let everybody know that they’re a leader in their own sense. So this way 
they won’t be worrying about trying to pick me off.”
 After a rash of arrests, the 
Invader leadership took to the press to champion the organization’s past accomplishments 
and promote the new agenda. Lance “Sweet Willie Wine” Watson, once the 
organization’s Prime Minister, replaced Charles Cabbage and Coby Smith as the most 
visible Invader.  
155 The two men instrumental in 
planting the seeds of Black Power in Memphis were no longer at the helm. Cabbage, who 
began as an anti-war activist in Atlanta in 1966, was arrested on charges of draft evasion 
and burglary and possession of a firearm.156 Cabbage received four and a half years in 
prison for the charges.157 Looking back on his Invader experience, Cabbage admitted that 
even though he, Coby Smith, John Smith, and other in others in leadership positions tried 
to maintain order, he had a “hell of a time trying to hold everybody in line.”158
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Coby Smith became a victim of the organization’s increasingly radical posture. 
Some members called Smith “too preppy” and claimed that he did nothing but “make 
speeches.” Younger members were upset by Smith’s refusal to “bust heads.” Seeing how 
far some members had strayed from the original purpose of the organization, Smith 
reminded them that instead of resorting to violence, members had to “use their minds, 
too.” Smith also claimed that he used portions of money saved for college tuition to help 
fund the group and he expected reimbursement from the NOP grant, but “after the money 
came they didn’t want me to have anything.”159
BOP and the Invaders precariously balanced between fighting the system and 
appealing to the system for financial help, further complicating the already murky 
relationship between Black Power and liberalism. Smith unsuccessfully led the 
organization’s attempt to secure a $50,000 grant from the National Council of Churches 
(NCC) for their proposed Memphis Leadership Conference For Black and Poor People. 
The proposal for the six-month program included training 120 young and older adults in 
the areas of: “community organizing, voter registration, use of the vote, political power, 
forms of agitation, propaganda and communications.“ At a meeting with representatives 
for the NCC, BOP once again solicited liberal support. Coby Smith and Louis Welch 
spoke on behalf of the organization asked the NCC for help against the persecution from 
law enforcement and the local press. According to Welch, “No one has said that since the 
assassination of Martin King more than 60 young black men and women have been 
jailed, more than half a million dollars in bond have been assessed, and almost every man 
labeled by the local news media as a ‘black militant’ has been thrown into jail.” Smith 
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appealed to the group’s liberal mission and Christian consciousness. “Our people have 
been jailed on charges ranging from armed robbery and murder to prostitution. We need 
to mobilize every Christian from Billy Graham to Oral Roberts to combat this sort of 
thing…we don’t expect you to fight with us, but if you are Christians, we expect your 
help,” said Smith.160
But the “new Invaders” could not shake the problems that plagued the “old 
Invaders.” After being arrested for allegedly threatening the owner of a neighborhood 
convenience store, Watson fasted at the Shelby County Jail to protest his 
imprisonment.”
 In spite of Welch and Smith’s impassioned pleas, the organization 
did not receive the grant. At the close of the year, Smith, one of the organization’s steady 
leadership examples, left Memphis for New York.  
161 The causes of Watson’s arrests ranged from the Invaders’ involvement 
with protests in Fayette County, Tennessee, and Forrest City, Arkansas, to carrying 
loaded firearms.162
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the organization.163 Watson’s dramatic stance ushered in a period of increased visibility 
and political activity for the Invaders within the more established networks.164
But the arrests of members and associates, not the protests, received the majority 
of the attention. Lewis Welch insisted that the organization had moved “to disassociate 
ourselves with persons who use the Invaders as a base to hide.” Welch continued, “Every 
effort will be made to protect the image of the Invaders as the true representative for the 
downtrodden blacks.”
  
165 As a part of the transformation, when the MPD opened a service 
center in the same building on Florida Street that once served as the site of the NOP, 
several Invaders met with Detective Ed Redditt to lend their support for the center, while 
pledging to engage only in constructive activities. “The Invaders are serious and I believe 
they want to do the right thing…this is a time for community, a time to do things,” 
Redditt told members of the Invaders.166
But the Invaders’ relationship with the established black leadership teetered 
between two statuses: pawns and pariahs. While the organization lent support to the 
campaigns such as union recognition for the striking St. Joseph Hospital workers, the 
NAACP Black Monday protests which demanded more black representation in school 
board and administrative positions, and crusades against racial injustices in Forrest City, 
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and Fayette County the programs created by Invaders received tepid support at best. 
Drawing inspiration from James Meredith’s 1966 March Against Fear, Watson conducted 
his own March Against Fear in 1969 from Forrest City to Little Rock, Arkansas, in 
protest of the horrid living and racial conditions in the region. Watson and several 
members of the Invaders worked with the Arkansas-based Committee for Peaceful 
Coexistence to conduct boycotts to dramatize “the plight of people not only in Forrest 
City but in Eastern Arkansas.”167
In Arkansas Watson and the Invaders found a new cause to champion and a 
community desperate for help in bringing attention to their battle. Many blacks in the city 
welcomed Watson and supported his efforts. When Forrest City police arrested Watson 
on a disorderly conduct charge, Florence Clay, the owner of, a Forrest City Mortuary, 
provided the bail money for the activist’s release.
  
168 Despite pockets of success among 
some of Memphis’s youth, the Invaders never received the same support in Memphis. 
Amid accusations that Watson and the Invaders only sought publicity for their efforts in 
East Arkansas, a Memphis Press-Scimitar article credited Watson with being “the real 
behind-the-scene catalyst,” an accolade the organization rarely received for any of their 
efforts in Memphis.169
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Another program, Operation Breakfast, modeled after the Black Panther Party’s 
Free Breakfast Program, fizzled out before children could benefit from the free meals.170 
An FBI report labeled Operation Breakfast as “racket…pattern[ed] after the Black 
Panther Operation Breakfast program in Oakland, California whereby the Black Panthers 
virtually extorted food and money from merchants in order that they might furnish free 
breakfasts to ghetto children in an effort to win support to their cause and to cover up 
some of their illegal activities.”171 However, in actuality, the Party’s Survival Programs 
were among the organization’s most successful initiatives. With Memphis ranking so 
high on the poverty index, the failure of Operation Breakfast to gain widespread support 




Fascination, curiosity, fear, and disgust encapsulated the way many Memphians 
viewed the Invaders. In many ways, the organization embodied all of those contrasting 
descriptions. Their image was so antithetical to the established black leadership that for 
some young black men, being an Invader became a badge of honor. Yet others were 
repulsed by the organization’s propensity to engage in reckless and criminal behavior. 
Many in Memphis, both white and black, had branded the youth as trouble from their first 
                                                                                                                                                              
group of whites, and arrested, as well as another Invader Eddie Tate who was charged in a 
separate incident with robbery and assault.  
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stint with MAP-South and the WOPC, before they could institute any of their concrete 
objectives. When the opportunity arrived to involve the youth in the NOP, so much had 
transpired between the founding of BOP, the MAP-South controversy in 1967, the 
sanitation strike, and the assassination of Martin Luther King, that the odds of the 
program’s success appeared slim. Yet as Charles Cabbage suggested, “no one ever 
wanted to hear about the structure. They only want to hear about the Invaders because the 
Invaders were really the ones that were kicking up all the dust.”173
Nat D. Williams, WDIA Disc Jockey and journalist, warned those quick to 
dismiss the organization that, “It might be well for the black and white community of 
well wishing people of goodwill in Memphis to take a closer look at the Invaders. They 
may have something more than the muscle to marshal demonstrate parades and the like. 
They may be saying something and standing for something fundamental.”
 When that dust settled, 
Memphis’s liberal establishment did experiment with BOP, the Invaders, and NOP. That, 
too, failed to make a lasting impact, and it failed to institutionalize Black Power and the 
Invaders.  
174
The community ignored Williams’ plea to take a closer look at the Invaders, or 
possibly they took a closer look and were not swayed. BOP’s and the Invaders’ 
involvement with the War on Poverty programs displayed the inability of Black Power to 
penetrate conventional political avenues. After the “One Hot Summer” diversionary 
program, BOP never realized its plan to institute political education courses in addition to 
its black history curriculum, limiting the organization’s ability to make inroads 
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politically. Culturally, however, the program exposed young students to black pride and 





“Why not at LeMoyne-Owen?”: Student Activism and Black Power at LeMoyne-
Owen College 
 
“We, as students of LeMoyne-Owen College have made one of the greatest steps toward 
determining the power of the student body. Are you satisfied with your teachers, our 
learning processes, and so-called great power the administration possesses? We realize 
that in all cases, except the Student Government Association, that the administration has 
the power. Together, we are. Scared, we are not. We want, we obtain. Satisfied, we are 
not.”1
 
—  LeMoyne-Owen Student 
   
November 25, 1968, a night intended to honor Dr. Hollis F. Price, President of 
LeMoyne-Owen College (LOC), the small, private historically black college (HBCU) 
situated in South Memphis, turned into a bittersweet moment.2 Greater Memphis State, 
Incorporated, an organization affiliated with Memphis State University, honored Price as 
a lifelong educator with its coveted “Educator of the Year Award” for his years of service 
and dedication to higher education in Memphis.3 “As a teacher, a dean and a college 
president he has distinguished himself,” read an article in the local paper.4 Born in 
Capahosic, Virginia, Price arrived in Memphis in 1941 and started out as dean of the 
college. Two years later the school’s board appointed Price the first African American 
president of the college.5
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 Price modestly downplayed the paper’s review of his many 
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accolades and acts of service through the years. “I am deeply honored,” said Price. “I 
only hope that during the past years, I have done enough for this community to warrant 
this award.”6
Back at Price’s campus he left a group of rebelling students and non-student 
dissidents who cared little about the president’s accomplishments or his recognition at 
Memphis State. Their immediate concerns centered on their uneasiness with the direction 
of campus politics and their lack of involvement in the decision-making process. Dr. 
Price did not have much time to savor the honor. Immediately after accepting the award, 
he hurried back to LeMoyne-Owen to control an increasingly unstable situation on the 
campus.   
  
A palpable tension existed on campus during the week leading up the president’s 
coronation as Educator of the Year. But true to his reputation among the community and 
the student body, Price believed that he could control of the situation. “I guess I’ll live 
through it,” Price told local reporters when pressed for a response to the circumstances 
unfolding on the normally quiet campus.7
                                                     
6Ibid. 
 “Live,” the operative word in Price’s reply, 
suggested that he understood that in order to move beyond the ruckus he could not idly 
dismiss the students’ grievances – he had to address them, whether he totally believed in 
their validity or not. He needed to manage the emotions of the protesting students and 
temper the influence of outside protestors not enrolled at the college. He knew that his 
reaction determined the future course of campus relations at the school.  
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The student protestors asked:  Why not LeMoyne-Owen? Out of the four college 
campuses located in Memphis, LeMoyne-Owen College, with its emphasis on 
conservative black middle-class values, seemed the least likely to be the first of the city’s 
colleges to join the national wave of campus protests. But the language and attitude of the 
students’ and non-student protestors’ demands mirrored those of Black Power proponents 
at other institutions. Students at LeMoyne-Owen rebelled against a perceived lack of 
respect from instructors, staff, and administration. Engaging in a symbiotic relationship, 
the students and the “outsiders” used each other to further their respective agendas. With 
the “help” of the community’s more outspoken proponents of the Movement - the local 
Black Power organization, the Invaders –the activists worked to change the campus 
dynamics and its relationship with the community. The students, already feeling 
disrespected, saw the Invaders as a means to an end – an instrument to make school 
officials react to their demands.  As a grassroots organization rooted in the community, 
the Invaders felt they had as much stake in the struggle as the students and used the 
opportunity to infiltrate the campus with their brand of Black Power ideology. The group 
urged students to seize the moment and build on the momentum of the burgeoning 
student movement on campuses around the country.  
 
LeMoyne-Owen’s stature as a Historically Black College and its place in the heart 
of South Memphis distinguished it in the mind of the black community from the other 
Memphis schools. For many years, LeMoyne College provided African Americans their 
only opportunity to pursue higher education in Memphis. The school, therefore, 
symbolized much more than simply an institution of higher learning; it represented a 
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source of pride for African Americans in Memphis. “The families…the hardworking 
families, poor, middle class, a few upper class…that’s the type of support the students at 
LeMoyne had during that time,” recalled former LeMoyne-Owen College Senior Class 
President Charles Diggs in characterizing the African American community’s 
commitment to the school.8
  
  
LeMoyne College’s rich tradition of service to Memphis’ black community began 
in 1862 when the American Missionary Association (AMA) dispatched a representative 
to “open an elementary school for ‘Contraband’ Negroes and ‘Freedmen’ at Camp Shiloh 
just below Memphis.” The organization traced its benevolent beginnings to 1839 when a 
group of separate abolitionist societies joined together in support of an insurrection of 
Africans aboard the slave ship Amistad.9  The separate groups merged in 1846 and 
formally incorporated as the American Missionary Association. In addition to their 
abolitionists’ endeavors, the AMA’s mission included political and educational 
opportunities for African Americans. Along with the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands (Freedman’s Bureau), the AMA established black colleges in 
throughout the south.10
The AMA’s desire to assist the Freedmen in their quest for education brought the 
organization to the Memphis area explicitly for that purpose. No institution or association 
needed to convince the masses of African Americans of the importance of an education. 
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African Americans had long valued education and the possibilities it presented. 
Education and the ability to read and write constituted a type of freedom that transcended 
the escape from physical bondage; it also represented a form of mental emancipation for 
African Americans.  
 The small school transitioned from its Camp Shiloh location on the outskirts of 
the city into the city proper in 1863. The move helped to facilitate the rapidly growing 
student body. Similarly, the nation, and the South in particular, found itself in the midst 
of a transition. After the Civil War the nation looked to quickly heal the physical and 
emotional damage between the feuding sections. The Reconstruction period attempted to 
reunite the succeeding southern states back to the Union and to revamp and revive the 
region’s labor system and answer the question: What to do with the newly freed slaves? 
Working with the Freedman’s Bureau, organizations such as the AMA attempted to solve 
the question by focusing on educating the Freedmen.11
By 1866, under the auspices of The Lincoln School, the future LeMoyne College 
continued to grow. The same year the federal government removed the protective 
presence of federal troops; racial violence and riots ensued. Rioters set LeMoyne on fire, 
but the fire did not shake the AMA or the students’ resolve. The AMA reconstructed the 
school shortly thereafter. The enrollment increased to 150 students and six teachers. The 
physical resurgence of the school did not translate into financial health, even with the 
backing of the AMA. A $20,000 gift from physician Francis J. LeMoyne in 1871 fortified 
the school’s place in the city. The school was renamed the LeMoyne Normal and 
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Commercial Institute. The school finally transitioned from its high school status to a full-
fledged four-year institution when it became LeMoyne College in 1934.12
 
  
In 1968 LeMoyne College and Owen Junior College merged their two respective 
institutions. “I will hate to see the school close…[Owen Junior College] has made me 
realize what it means to have a friend, and I realize how many I have now,” expressed 
Miss Owen Junior College Patricia McWright.13 McWright worried that closing the 
junior college would leave her and other students without an educational alternative. 
Skeptical of her ability to get into Memphis State after the merger, she expressed an 
interest in attending another historically black institution, Tennessee State University in 
Nashville. With the inevitability of the LeMoyne and Owen merger looming, she 
questioned the motives of those in charge of keeping the school viable, especially its 
sponsor, the Tennessee Baptist Church Convention. “It is one thing I would like to 
know,” inquired McWright, “all the ministers that are supposed to be supporting this 
school, what do they do with the money, where does it go?”14
The institution struggled financially after a dormitory and a main building on 
campus caught fire in January of 1967.
  
15
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also served as a dormitory.16 The blaze displaced students living on campus and 
destroyed the school’s main hall. With finances at a premium, Owen President Dr. 
Charles Dinkins hoped for assistance from the federal government to repair the damaged 
buildings. Dinkins also blamed the increased cost of yearly operations and maintenance 
for the school’s need to even consider the merger.17
LeMoyne’s president cited “improvement…[the desire to] strengthen academic 
programs, improve facilities, and increase student services,” as primary reasons that the 
schools decided to join forces.
 For Owen, a merger made fiscal 
sense. The schools began discussing the proposed union in the spring of 1967.   
18 In a Commercial Appeal article, both presidents found 
themselves explaining the merger and defending the relevance of black colleges in 
general. As boundaries tumbled, black students found the opportunities to attend 
predominately white institutions increase. While black colleges provided nurturing and 
protection from society’s corrosive racial elements, they lacked the resources of many of 
their white equivalents. Black students themselves began to question the politics of 
HBCUs. Viewing the schools as out of touch with the realities of contemporary black 
life, students attending historically black schools challenged their institutions to “become 
actively involved in the drive to liberate and empower African Americans.”19
LeMoyne, and to a lesser extent Owen, found itself in competition with Memphis 
State, though neither side acknowledged it. Black colleges were valuable resources, 
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contended Price, and the merger increased the effectiveness and attractiveness of both 
schools. Owen President Charles Dinkins furthered defended the validity and necessity of 
historically black schools. “You can’t look at Negro colleges as a class,” Dinkins 
explained, “They run the spectrum from good to bad. Negroes have pride in their 
colleges…you can’t decry these services just because the colleges aren’t second 
Harvards.” Pedigree and prestige, he argued, could not and did not always determine the 
quality of education.20
Officials decided to merge without much student or community input. During a 
time when students all around the nation demanded a larger role in determining the 
direction of their institution, Owen students, like Patricia McWright, expected 
administrators to solicit their input. Beyond those expectations, the students recognized 
Owen’s importance. “This’ll knock a lot of people out of their education,” insisted Owen 
Student Government President Charles Turner.
  
21 As a voice for the student body, Turner 
relayed the students’ angst over the merger. Most students attended Owen in the first 
place because of tougher admission standards at LeMoyne, Memphis State, and other 
four-year institutions.22
The unification process did not happen smoothly. Initially school officials 
targeted completion of the merger by the fall semester of 1967. However, they soon 
realized that deciding on specifics of the move proved more difficult than originally 
planned. Both sides worked diligently on the logistics, but an important question 
  
                                                     
20“‘Improvement’ is Goal in LeMoyne and Owen Merger Plan,” Memphis Commercial 




22“LeMoyne and Owen Discuss Merger,“ Memphis Press-Scimitar, May 5, 1967.  
162 
 
remained: How would the school absorb the 400-plus Owen students?  Trustees of both 
schools questioned if they could smoothly exchange faculty, or if they could move all 
their cultural events and programs to one campus. “We decided there are a lot of 
problems involved in meshing two institutions smoothly,” Dr. Price explained. “If you 
rush it, you do a bum job.”23
On May 6, 1967, a year before the school unification, approximately 100 students 
voiced their displeasure with the merger.
 Also, because of LeMoyne’s long-standing status in the 
community, would the merger be equitable? In light of those issues, officials postponed 
the merger a year, although a $10,000 grant from the United States Office of Education 
awarded to Owen eased some of the financial burden.  
24 Despite the students’ passion, school officials 
virtually ignored their show of discontent. A year later and closer to the actual merge 
date, the students staged another protest. This time they took their grievances directly to a 
meeting of the Tennessee Baptist Missionary and Educational Convention, where board 
members convened to vote on whether or not to continue with the proposed merger.25 
“Owen is fulfilling a unique function,” remarked Owen student, local Black Power 
activist, and member of the Invaders, John B. Smith. “It provides educational 
opportunities to many black students who would not be able to meet the entrance 
requirements at LeMoyne or Memphis State.”26
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Smith also questioned LeMoyne’s ability and desire to accept all of the Owen 
students, but Dr. Price promised that current Owen students in good standing who wanted 
to transfer could do so without penalty.27 “It is the overall common good for LeMoyne to 
merge with Owen. The merger will give us a broader base of support and provide an 
opportunity to be of larger service to the community,” said Price.28 For the long term, 
however, the students suggested that if the merger happened, the state should seriously 
consider creating another junior college in Memphis.29 Despite the students’ efforts – 
Smith declared that a yes vote by the board was akin to “tampering with our future” – the 
governing body of Owen Junior College pledged their support for the union.30 
Conversely, the merger did not seem to faze LeMoyne College students. Possibly the 
students realized, the move was a “merger” in name only. “Students at LeMoyne didn’t 
care one way or the other. It was more of an issue for Owen,” recalled Charles Diggs.31 
LeMoyne students’ only concern was the possibility of an overcrowded campus.32
In June 1968, Owen held its last commencement exercise and graduated the 
largest class in the brief history of the school.
  
33
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College] started 14 years ago with 33 pilot students and a loan of $500,” President 
Dinkins told the graduates.34 More than 4000 students attended Owen during its 
existence. Though Dinkins praised the school for its impact in the city, he argued still that 
a transformation in the local educational landscape necessitated the merger of the 
schools. Owen Junior College, Dinkins suggested, “had begun to feel the impact of 
change.”35 All of Owen’s assets, physical and financial, were transferred to LeMoyne in 
the merger.36 The commencement had a two-fold purpose: it ushered its graduates into 




“The students mean business,” reported a Tri-State Defender editorial on the state 
of student-faculty-administration relations across the country. The weekly regional paper, 
which serviced Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas, often published editorial pieces 
outside of the usual local and regional news reports. The commentary in the editorial did 
not blindly condemn campus radicals or criticize the right of students to protest. Instead 
the author chose to focus on the most constructive aspects of campus protest. The 
editorial praised student councils and government associations for the organized manner 
in which they challenged authority on their respective campuses. Students across the 
nation, the article suggested, grew tired of pacifying tactics of administrations who 
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allowed them “sitting-in privileges at faculty meetings;” they demanded instead a 
“greater say in policy-making.” Colleges invited extremism, the author reasoned, by not 
listening to the reasonable request of students. At this point, campus upheavals were 
happening around the nation. Yet at press time, Memphis had yet to feel the sting of 
student dissent. Soon it would.38
 LeMoyne-Owen’s special events committee, aided by the student government 
association, attempted to exercise some independence with its Inquiry Week program.
 
39 
A new idea and very much in line with the students’ desire for more control, the 
committee invited local and national speakers to the campus to “discuss current issues of 
the day.”40
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 As one of the first major programs since the merger, the decision to initiate a 
program such as Inquiry Week reflected a heightened level of consciousness among the 
student body and to some degree, the faculty and administration. They invited an array of 
speakers with different backgrounds and ideological viewpoints on the racial issues of the 
day. The new head of the Memphis branch of the NAACP, Reverend Ezekiel “Zeke” 
Bell, delivered a speech. Zeke Bell, a fiery Presbyterian minister, differed from the past 
NAACP leadership. Bell was not a part of the upper crust of Memphis’s black society, 
yet he rose to leadership in the organization because he reflected the branch’s new, more 
radical reality. Former LeMoyne College student leader Marion Barry also returned to 
Memphis at the students’ invitation, reinforcing the connection between the civil rights 
leader’s activist beginnings at the college and his grassroots leadership on the political 
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scene in Washington, DC. “We knew of his [Marion Barry] history with the sit-ins and 
integrating the public libraries,” explained Charles Diggs.41 In many ways Barry 
personified the national student movement to the students. Barry’s speech, “So you’re a 
College Student and you have a Right – A Right to What?” showed his connections to his 
student activist past.42
But it was a November 15 speech by BOP cofounder and Invader Coby Smith that 
caught the attention of the Memphis Bureau of Investigation. Smith, a recent college 
graduate, provided a unique viewpoint that neither Bell nor Barry could give. Smith 
spoke to the students specifically about their role and responsibility as black students in 
the current local movement. The FBI had been targeting BOP on a limited scale since its 
inception in 1967. The national office’s Counter Intelligence Program, code named 
COINTELPRO, monitored the activities of any and every so-called subversive 
organization, individual, or movement, including, and most particularly, civil rights and 
Black Power activists.
 The speech intended to provoke the students to think deeper about 
their responsibility as college students, especially as more and more students demanded 
power.  
43
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 In a report that detailed the Inquiry Week activities and the 
movements of the “subversives” involved, local Bureau agents claimed that Smith’s talk 
provoked the students. Smith, the Bureau reported, “told the students they were not doing 
enough and that they should initiate some action to assert their independence of the 
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The 1968 Inquiry Week festivities ended on such a high note that organizers 
began to plan for the following year.
 BOP believed in the same “move or get moved over” attitude 
that many Black Power advocates of the day embodied. The group’s more virulent call 
for action coincided with their view of their responsibility as the city’s sole purveyor and 
defender of Black Power ideology. While it is hard to determine how much of an 
impression Smith’s Inquiry Week speech left with the students, or if it indeed provoked 
the students as the FBI claimed, Smith did force the students to think closely about their 
responsibilities as college students.  
45 “The committee is very proud of the students’ 
response to this week of activities,” expressed LeMoyne-Owen Student Center Head 
Dorothy Harris.46
Tensions, however, bubbled beneath the surface during the week of activities. The 
Memphis field office noted dissension among several in the school’s older student 
population.
  The open format encouraged students to not sit idly and listen, but to 
question the speakers. Conceptually, Inquiry Week succeeded because it allowed the 
students an opportunity to express themselves in an open forum and challenge the views 
of established civic and community leaders.  
47
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 Older students often took advantage of cheaper tuition and relaxed 
admissions standards by taking classes at Owen. With the merger of the schools, it was 
 
45“‘Inquiry Week Gains Students’ Approval,” Tri-State Defender, November 23, 1968. 
 
46“Inquiry Week at LeMoyne-Owen Holds Attention,” Memphis World, November 23, 
1968.  
 
47“Invaders” LeMoyne-Owen Disturbance, “FBI Memo Racial Matters 157-1067-569-
157-1067-633” (Memphis, Tennessee November 23, 1968). 
168 
 
not uncommon to see older and younger students comingling on the same campus. 
Younger students joined with the older students to lodge complaints with Dr. Price 
“seeking better food in the school cafeteria, cheaper food prices, more off campus 
activities to be permitted on campus, and greater student participation in the overall 
operation of the school.”48 They also demanded longer hours for certain buildings on 
campus, improvement to facilities, a more favorable grade point scale, improved 
bookstore, more black history courses, lower tuition, additional campus police, 
establishment of on-campus health services, and optional, not required, attendance at 
assemblies.49  Dr. Price planned to retire from his post as school president at the year’s 
end. The students, fearful of the trustees handpicking another “company man” to replace 
Price, wanted to help name his successor. 50
Some of the students’ complaints also questioned the fiscal responsibility of the 
school and its trustees. “The students are charged high tuition and have to go to class in a 
garage-type building,” some complained.
 
51
                                                     
48Ibid. 
  In a larger show of discontent during the 
week, the students boycotted all of the campus facilities that needed money – their money 
– to operate. They neglected the vending machines in the student areas, avoided the 
cafeteria, and even stopped using the pay phones. These simple moves proved powerful 
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enough to gain the administration’s attention.52 Some promoted the idea of a non-violent 
Black Power. Instead of revolutionary nationalism, some African Americans advocated 
control of the “economic, education, and political institutions” in their communities.53
The boycott of the facilities put the faculty, staff and administration on notice. 
The students asked for small concessions from the administration, but at a time when 
many campuses railed by protest, not every student protesting perceived injustices 
claimed to be a radical, and not all campus disturbances centered on anti-war and civil 
rights disparities. Even if students championed other causes, they also gravitated toward 
issues personal to their campus experience. The mild demands of the LOC students 
reflected that reality. They simply called for respect and recognition, or as a handwritten 
proposal described, “an equilibrium of power between the administration and the 
students.”
 
The boycott placed pressure on Price to act swiftly and the students threatened to respond 
more aggressively if he did not. 
54
On November 21, the students planned a sit-down protest in the halls of the 
administration building, Brownlee Hall, to demand that the administration make 
 It was one thing to call for a larger hand in deciding their own fate, but a 
demand for an equal share of power with the administration was an unrealistic request 
even in the best of circumstances. If the administration and staff questioned anything, it 
was not the students’ ambitiousness.  
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changes.55 Again, they demanded that Dr. Price respond immediately to their concerns. 
Price argued that he was in no position to do so.56 In response, students took turns sitting 
in the unoccupied seats in the waiting area outside of the president’s office.57 Alternating 
bodies, the students protested without missing class, showing their commitment to their 
education while adhering to certain procedures in order to get the respect they sought. “I 
told them [the students] to stay in class…I didn’t want them thinking we were cutting 
class,” recalled Charles Diggs.58
Throughout the day the students continued their protest, content to gain the 
attention of the administration without causing a major disruption. Some students 
remembered the activism of past LeMoynites and how they achieved success in their 
movement. “A lot of things they did made it so when I was in high school we could go to 




A handwritten manifesto entitled “Force and Power (A Senior’s Comment)” 
circulated throughout the campus. The unnamed senior, who called himself “ignorant and 
oppressed,” accused the administration of sealing “my mouth with their threats and 
 The protest continued, quietly, without much fanfare, and seemingly 
without much acknowledgement from anyone in authority.   
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nonchalantness.”60 The senior’s accusation did not mark the first time that students 
charged the administration with not taking their cause seriously. “I have potential power, 
but it has been confiscated. I am Black, but I’m being white indoctrinated,” the student 
maintained in another claim against the perception that the school did not promote or 
encourage enough black cultural values.61
I. Use of facilities at all times 
 The document also formally outlined the 
students’ grievances: 
II. More Black Curriculum 
III. Bookstore (More contemporary books) 
IV. More courtesy from the business office 
V. Use of student lounge  
VI. Knowledge of qualifications of new president 
VII. Health Services (more availability of health services on campus) 
VIII. Lowering of tuition 
IX. Allocation of activity fee  
X. Improved dormitory facilities for athletes  
XI. More campus police  
 
Preaching unity and black awareness while calling for an educational revolution, the 
document proclaimed that the students realized that together they could change their lot. 
“We all have proved to the administration, faculty, and to ourselves that we are 
Together,” the student stressed.62
Much to the dismay of the administration, outside elements joined the students’ 
cause. On the afternoon of the initial protest, the FBI reported spotting Invader Lance 
“Sweet Willie Wine” Watson and several members of the organization on the campus 
 Still, the students felt they lacked respect from the 
faculty and administration, as well as a voice in the decision-making process.  
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talking with LeMoyne-Owen students. Although Watson and many of the Invaders grew 
up near the campus and were products of the South Memphis community, administrators 
did not welcome their involvement. “We had Lance (Sweet Willie Wine) Watson and 
some Black United Front (a militant Black Power Group) are talking to the students,” 
lamented Dr. Price.63 While the students hoped to prove a point, so did the Invaders. 
Some students voiced concerns about the aggressive approach of the Invaders. Though 
they wanted change on campus, many LOC students believed that Dr. Price treated the 
students fairly. Charles Diggs specifically remembered Dr. Price soliciting his advice on 
what the students wanted. He remembered telling Price, “We are the future leaders of this 
nation and we want to be respected by the people that are running this college.”64
Understandably, Price worried about the influence the group could have on the 
students. Many of the city’s young black men rebuffed the more conservative politics of 
the NAACP and the various ministerial alliances. They gravitated toward the 
organization’s more radical ideology. Some of those same men attended LeMoyne-Owen 
College. Watson believed it was their responsibility to help the students, out of loyalty to 
their community, as a voice for the underrepresented. Coby Smith and other Invaders 
held a meeting with some of the students to lend support, and to also stoke the fire of an 
already uncomfortable situation.  
 
Some students welcomed the support of the more militant group. Putting a more 
aggressive face on the situation, they argued, could only speed up the process and show 
their seriousness to the administration. Senior Class President Charles Diggs argued that 
the students could hide behind the actions of the Invaders. He said, “without telling them, 
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you can get people to do things you can’t do.”65
Donald Stone, reportedly a field representative for the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), replied, ‘”this [situation] is small and a black 
revolution is going on all over the United States and you will need help of the 
outsiders.’”
 However, that stance applied to the 
Watson and the Invaders as well. If the Invaders helped the students to gain the attention 
of the administration, the students in return gave the Invaders a platform to advocate their 
Black Power agenda. When some students began to insist that they did not need outside 
help, members of the Invaders pushed back. The FBI, having already infiltrated the group 
with an informant of its own, reported on the closed-door meeting. According to their 
report, a student suggested, probably sensing trouble, that LeMoyne could handle the 
problem internally and did not need the interference of the Black Power group.  
66 Reportedly, Watson responded more aggressively and definitively: “‘We 
are the Invaders and the black people’s army. We are going to help you whether you want 
us to or not.’”67 Rumors circulated that an Invader pulled a gun and fired shots toward the 
dissenting students.68 But a few students agreed with Stone and asked the Invaders to stay 
and help.69
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 Though he did not agree with the more radical approach, Diggs recalled 
respecting the Invaders’ stance simply because, “they had what it took to get up in their 
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[the administration’s] face.”70 Early on the morning of November 25, students ran 
through the hallways and into classes in an effort to cause a disruption and get the 
campus’s attention. Several students sat down in the hallways to impede the movement of 
anyone who ventured outside the classrooms. The LeMoyne-Owen situation prompted 
support from other student organizations. White students at Memphis State University 
attempted to establish a chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) on the 
campus with no success, but a local city chapter emerged in 1968 and many Memphis 
State students held membership.71
 
 SDS members, along with Memphis State Black 
Student Association members, aligned themselves with the Black Organizing Project. 
They met at Memphis State University to discuss the events unfolding at the South 
Memphis campus to discuss if they could help.  
LOC students moved beyond hallway hijinks to more aggressive tactics. They had 
already determined that some sort of campaign to disrupt the normalcy of day-to-day 
operations, even on a small scale, could get the attention of the administration, faculty, 
and staff. A spokesman for the group “insisted that violence would not be tolerated and 
instructed the group that if police disturbed their sit-in not to resist arrest and proceed to 
jail in an orderly manner.”72
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students’ concerns. The students’ threat of more intense action if they did not return with 
an immediate response loomed over the proceedings.73 Faculty obviously did not heed 
the threat, nor did they feel intimidated. “We were upset because the faculty had belittled 
our grievances,” explained a student, “They came out of the meeting and said they were 
laughing at our demands, but to us this was a very serious thing.”74
About 4:00 on the afternoon of November 25, LeMoyne-Owen students, along 
with members of the Invaders, some members of SDS, and the Memphis State BSA, 
began to gather around Brownlee Hall, the administration building and main campus 
hub.
 No school that 
experienced any campus upheaval during the 1960s and 1970s took kindly to disorder 
and chaos from student dissidents, but for a small black school, any deviation of the 
schedule or destruction of resources could cause more setbacks and problems than at the 
larger majority white universities.  
75 Months earlier at Columbia University, black and white students seized buildings 
on the campus in an effort to advert the university’s planned expansion into a nearby 
Harlem park.76
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 At Columbia students strategically captured two of the school’s more 
important buildings, Hamilton Hall and Low Library. Though neither the LeMoyne-
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campus, the tenuous mix of young activists using one protest to promote their respective 
agendas resembled the situation at Columbia. 
While the students gathered outside of Brownlee Hall, faculty and administration 
continued their discussion of the students’ demands in the library. The students’ opening 
salvo in the hallways did little to garner sympathy from the faculty and administration. 
“There is a procedure for orderly change, the students could have followed it rather than 
submit the demands…they just think their voice can’t be heard, but it can,” Price 
assured.77 Many students reasoned, however, the matter was not as simple as Price 
proposed. “We’re fighting for something we believe in,” declared one student.78 
Dissenters had an overwhelming sense that they did not have the respect of the faculty, 
even during times that the campus life ran smoothly and everyone co-existed peacefully. 
The students’ claimed they received at best only “half-hearted” respect and support from 
the faculty.79 But Price pointed out that the students enjoyed more freedom, expression, 
and privileges than they acknowledged. “Students are on every college committee except 
one and have a student council,” he explained.80
Stressing the community nature of the school, the students argued that the 
LeMoyne-Owen family consisted not only of the faculty, staff, administration, and the 
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student body, but the “physical neighbors of LeMoyne-Owen College.”81 One of the 
students’ demands included their physical neighbors, the residents of the nearby public 
housing development LeMoyne Gardens. They not only demanded that the school open 
up facilities for later hours, but also they wanted facilities such as the swimming pool 
made available for community use.82 “Students want a closer alignment between the 
campus and the community. They want all facilities to be open to the community, allow 
the public to attend social functions,” explained psychology instructor William 
Zachary.83 Ever the pragmatist, Dr. Price wondered how they could open the pool to the 
children of LeMoyne Gardens and ensure their safety.84  Students instead insisted that 
class bias, not safety, motivated Price to keep the pool closed to the neighborhood kids. 
Price, the students alleged, would not open the pool because he felt the “black kids of 
LeMoyne Gardens are too dirty to swim in the pool at the college.”85
Certainly the inclusion of the surrounding community became integral to the 
cause. Invaders leader Lance Watson walked through LeMoyne Gardens hoping to get 
help from its residents.
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The students and their supporters barricaded the doors of Brownlee Hall, using 
rope to secure the doors. They allowed the switchboard operator and other officials inside 
to leave.87 Despite the alleged mocking of their demands by faculty, students defended 
their need to protest. “The quality of the education we receive is our primary concern,” 
one student conveyed, “This is not my personal fight; it involves all students.”88
The escalation of the protests did not sway the unconvinced. Faculty returned 
from their meeting only to find that they were persona non-grata at the administration 
building. In the meeting the faculty decided that some of the students’ requests had 
validity; others, they would refer to a “steering committee” for a final decision.
 In spite 
of that assertion, not all students, even those sympathetic to the cause, joined in the battle.  
89 
Refusing the faculty entry into Brownlee Hall not only challenged the authority of the 
faculty, but also placed the students in a position of power. The physical barricade 
complicated matters, as did the approaching Thanksgiving break, as well as the school’s 
scheduled payday. Whether strategically planned or not, blocking the doors on payday 
further frustrated the school’s personnel.90
Two hours had passed since students, Invaders, and other supporters had secured 
Brownlee Hall. An FBI source reported that a few Invaders left LeMoyne-Owen and 
headed for their office at Clayborne Temple AME Church around 6:30 p.m. to retrieve 
guns. Watson, the informant reported, suggested that they surround the perimeter of the 
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school in case any police approached, so they would be ready to defend themselves.91 
The informant’s report backed up the FBI’s claim that the SDS and Invaders looked to 
use the LeMoyne-Owen situation as a way to enhance their own standing in the city and 
among the more radical and militant organizations nation-wide. Indeed, the Invaders 
looked to capitalize on the situation and aggressively spread their Black Power ideology, 
though not maliciously or in an attempt to “brainwash” the LeMoyne-Owen students, as 
the FBI suggested.92
Dr. Price approached the building prepared to reason with the students without 
police interference. He conceded, however, that the students “don’t have much faith in 
my talk.”
 Ultimately, whether or not one agreed with the group’s approach, 
their concern for the black community never wavered.  
93 Earlier, Price and school personnel asked detectives from the Memphis Police 
Department (MPD) to run the outsiders off campus, but the MPD explained that they 
could not just run them off; they had to arrest those responsible. Price refused to have the 
police officially arrest the students involved. “This is tragedy enough,” he said.94 With 
rumors of protestors holding guns, Price feared that having the police clear the building 
would aggravate an already hostile situation. He would have to “find another way” to 
reach the students.95
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About forty or fifty on-lookers gathered around Brownlee Hall. The president 
talked briefly with students, but gained no headway with the protestors, since he could 
not assure then that he and the staff would agree to all of their demands.96 He slipped the 
students a note that asked them to consider meeting with the administration.97 Rumors 
circled that SDS members planned to “hold key faculty members and LeMoyne 
administrators as captives inside the library building” if faculty members and 
administrators failed to properly address the grievances.98 Intelligence reports from the 
local FBI office often sprinkled kernels of truth around exaggerated rumors and hearsay. 
The LeMoyne-Owen situation, with its seemingly spontaneous origins, made it harder to 
determine exactly what was happening on the campus. However, students did warn the 
staff, “if you come in, you don’t go out.”99
 
 
“When I have a problem, I work on it and do the best I can. I know the answers I 
get won’t be perfect,” a Price told a Memphis Press-Scimitar.100 Price was often cited as 
a visionary for the education of African Americans in Memphis. He used that same 
resolve to help end the situation on his own campus.101
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returned to LeMoyne-Owen at about 9:30 p.m., the situation in Brownlee Hall remained 
unresolved and the stalemate continued. Dr. Price seemed reluctant to indict the staff or 
fully condemn the students despite their actions. “They’ve been protesting the sins of the 
administration,” he explained in response to the students’ qualms.102
The administration and faculty mistakenly thought the standoff would end before 
nightfall. Price feared “major difficulty” if the students stayed in the building all night.
 While some students 
applauded Price’s fairness, others felt invalidated and marginalized. Price touted an open 
door policy whereby students did not need to protest, but some students still believed that 
they would only gain a voice and respect through drastic actions.  
103 
Duty called faculty back to the campus, while students and non-student supporters stood 
firm in Brownlee Hall overnight. They roamed the hallways and did not enter the offices, 
though surely the temptation hovered. Ignoring the initial warning to stay out, Price, 
along with a photographer and Reverend Malcolm Blackburn of Clayborne Temple 
African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, entered the building through the basement 
door and remained there to deal with the situation personally. One protestor stood guard 
at the door at all times.104
Lance Watson pressed for Price to “sign an agreement granting all grievances,” 
which Price refused to do. 
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Memphis Fire and Police Departments, that he was safe. Price continued unsuccessfully 
until about 11 o’clock that night to persuade the students and others to leave the building, 
warning that he would make a decision in the morning on whether or not to call for their 
arrest.106
Obviously upset with the pace of the administration’s deliberations, the protesters 
switched strategies. During the night students left and entered the building, which 
contributed to disjointed leadership and an abrupt change in tactics. It is unclear who was 
in charge, Invaders or students. The FBI believed that Watson and the Invaders, as well 
as SDS, used the students as pawns in their plans to wreak havoc on the campus. 
Intelligence reports charged SDS, and the Invaders with using the students and taking the 
demonstration away from them. SDS, already in a fight to gain a charter at Memphis 
State, pulled out either during the night or the early morning of the standoff, in order not 
to further “hurt their image in Memphis.” By 10:00 the next morning the protest spread 
from Brownlee Hall to include the science building and the Co-op building. Protestors 
halted all communications to the school, since the administration building housed the 
school’s switchboard.
  
107 Brownlee Hall, a symbol of repression in the eyes of the 
rebelling students, was now designated a “liberated area.”108
                                                                                                                                                              
“verbally intimidate” Hollis Price into agreeing to demands as well as not pressing charges 
against those involved.  
 Self-determination and 
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less focused on the Movement’s principles, as in the case of some of the students, 
acknowledged the importance of having a voice in determining their own state of affairs.  
 
At LeMoyne-Owen the issues of blackness, community, and power permeated 
discussions between the Invaders and students. Although some students solicited the 
Invaders for help, they did not predict that the situation would progress so quickly. Some 
students felt that they made their point to the administration, and now they should work 
out their issues. Protestors draped what they called the Black Flag of America outside of 
the administration building.  Lance Watson described the significance of the flag: 
The black background represented the black people of America united and the 
triangular red tips on each side represent the blood that black men shed in the past 
struggles for freedom. A gold horseshoe-shaped fig leaf wreath represents the 
virtue food of Africa. Inside the wreath is a Monarch sword, once used by the 
Moors in Africa. 109
 
 
Along with the liberated zone designation, the flag visually denoted the attempt to 
transition the “Negro” campus to a “Black” campus in thought and orientation. Watson 
walked from occupied building to occupied building displaying the flag in an effort to 
rally the troops. Dr. Price diplomatically called for an early morning meeting with the 
faculty that this time included student leaders. Students reiterated their complaints, but 
also included smaller issues. Charles Diggs remembered being charged with lab fees even 
when not enrolled in lab. Students could appeal to Price’s logic, Diggs suggested.110
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was not satisfied with the school’s direction. “I’ll tell you one thing, “ the freshman said, 
“a lot of changes have to be made.”111
The press was alerted to the escalation of the situation. They initially did not 
cover the build-up to the administration building occupation in any depth. The situation 
remained underground and private until the Invaders became integrally involved. When 
the city’s media outlets showed up to the school to report on the situation, the students 
did not greet them too kindly. The private school preferred to keep the matter private. 
The Student Council President, Donnell Cobbins, explained, “students had not intended 
that internal matters they were seeking to have solved on campus should be aired in the 
news media.”
 
112 They did not want or solicit the help of outsiders. Though students had 
the right to be angry, Price reasoned, the influence of outsiders created confusion.113 
“Some outsiders had talked to the students before we could,” said Cobbins, obviously 
annoyed at the circus unfolding on the normally quiet campus.114 Nevertheless the press 
continued to roll the cameras and jot notes, much to the dismay of the students. Chants of 
“the press has got to go” reverberated around Brownlee Hall.115
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not going to make bums of us,” the student yelled.116 Another student went as far so to 
rip up the notes of one CBS reporter. Watson yelled that he would “have the reporter’s 
head.”117
With most of the students fatigued and ready for some sense of normalcy to 
return, campus leaders again met with school officials to bring an end to the drawn-out 
and over-dramatized affair. “Demonstrations to show dissatisfaction with the policies of 
LeMoyne-Owen College have been met with some effort for settlement by the faculty,” 
read a prepared statement by the student representatives.
 When they asked the reporter to leave the campus, he did so with no hesitation. 
Internally they may not have agreed with the direction of the protest, or whether to even 
protest at all, but the students did not welcome the presence of the media; instead they 
looked to end the situation.  
118 In a four-hour meeting 
intended to clear the air, more confusion seeped in. Some students became upset when 
Price chose only a few campus leaders to attend the meeting. 119
To whom exactly did the title “campus leaders” refer to? The students who 
officially held positions in student government, or the students directly involved in the 
 Additionally, the 
students asked the Invaders to leave in order to allow the meeting to take place. Senior 
Class President Charles Diggs and Student Council President Donnell Cobbins, not 
among those camped out in Brownlee Hall, attended the closed-door meeting with Price 
and faculty.  
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protest? The two groups were not always one and the same. Not every student protested, 
and those that did wanted to be included in the closed-door meeting. They were not 
included when the sides sat down at the bargaining table. Nevertheless, the two sides 
reached a tentative agreement. Among the demands met, officials voted to “open to 
students a special dining area and lounge to the student center…return to the students a 
student lounge in Brownlee Hall, which several weeks ago was converted into office 
space and record room.”120 That school officials used a student-designated space for their 
own needs without consulting the student body seemed, on the surface, a petty issue. Yet 
it resulted in a breach of respect that had spilled over into the weeklong protests.  In 
addition to the agreement to open more areas, Price supported the students’ desire for 
more black history courses, better dormitory facilities for athletes, and a larger bookstore. 
In the end school officials agreed to meet most of the demands, but also decided they 
needed to meet again to iron out details.121
As a sign of good faith the students huddled together and came to a decision to 
release the three buildings around 1:30 p.m. on November 26. The siege had lasted 
almost twenty-hours.
  
122 “We’re pulling out now,” LeMoyne-Owen student and protestor 
Franketta Guinn replied. “We’ll give the administration until Monday to meet our 
demands.”123
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attempt to equitably adjust the grievances and bring back a final report to the students 
when class resumed on December 2.”124 Dr. Price charged committees comprised of 
students and faculty with the task of working together to mend the wounds. Cooperation 
between faculty and students, some students argued, had not happened much before that 
time. “There has been a lack of communication between students and faculty and among 
students themselves. Now we know how to talk to each other,” said a student 
representative.125
The administration, staff, and student committees did not invite the Invaders – the 
“People’s Army,” as they dubbed themselves – to the table to work out the final 
negotiation with the students and school officials. The Invaders urged the students to 
stand firm and stay in the building until the administration met all of their demands. 
When the students asked the Invaders to leave, effectively splitting what was left of the 
already fractured coalition between the students, Invaders, SDS, and other supporters, the 
group did not take too kindly to the dismissal.
  
126
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their involvement was no longer needed their involvement. A heated verbal exchanged 
ensued, the students explained to the police, and shots followed.127
“We couldn’t just let them run us [Invaders] off. It would cost us some support,” 
an FBI informant reported overhearing Lance Watson say. The Invader leader, however, 
claimed that the LeMoyne-Owen students attacked first and pulled guns on him and the 
other Invaders. They only returned gunfire, he argued, because the students fired shots.
  
128 
The organization and their unsteady reputation in Memphis caused some students to 
question their presence. “A number of us were pursuing a different course of action,” a 
student said when questioned about the role of the Invaders in the protest, “But I think the 
student body is more united now.”129 Others argued that LeMoyne-Owen needed a 
revolution of some sort and appreciated the Invaders serving as a conduit. “Students 
around the country are moving in this direction,” stated a student-penned position 
paper.130
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campus. “This is a community college,” a sympathetic student explained, “They had as 
much right here as the newsmen.”131
The students’ divergent viewpoints mirrored arguments of more well-known 
proponents and opponents of the Black Power Movement. Some believed that the Black 
Freedom Movement, in order to continue to build upon the promise of the gains with the 
passing of the major civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s, had to increase the pressure 
and make it happen “by any means necessary,” a phrase made popular by Malcolm X.
  
132 
These same arguments played out the smaller stage at LeMoyne-Owen College. “We 
tried to speed up improvements…to bring things to the attention of the administration,” a 
student claimed.133 Others called the occupation of the administration building a means to 
an end. Over forty years after the incident, Charles Diggs remembered using the protests 
as a tactic. “We got mad one day. So we got their attention …when it got down to it,” he 
explained.134
Though the faculty and the administration sat down to discuss the problems with 
the students and agreed to most of the changes, the attitude still remained among officials 
that the protest was an unnecessary and unfortunate event. “They didn’t think the 
demands warranted the extent of the demonstrations…most of the demands were 
reasonable, and we were meeting most of them. I don’t see why the students should have 
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gotten so upset,” claimed one professor.135 The climate of 1968 probably did as much to 
amplify the issues as the actual problems themselves did. Campuses around the nation 
and the country exploded, exposing students at smaller schools like LeMoyne-Owen to 
the impact of student power. Psychology instructor William Zachary placed the students’ 
grievances in perspective, considering all the campus turmoil during 1968: the demands 
were “all valid…and not as dramatic as the student demands at other colleges.”136
The school did not punish or prosecute any one involved. 
 
137 School began again 
on December 2 and the staff/administration committee met with the student council to 
finalize the agreement.138 The committee and the council agreed to all of the demands 
with the exception of two: lower tuition and public dances on campus.139 In the matter of 
lower tuition, the administration informed the students that the board of trustees had to 
make that decision. Recent attempts to open up the dances had resulted in damage to the 
campus and the administration argued could ill afford to have facilities on the small 
campus destroyed.140
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pool for neighborhood use, but several other issues met the committee’s approval, 
including abolishment of required assemblies, opening the gym for student use, 
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not guarantee that demand), and improvement of the food.141 Price informed the students 
that he would consult the student body about hiring his replacement and that the school 
would exercise more transparency with student fees.142 He also reiterated his 
commitment to honor the students’ wishes for more black curricula. In an effort to 
facilitate the request, he pledged to send a student delegation to an African and African-
American Studies Conference at Atlanta University. LeMoyne-Owen already offered 
some “Negro” history and literature courses, but students wanted more breadth of subject 
matter such as politics, music, and art.143 In addition to a wider African American 
curriculum, Price hoped to get “additional resources to provide for an interdisciplinary 
minor in African Studies.”144 The entire student body held a meeting where Diggs 
reported on the outcome of the meeting and asked the students to vote yea or nay on the 
proposals. In addition to accepting the proposals, they also halted their economic boycott 
of the cafeteria and pay phones.145
Coby Smith attempted to continue to inspire the LeMoyne-Owen and encourage 
the activism in the black students at Memphis State. During a Black Student Association 
forum at Memphis State, Smith briefed the black students about the LeMoyne-Owen 
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situation and asked, “‘how long are we going to sit in forums and just talk?’”146 Black 
students had a responsibility to relate to the black community, and that could only happen 
not with words, but with action. Smith urged “Black students to work in the black 
community in the areas of sociology, political science and psychology,” and suggested 
that the “BSA here at Memphis State communicate with all black students in 
Memphis.”147
As Freshmen, you are the most important students on LeMoyne-Owen’s campus 
this year. You have reached this educational crossroad, just as hundreds of other 
students that have gone before you. Your choices will be the same as theirs, but 
your dicisions [sic] can be different. You can choose to become black students, 
rather than middle class Negro pseudo-intellectuals committed to the philistinistic 
ideals of White America.
 As students matriculated out and freshmen entered in at LeMoyne-Owen, 
campus activists primed the incoming students to their importance in keeping the 
Movement alive and holding the administration accountable. What’s Trump, a 




The newsletter continued to stress that freshmen determined the fate of the campus and 
what they did during their time at LeMoyne-Owen determined the fate of the black 
community. “Our president seems to be ingaged [sic] in a conspiracy with the White 
community, aimed at removing any vestige of Blackness from our campus,” the 
newsletter warned the freshmen.149
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few years ago LeMoyne-Owen was deeply involved in an effort to throw off its 
plantation heritage,” the author wrote in reference to the 1968 protest.150
 
  In the eyes of 
some students, the direction of campus politics had not changed much since the 
November 1968 event. 
Ultimately, what did the stance and its outcome all mean for the students? Instead 
of a story that championed the students, or even reluctantly credited their success in 
gaining almost every demand they requested, the press instead chose to frame the 
LeMoyne-Owen incident as a professional triumph for Dr. Price. Their stories showed 
him prevailing over the angry, meddling militants and a few unruly students. In the days 
that followed, one headline read, “Dr. Price Keeps his Cool,” and other stories focused on 
Price’s ability to maintain order. Not one article, not even in the black press, told the 
students’ side of the story. None questioned why, if protests were so unnecessary, the 
administration granted so many of the students’ demands. Nat D. Williams’s editorial in 
the Tri-State Defender suggested that as the “highest cultural expression for black people 
in Memphis,” the LeMoyne-Owen situation “threaten[ed] the stability and progress of the 
school.”151 Williams acknowledged that neither he nor other Memphians knew the 
reasons behind the students’ and activists’ actions, but their primary concern was the 
safety of the Dr. Price, who had “earned the right to end his career in there in an aura of 
peace and honor.”152
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Months later at Memphis State University, the local NAACP rushed to the side of 
the protesting students and pledged its support. The NAACP by all accounts was absent 
during the LeMoyne-Owen incident.153 Memphis’s evening paper, the Press-Scimitar, 
lauded Price and chastised the students who were “aided and abetted by outside agitators 
who have little or no interest in education.”154 Even LOC students tossed around the 
word “outsider,” which only served to place more distance between the members of the 
community and the Ivory Tower. Using language usually reserved for criminals, like 
“aided and abetted,” and assuming that the “outsiders” had no interest in education, 
belied the real truth: for a brief and mostly forgotten moment in Memphis, a few students 
and some community activists coalesced around issues of community, power, respect, 
and class to make a “Negro” campus aware that in 1968 it was indeed “Black.” 
LeMoyne-Owen College was not insulated from the sting of student rebellion. Decades 
later, still keenly aware of the attitude that sparked the event, Charles Diggs recalled his 
and many of his classmates feelings’ about the situation. “It’s like they [faculty and 
administration] were teaching us skills to work in their world,” Diggs reflected, “But the 
thing of it is, we wanted our world.”155
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“We can’t be isolated any longer”: Memphis State University, the Black Student 
Association and the Politics of Racial Identity 
 
“The real issue of Memphis State is not whether or not we are going to get $1750 to bring 
Congressman [Adam Clayton] Powell here. The real question is whether or not we as a 
people are going to stand up and say to this administration and to the world: “We are 
not your slaves and we are here and must be reckoned with – and that is the issue.” 1
 
— 
James Mock, Memphis State University Black Student Association member 
“Are you as Black Memphis State students aware of the answer, or even the problem? Do 
you realize that you are attending an integrated school? Are you in other words ‘hip’ to 
the Black Revolution? It’s what’s happening you know. By the white man’s standard it 
[Memphis State] has been integrated for 10 years, since the Ralph Prater vs. Memphis 
State incident. Now ask yourself the question, ‘Am I proud of the progress that I have 
made of the Prater struggle?’” 2
 
 – The Black Speak Easy, Black Student Association, 
Black Thesis, Vol. 1, No. 1 
On April 23, 1969, James Mock and another member of the Memphis State 
University (MSU) Black Student Association (BSA) approached MSU President Dr. 
Cecil C. Humphreys while he walked across the campus. The two students reiterated a 
previous BSA request for funding to bring in Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. as 
the keynote speaker for the organization’s Black Extravaganza festivities. President 
Humphreys considered the issue a moot point, since the school previously denied the 
organization’s funding request. He placated the students explaining that while he was 
sympathetic to their plight, because of a lack of funding, he in no way could justify the 
$1750 it would take to bring in Congressman Powell. Humphreys retreated to his office 
and the BSA members regrouped, no doubt alerting other members about the earlier 
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impromptu session with President Humphreys. Shortly after noon that day the students 
who approached Humphreys returned to his office with seventy-three more students. A 
potential crisis was quickly quelled, after threats of police intervention. The students left 
unsatisfied and undeterred. Four student representatives of the BSA returned the next day 
with a longer list of demands. President Humphreys agreed to confer with the students at 
a later meeting.3
When the students later met with Humphreys and two other school officials, Dean 
Dr. Jess Parrish and Dr. Ronald Carrier, both sides stood their ground. Unsatisfied with 
Humphreys’ continued refusal to allocate the funding, the students refused to leave his 
office. Humphreys felt threatened by the students’ stance and called on the police to 
secure the campus. As a former FBI agent, Humphreys relied on his law and order 
sensibilities to control the situation. He vowed to “carry on the business of the university, 
regardless of what it takes to do it” and “use whatever force necessary.”
 
4 No action was 
taken and the students left peacefully, but undeterred. The students returned on April 28th, 
five days after the initial flare-up and used a more direct and aggressive approach. 
Approximately 200 students flooded the President’s office, refusing to leave until 109 
were arrested for their actions.5
 The funding to sponsor Powell’s visit, the ostensible reason for the students’ 
actions, soon took a backseat to the larger issues on the students’ agenda. Injecting those 
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issues into the Powell debate after the intense sit-in in President Humphreys’ office, BSA 
executive board member James Mock remarked, “We are not asking for any favors. It is 
no favor to me if you teach me the history of our own people. This is something we must 
have. These demands are things which are our basic rights, and you do us no favor by 
granting these rights to us.”6 For over a year, Mock and other African American students 
campaigned for change on the urban campus, lobbying for several changes on behalf of 
the black student body. Those changes became a list of demands that Mock and other 
BSA leaders presented to the administration. The issues, as Mock and other BSA 
members saw them, had less to do with the specific implementation of the demands on 
the list and more to do with why the list was even necessary at all. Like many black 
students attending predominately white educational institutions across the nation during 
the 1960s and 1970s, African American students at Memphis State University struggled 
to gain acceptance and inclusion into the campus culture. Many of the students argued 
that they did not see themselves represented in any significant fashion in campus 
activities, social events, academics, or athletics. They asked: where was the black studies 
curriculum? Why was there such sparse black representation in student government? 
Where was their voice? There were only two black professors on staff prior to the sit-in 
in the administration building in 1969, and there were no African Americans employed in 
the higher ranks of campus administration.7
The mid-to-late 1960s witnessed a flurry of campus activism, protest, and dissent. 
As baby boomers came of age, they questioned and sometimes the suburban existence of 
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their parents’ generation. The boomers rallied around issues such as protesting against the 
Vietnam War, demonstrating for civil rights, and calling for free speech. They raised 
objections to strict and conservative university regulations.8 Campuses around the 
country exploded as the students, both black and white, shifted the focus of their civil 
rights protest from desegregating lunch counters and registering voters to transforming 
the culture and politics of higher education. William Van DeBurg author of New Day in 
Babylon: The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975, contends that 
by 1968 black students no longer utilized the same modes of protest that characterized the 
struggle for civil rights in the early part of the decade. Protest became more aggressive, 
more vocal. They invoked more radical and inclusive demands than the previous phase of 
the movement. The civil rights legislation of 1964 and 1965 gave African American 
students the opportunity to focus on the inequalities in the academy. Van DeBurg argues 
that the scope of black students’ protest “became somewhat more localized than in earlier 
years.”9
In spite of the conservative nature of its student body, both black and white, 
Memphis State did not escape the campus unrest of the period. On the surface Memphis 
State did not appear to be an overtly hostile campus to student activism, such as the 
University of Mississippi (Ole Miss) or the University of Alabama. The schools did share 
one commonality – African American students experienced difficulty adjusting to life as 
minority students at a predominately white institution. Recalling his initial impressions of 
the campus, past BSA member John Gray expressed, “There were no university 
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sponsored activities which encouraged cultural interaction at all. We on the whole felt 
that we were there and it was not necessarily because they wanted us to be there.” Black 
students, Gray argued, were only tolerated and not accepted.10
Understanding the importance of identity and the ability to create a cultural 
distinctiveness on a de facto segregated and racist campus, African American students at 
Memphis State University, and those particularly aligned with the BSA, placed the issue 
of racial identity at the forefront of their struggle for recognition and parity on campus. 
Many did not consider themselves Black Power activists; however, they rallied around 
the cultural tenets of the Black Power Movement, evoking the Movement’s insistence on 
self-definition, affirmation of a distinctive black cultural heritage, and advocacy of black 
representation in positions of power to promote the collective interest of the black 
community as a whole. Despite their frustrations and the opportunity to use more 
physically aggressive tactics, BSA members fused their newly appropriated Black Power 
ideology with traditional civil rights sensibilities. The students demanded inclusion, but 
also maintained that inclusion should not negate their identity as black students.  
 
 
Scholars of the Black Power Movement stress the continuities between the civil 
rights and Black Power Movements. As Simon Hall argues, “The conventional 
dichotomy between ‘civil rights’ and ‘Black Power’ often serves to obscure rather than 
enlighten the scholarly discussion.” Black students at Memphis State straddled both 
worlds. The city of Memphis maintained strong ties to traditional civil rights 
organizations, specifically the NAACP, and no doubt many of the students took cues 
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from the local branch. Yet, as the sit-in in President Humphreys’ office illustrates, the 
students understood the changing dynamics of the Black Freedom Movement and the 
need for their activism to reflect that transformation.11
Joy Ann Williamson provides an in-depth look at how black students organized 
their struggle around the tenets of Black Power. Her work, Black Power on Campus: The 
University of Illinois, 1965-1975, explores how students on the campus of The University 
of Illinois-Urbana Champaign used Black Power principles in their demand for reform of 
their institution. Williamson argues that African American students that attended 
predominately white universities during the height of the Black Power Movement used 
the Movement’s “principles and molded them to fit their specific context.” Though most 
predominately white campuses may have only contained a handful of activists, those 
activists used Black Power ideology to fight against the institutional racism prevalent on 
campuses. Whether it was establishing black student unions, demanding black studies 
curriculum, or calling for increases in black faculty, African American students during 
this period engaged in a mode of protest that embraced fundamental concepts of Black 
Power ideology. Campus activists at Memphis State, similar to the students at the 
University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, used a Black Power framework in their protest 





As the first African American students to attend Memphis State either graduated 
or left for other institutions, black students that followed gained more latitude and were 
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more assertive in their desire for recognition. The students looked for ways to integrate 
campus life by creating cultural institutions that distinctly addressed the issues that they 
faced on campus. By constructing these institutions, black students established 
connections to the campus through activities and organizations that cultivated and 
promoted their cultural heritage. They formed organizations such as the BSA, held their 
own forums, and invited black speakers to campus that spoke not only to their plight as 
minority students, but also to their larger community concerns. They also printed their 
own publication, held their own showcases, and staged beauty pageants and plays to fill a 
cultural void. Desegregating the school was no longer the students’ primary focus; now 
the issue was a genuine integration. Black students at MSU during this period sought to 
reform the higher educational system to make their experience on-campus experience 
more palatable. They further used their campus activities to affect change in the 
Memphis’s black community. 
 
With the tenth-year anniversary of the 1959 desegregation of Memphis State 
University looming, Memphis’s daily newspaper The Commercial Appeal ran an article 
entitled, “Memphis State And the Negro.” A retrospective of sorts, the article, could have 
doubled as an advertisement promoting diversity in the school’s recruiting brochures. It 
extolled the university’s virtues, while applauding its tolerance. It also suggested that the 
school was central in the lives of Memphis’s African American community. The article’s 
author, H. A. Gilliam, Jr., lauded the school’s administration for the fairness it extended 
to all its students, including those who only ten years earlier could not enroll as students 
at the school. “We seek to give everyone an equal opportunity,” Memphis State president 
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Dr. Cecil Humphreys expressed, “it is up to the individual to take advantage of it.” 
Several African American students quoted in the article echoed Dr. Humphreys’ 
sentiment. Two students, Helen Ann Forbes and Sam Johnson, both lived in the campus 
dormitories and both, at least according to the article, seemed oblivious to any issues that 
other black students faced on campus. The two students praised Memphis State for the 
opportunities it afforded and rebuffed any talk of militant action on campus. When 
probed about campus militancy, Forbes responded, “There are some individuals who 
believe in just picking up the gun and going at it, but there is not an organization of 
people like that I know of.” The only complaint Johnson lodged regarding any issues of 
equity between black students and the rest of the student body was the lack of black 
athletes on the football team.13
Despite the testimonials from the black students, the article neglected to discuss 
the difficulties black students in general faced during the school’s transition from a 
segregated to an integrated institution. Certainly the school experienced some growth, as 
Forbes and Johnson attested to, though it is not clear whether that growth reflected 
changes in attitude or reluctant conformity. Several years after the school’s integration, 
African American students still complained of harassment from white students. White 
students still ridiculed and targeted black students in the cafeteria. In fact, the issue was 
so commonplace that the local branch of the NAACP solicited help to stop the 
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 Even after promises of equal access to facilities, the school still barred black 
students from taking swimming classes. Again, the Memphis NAACP took the lead on 
behalf of the students by sending letters of protest to President C. C. Humphreys, with 
copies also landing on the desks of the City Commissioner, State Commissioner of 
Education, and NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins, since the YMCA’s guidelines 
also violated the newly passed Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 The University argued that it 
was not their policy that denied the students from the pool, but those of the owner of the 
pool – the YMCA. It was the YMCA’s position, University officials offered, that the 
facilities remain closed to blacks and they were only obliging the club’s policy.16
Even as the black students searched the campus for positive black representations 
and meaningful social networking outlets, white students flaunted their social freedom. 
Kappa Alpha Order (KA) Gamma Gamma Chapter, a fraternity founded in 1865 at 
Washington College in Lexington, Virginia, was one of the more popular organizations 
on campus among the white student body.
 The 
majority of Memphis State’s African American student body longed for the simplicity of 
campus life that Gilliam described in his article.  
17
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College president, Robert E. Lee.18 For many white southerners, Lee served as a hero and 
representation of a past not rooted in shame or hate, but in a strong, prideful southern 
heritage. Most black students, however, felt victimized by the fraternity. The 
organization’s annual Old South Secession Ceremony sought to “revive the Old South in 
Memphis.”19 The ‘Cotton-Pickin’ Ball was the highlight of the annual celebration. 
Fraternity members and their dates dressed as plantation owners and plantation 
mistresses.20 In one final hazing event, the pledges donned slave costumes and jockeyed 
for the ‘Best Slave’ award. By week’s end, pledges hoped their efforts ensured their full-
fledged membership in KA.21 At the culminating parade, KA members dressed in 
Confederate military attire and mounted horses in tribute to the Old South. “Those white 
boys with KA use to ride around campus on horses with Confederate uniforms on,” BSA 
leader David Acey recalled. “We didn’t know what was going on. Those folks had horses 
out here. You walked across campus, they would charge at you on their horses,” 
expressed Acey.22 The fraternity not only replicated the Confederacy with the regalia and 
antebellum attire, but they also “‘seceded’ from the Union for 24 hours.”23
At the 1962 celebration, KA wired then President John F. Kennedy a telegram 
that informed him of the organization’s intent for secession. It was one thing to contend 
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with racism via lunchroom jeers or a swimming pool snub, black students argued; 
however, it was another matter altogether to have the Civil War reenacted and classmates 
dressed as slave owners and slaves. As they navigated the system of Jim Crow, KA’s 
festivities made black students all the more mindful of slavery’s horrific legacy. While 
northern troops fought the war to preserve the Union, the South fought to defend slavery. 
The Civil War and the Confederacy’s role in it symbolized the South’s last stand to 
maintain the peculiar institution. Recreations that glamorized the Civil War and slavery 




“All I do is come to school, study, eat, go home or to work, hear my parents nag, 
go to sleep, get up the next morning and start the little merry-go-round again,” 
complained one black student to a reporter writing an article on Memphis State’s African 
American students for the school’s paper, Tiger Rag. As the pulse of the campus, the 
Tiger Rag served as the official mouthpiece of the student body. Though not all students 
felt represented in the publication’s pages, this particular article, published in January 
1966, “Negro Students Speak Out on Memphis State,” signaled the paper’s first attempt 
to explore the attitudes of black students in a manner that allowed the students to 
candidly express their frustrations.25
Black students griped about the lack of integrated social functions. Just as 
striking, the students objected to their inability to cultivate their distinctly black 
organizations. Chartered in 1963, the Epsilon Kappa chapter of Delta Sigma Theta (DST) 
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became the first African American fraternity or sorority on campus. Its members took the 
distinction seriously. DST members used their status as the first African American 
sorority on campus to promote a positive example of a black organization on campus. 
They hoped to make it easier for other black Greek-lettered fraternities and sororities to 
receive charters. Yet, DST members realized that the lack of exposure to Greek life, 
especially black Greek life, on their campus hindered the development of their chapter. 
“When sisters from other universities come home, it is embarrassing to see how little we 
know about Greek life on a college campus,” one DST member conveyed to the Tiger 
Rag reporter in an almost self-conscious manner. Nevertheless, “the ladies, as best they 
could, tried to bridge the racial divide that existed in the wake of integration, by 
participating in not only events germane to black student’s interests but to the common 
student body as well.” The Pan Hellenic Council did not invite the DST to join, but 
members did not take the snub by the Council as a sign to retreat. Instead, “they pushed 
to participate in pageants and talent shows such as the Delta Zeta Follies and All Sing 
with other white sorority contestants.” 26
 
 
Devoid of any real sense of belonging on campus, yet with no formal connection 
to each other, some black students at Memphis State decided to formulate a way to 
organize into one collective unit. In describing his first impressions of the school, BSA 
member Eddie Jenkins expressed not simply his feelings of alienation from the majority 
of the student body, but also a disconnect from black students. “You feel like a fly in the 
buttermilk even though you’re looking at black people all around. It’s not enough where 
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you don’t feel like, well you know, it’s really a bunch of us here. You still feel like the fly 
in the buttermilk when you go into class.” Ronald Ivy, another BSA member, agreed with 
Jenkins’ assessment of the campus atmosphere. Ivy, however, suggested that black 
students not only experienced a sense of culture shock in the classroom, but also lacked 
self-awareness and engagement in their own cultural and community affairs. “I saw a 
need,” Ivy explained, “for, at least, some awareness on their [African American students] 
part of the fact that they had to play a greater role, a larger role than just going…coming 
here, saying, I go to Memphis State.” The attitude on campus reflected not only what 
black students perceived as prejudiced inclinations on the part of whites, but as Ivy 
argued, some black students failed to seriously consider the responsibility they had to 
improve their own plight. Ivy understood that while the accountability for fostering an 
environment where all students felt represented rested with the university, because of the 
systematic exclusion from many of the school’s social activities, the onus was not only 
on the administration to create an open atmosphere, but also on black students to take 
control of their situation and demand inclusion.27
In the mid-to-late 1960s, looking to forge their own path, black students on 
college campuses throughout the United States began forming Black Student Unions 
(BSU) and BSAs. In an article commemorating the legacy of BSUs, Ibram Rogers argues 
that black students reacted to the hostility they faced on predominately white campuses 
by creating “a political group that would unite Black students and demand a weather 
change, in addition to organizing social and political activities.”
 
28
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on the campus of San Francisco State College in 1966. As the “central coordinating 
mechanism for Black Power protests,” BSUs and BSAs through various modes of 
protests held administrations accountable for injustices and deficiencies in regards to the 
welfare of the black student body.29 Though many BSUs shared similar goals, the nature 
and mode of organizations differed from campus-to-campus with local and regional 
concerns driving each group’s respective protest activities. More radical unions and 
demonstrations, such as those on the campuses of San Francisco State and Cornell, shape 
the dialogue and scholarship on the impact of BSUs and BSAs and the role of Black 
Power in campus politics; yet there is much to glean from the activism of unions and 
associations on smaller campuses and areas of the country less known for its Black Power 
activities. The larger movement encouraged black students at Memphis State to organize. 




A caption in the first edition of the Memphis State Black Student Association 
newsletter, The Black Thesis, read:  “LOOK around you and see what is happening at San 
Jose State, Howard, Yale, Fisk, Tuskegee, Atlanta, Harvard, Berkeley, A&I, NYU and 
other universities where there is hope.” Imploring the students to act and to realize their 
own power, the newsletter boldly claimed that black students would “not be a crybaby,” 
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“equivocate” or “allow others to do all the work” on their behalf. Like many young men 
in the 1960s, especially black men who were less fortunate than their white counterparts 
in receiving draft deferments, the fear of being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War 
remained a pressing concern.31
The newsletter simultaneously condemned the war and the campus’s segregated 
ROTC program. Black men refused to be “pawns of war,” sent off to fight “a land he 
knows little about,” especially because the military training ground on their college 
campus remained segregated.
 
32 The newsletter, circulated in the spring of 1968, marked 
the official beginnings of the BSA at MSU. The organization’s mission included 
furthering the “interest of black students of Memphis State University and the community 
and to participate in programs aimed at furthering the interest of the black community as 
a whole.”33 Critical not only of the administration’s lack of black inclusiveness, leaders 
found fault with the SGA’s role on campus. “However well intention[ed] it was in 
forming the SGA to be representative of the student body, it failed to do so in as much as 
SGA is a white organization and BSA is a black organization,” Mock expressed. “It is my 
opinion it becomes an administrative problem of the university to serve all of its 
students,” he continued.34
Informal organizing of the BSA began in 1966 and 1967 among a few black 
students. Several black students on campus realized the need to become a more active 
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and organized faction in the university community. “‘Sixty-seven we finally got our act 
together as far as getting other members to join, because we had a plan,” explained 
Acey.35 Outside pressure from local Black Power activists Charles Cabbage and John 
Smith proved crucial to the formation of the BSA as well. In early 1968, Cabbage, Smith, 
Clifford Taylor, and Memphis State student Ronald Ivy met with Dean Parrish to inquire 
about starting a black student organization on campus.36 Although the details of the 
meeting are not known, that black campus leaders had begun to align their movement 
with the young community activists showed the seriousness of the need for a formal 
campus organization for the black student body. Using what Stefan M. Bradley defined 
as “Black Student Power” in his study of the 1968-1969 uprisings at Columbia 
University, students David Acey, James Pope, James Mock, Ester Hurt, Eddie Jenkins 
and Ronald Ivy all viewed themselves as Black Power activists who were ultimately 
responsible for leading the black student body.37
All of the men were pivotal leaders in the BSA and they took the initiative in 
organizing the black students since they believed that the university had no interest in 
their development. “There is no vital effort by the administration to develop individual 
initiative or a competitive spirit vital to black survival,” read the BSA’s Black Thesis 
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newsletter. 38 Because there was not a formal outlet that black students felt comfortable 
relying on, who could they lean on to bring pressure on the administration to solve their 
problems? BSA organizers argued that because they had no representation, the 
administration had even more latitude to ignore their concerns. “We had less than 100 
black students out here I think at the time,” Acey recollected. “I was walking around 
campus and I met Pope, James Pope, and he had been to the Army also. We discussed the 
situation. ‘Man this is terrible over here.’ We kept talking about it, we said, ‘Well, what 
are we going to do?’ We said, ‘well, we need to organize and straighten it out.’ Then we 
met a few other people. ‘What we need to do is organize the Black Students Association. 
All the white people had all kinds of organizations.’”39
The BSA had a simple mission: integrate as Memphis State students without 
sacrificing a collective black identity. “There won’t be any real integration at the 
university until a black student can be involved in campus activities and still maintain his 
identity as a black student who has black characteristics and a black culture,” one student 
argued, expressing his disdain with the campus’ expectation of conformity. “Now if he 
wants to participate,” he explained, “he has to imitate the white students or he won’t be 
accepted.” Arguably the most enduring legacy of the Black Power Movement is the 
ability it had to culturally redefine the image of what it meant to be and feel black in 
America. Those not in step with the ideological musings of Black Power activists could 
aesthetically connect to the Movement through dress, hairstyles, music and other cultural 
outlets. If African American students at Memphis State did not relate fully to Black 
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Power as a practical transition or extension in tactics in the Black Freedom Movement, 
their experiences on campus informed the connections they made with the Movement. 
Without strictly aligning themselves with Black Power, African American students spoke 
in clear terms regarding their feelings on black identity. “You can’t be a real human being 
without pride in yourself and your race… we don’t want what you’ve got, we just want to 
get something for ourselves. We’re not going to wait for handouts,” declared one black 
student. The students equated their physical existence directly to pride in their own 
heritage and culture. Clearly, the students adhered to key components of the Black Power 
Movement.40
However, there was still the matter of approval of a charter to officially recognize 
the organization on campus, though leaders declared they had no real desire for formal 
recognition. University requirements for student organizations stipulated that an 
organization needed a faculty advisor and an approved constitution in place; the students 
found both tasks difficult. The school had no black faculty members at the time and 
students were cautious about relationships with white professors. A white English 
professor, Elizabeth Boyd, sympathized with the students and signed the petition. BSA 
leaders decided that the constitution should reflect the organization’s desire to emphasize 
all things directly related to the uplift and welfare of African American students. “Our 
constitution said that it [BSA] was going to be black,” recalled Acey. Fearful of the 
implication of an all-black organization, the administration accused BSA organizers of 
promoting segregation. The students questioned the hypocrisy of the administration’s 
response to their constitution. How could they question the BSA’s intentions when there 
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were several organizations on campus that implicitly barred black students from 
participating? To circumvent the administrations’ accusations, the BSA leadership 
included a clause that stated: “Anybody that is generally interested in supporting the 
programs of the black students can join and that the organization’s mission is to “foster 
and develop the traits and talents of the Black People not in opposition to or contempt for 
other races.” The change in wording technically left the door open for whites to 
participate in the BSA, but the organization instituted membership cards as a way of 
“getting around whitey.” There was a legitimate fear among some members that whites 
would attend the meetings strictly for the purpose of reporting information back to the 
administration. Whenever the group needed to discuss important issues, they called a 
members-only meeting and only those who brandished membership cards could attend.41
Before the existence of the BSA, many black students felt powerless. “There were 
few people here that even had the guts to go and say anything to their instructors if they 
felt they got a bad grade,” James Pope explained. “Not even mentioning going to speak to 
the president of the university and telling him that he thought that black people were 
being treated bad on campus. They weren’t getting what was due them, you see?”
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Jenkins assessed that in order for the organization to effectively change the dynamics of 
campus race relations, they had to reclaim power and remove the students’ fear – both 
black and white. “The individual black student feels a certain strength within each 





organized power structure whereby he can call his hand, where beforehand there was no 
organized power,” he assessed.43
A lack of organized power was only one of the internal issues among the black 
student body; apathy and lack of self-awareness were also problems. “When I first came 
out here, I saw something lacking. Some of the Negro students out here were 
lacking….Memphis State students always seemed so backwards,” Ivy suggested 
comparing black students at Memphis State to those at LeMoyne College and Owen 
College. “They knew what was in the books…but they didn’t know anything about what 
was happening in the world,” he concluded. 
  
44
Clearly frustrated with the apathetic attitude some black students’, BSA 
leadership used an editorial in the Tiger Rag to send the students a wake-up call. “Black 
leaders have been actively soliciting the support of black students, but have failed to get 
it,” the article sounded off. The writer concluded that “seemingly, all black collegiates 
want to do is to get out of college and find a token job.”
 
45 Issues of class divided the 
black students on campus. The piece mocked the so-called black bourgeoisie, chiding, 
“we know you are the exception after all; your parents were professional people who 
brought you up in a stable middle-class neighborhood. We understand and we sincerely 
regret embarrassing you with all the demonstrations, freedom songs, sit-ins, and boycotts. 
We are sorry that because you look like us, white people invariably lump you together 
with us.”46
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 The tone of the article alternated from pleading, to indignation, to mocking, 
 
44Ronald Ivy, interview. 
 




and ultimately to calling for the students to come together. “Black people must unite 
because unity is an agent that can be utilized to salvage black people from the effect of 
white racism. Unity is also a power base that black people can utilize to achieve total 
freedom.”47
James Pope agreed with the article’s appraisal of blacks’ attitudes on campus, 
arguing that the black students straddled between various levels of black consciousness. 
He believed that their complacency with the conditions on campus paralleled the 
complacency of the city. “Concerned about the plight of black people” prior to entering 
Memphis State, Pope suggested that black students did not engage in campus politics 
because many never participated in any aspect of the Civil Rights Movement.
   
48 While not 
a completely accurate account of all protest activities of black students as, some students 
worked with other organizations not affiliated with the university, Pope’s statement 
connected to a larger theme of the BSA – in order for the circumstances of black students 
at Memphis State to change, the students themselves had to be the catalyst. “For all 
clarity, we are not condemning the administration alone for lack of efficiency. We should 
realize that the major problems lie within our own confines as unconcerned and 
uninterested black students,” read an issue of the BSA’s Black Thesis.49
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black students wanted to be simply painted as victims. “We realize MSU has not been 
overlooked by the Black Revolution, rather MSU overlooked the Black Revolution.”50
Despite accusations of complacency and apathy, “some black students had been 
concerned about the attitudes on campus, about the practices and actions on campus and 
nobody ever did anything about it.”
 
51 BSA leaders worked actively during 1968 to 
increase the level of consciousness and stimulate interest in the BSA among black 
students. Beginning in the fall of 1968, BSA leaders David Acey, James Pope, James 
Mock and others coordinated small cultural sessions to discuss black pride and debate the 
philosophies of Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, and other black leaders to “stimulate the 
interest in blackness to the students at Memphis State.”52
The organization also formed book clubs to ease the burdens on students that 
financially could not afford to purchase books each semester. “We had rooms in the 
University Center and we had long tables and we had the books lined up: freshman 
English, freshman biology, sophomore biology. We were passing to the junior area, we 
would take all our books and leave them, and then we would go to the junior section and 
pick up free books when the seniors had left. We had this rotation and everybody was to 
do this. There wasn’t any exceptions, whether you joined the organization or not,” Acey 
 Older students incubated 
incoming black students; believing that by absorbing the young students into the ranks of 
the BSA, the organization would continue to grow. Students who experienced difficulty 
in their classes received tutoring.  
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explained.53  Determined not to be a fraternity, sorority, or just another campus social 
club, the BSA used social events like dances as recruitment tools. They lured the students 
into social gatherings under the guise of entertainment. Once congregated, BSA 
leadership planted seeds. Acey contends that black students, regardless if they officially 
joined the organization or not, faced the same issues as the students actively involved. 
“We had a motto,” Acey rationalized, “Get out of our way, or get ran over.”54
 
 Each event, 
each activity served the purpose to create unity, cement bonds and replace the apathy and 
fear with a non-violent, revolutionary spirit.  
During the 1968 sanitation strike the BSA found what Jenkins described as an 
“issue to rally around and not just a cause.” Jenkins admitted that the black students, were 
not engaged in what was happening during the strike, like students were at LeMoyne and 
Owen. However, a chance meeting with Mayor Loeb reminded Jenkins that he and the 
black students at Memphis State had a responsibility to support the striking workers. 
Jenkins met Loeb at a downtown function and in front of several important city leaders 
asked the Mayor if he could meet to discuss the strike. The Mayor agreed, but when 
Jenkins arrived at his office, he refused to engage the topic with Jenkins. Angered by the 
failed meeting, Jenkins returned to campus and informed BSA members what had 
happened. Afterwards the BSA organized a march in support of the workers. That march 
was “a key in the Black Student Association…the issue helped our cause.”55
                                                     







In March 1968 black and white students marched together in the largest march in 
the history of the university at that time. Professors admitted that the march was the first 
time that they witnessed black and white students communicating with each other. 
Groups of students discussed “the strike, human and racial relations.” They even talked 
about Black Power. The interracial march shocked Laura Ingram, a white student, who 
like others on campus had never seen that type of interaction between black and whites. 
“I could not believe that this was Memphis State. I was encouraged by it,” said Ingram.56 
After the march on campus, BSA members became more involved in the sanitation strike 
demonstrations. Jenkins stated that in the early days of organizing the BSA, members 
were trying to find a way to link their on-campus activism with the issues in the 
community. “We were still connected to the community,” Jenkins said. “We were 
looking for ways to connect back to the community.”57
In general the year 1968 tested the strength of democracy as well as human and 
civil rights worldwide. Demonstrations and rebellions in urban communities, and campus 
unrest raged throughout the nation. The assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Robert Kennedy reverberated throughout the world, forcing many at home and abroad to 
question the integrity and soul of America. The fall of 1968 served as an important period 
of growth for the BSA. Members met with the administration to “discuss specific 
recommendations in regard to recruitment of Black teachers; initiation of a Black Studies 
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Program; suspension of fraternities, sororities and other campus organizations which 
discriminate against minority groups; and increased participation by Blacks in all phases 
of college life.”58 After the death of King the organization “turned internally,” as it 
looked to refocus its attention on improving campus life.59
On December 10, 1968, Charles Evers, civil rights activist and brother of slain 
civil rights martyr Medgar Evers, spoke to a group of students in the University Center 
Ballroom at Memphis State. The crowd of students, composed primarily of black 
students, filled the room to hear him speak. According to the Tiger Rag, Evers’ topic, 
‘Black Nationalism and Civil Rights,’ promoted a message of hope, understanding and 
unity between the races. Evers warned the students to not succumb to violent Black 
Power. In light of Evers’s tragic family circumstances, he easily could have discarded the 
concepts of hope, understanding, and unity. Still his message remained positive. 
Surveying the Memphis State racial landscape, however, Evers voiced his disappointment 
in the school’s lack of black football players. He also questioned why “in a faculty of 650 




 Evers’s speech at the end of the fall 
semester served to bridge a frustrating time of inactivity in the organization’s infancy to a 
recommitment to the mission of the BSA and a new phase of involvement by the black 
student body. 
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Twelve years after Memphis State rejected Miriam D. Sugarmon’s application for 
admission, she returned to the campus in a more official capacity. In 1957, Sugarmon and 
Maxine Smith attempted to apply for admission to the school, but they were turned away 
before they could even submit an application. The women were already quite decorated 
academically. Sugarmon, a Phi Beta Kappa, earned her degree from Wellesley College. 
Smith graduated top of her class from historically black Spelman College and continued 
her studies at Middlebury College, where she graduated with a Masters of Arts degree in 
French. Smith and Sugarmon later credited Memphis State’s rebuke for fueling their 
activist spirit. In the aftermath of the Memphis State incident, the local branch of the 
NAACP extended the women an invitation to join the executive board. NAACP led the 
charge again to desegregate the university in 1959.61
Now the first African American professor at Memphis State, a move that to some 
degree signaled the school’s growth, Sugarmon still believed that the university needed to 
do more to promote diversity. She replaced Elizabeth Boyd as advisor for the BSA, 
giving the students the opportunity to work closely with an African American that also 
shared their vision. “She was a very positive inspiration for a lot of students,” BSA 
member John Gray explained. “She was a motivation for those students believing we 
could make a difference…we weren’t absolutely convinced we could make a change. We 
knew Dr. Sugarmon was intelligent and capable,” said Gray.
 
62
In the aftermath of Charles Evers’s appearance on campus, Sugarmon submitted a 
memo that called for the faculty and the administration to assess their role in changing 
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the campus culture. She urged Memphis State to take a closer look at its human rights 
record and to critically evaluate its current state in the area of human rights. She also 
suggested recommendations for the future. “If you feel as I do,” Sugarmon wrote, “that 
MSU has a responsibility to offer creative leadership and to provide the kind of academic 
environment in which Blacks and whites can realize their full potential as human beings, 
will you do FOUR things:” 
1. Indicate your support of this program to the Administration. 
2. Contact 3 persons on the Faculty or Staff by telephone, letter or personal visit 
to enlist their support in this project.  
3. Confer with your department chairman to ask that he actively seek out 
4. Use your influence with Faculty groups – Faculty Council, Curriculum 
Committee, Library Committee, AAUP, etc., – to which you belong to gain 
their support in this endeavor.
qualified black teachers and graduate students. 
63
 
   
Sugarmon hoped the administration and faculty shared her goal of a more diverse and 
inclusive campus. She followed up her February 4th memo with another memo listing 23 
black candidates for possible employment at Memphis State. The famed historian of 
black religious life and LeMoyne College graduate, C. Eric Lincoln, made Sugarmon’s 
list.64
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 Some resented Sugarmon’s implication that the university needed to work on its 
human rights record. An anonymous, bold-faced printed copy of Sugarmon’s original 
memo revealed the bitterness: “Support Dr. Humphreys’ resistance to absurd demands 
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and phony crusades that only serve to distort and aggravate real problems!!!”65 Quoting 
philosopher Immanuel Kant and Founding Father Alexander Hamilton, it charged that 
Sugarmon’s request for a Coordinator of Black Affairs promoted “resegregation” and that 
“her proposal constitutes an invitation to unnecessary turmoil and divisions.”66 A Tiger 
Rag editorial criticized the anonymous condemnation as a “racist attack…to slur a 
realistic and reasonable plan for working to help black students.”67
 Sugarmon’s memo aimed to sway the faculty; a second memo written in 
conjunction with the Human Relations Club targeted the student body. The Human 
Relations Club distributed a petition that outlined a five-point program:  
 Sugarmon did not 
intend to ignore the school’s racial situation like the critics of her proposal suggested. 
Instead, Sugarmon designed her proposal as a way to open an official line of 
communication between faculty, administration and students.  
1. An immediate end to all forms of discrimination on campus. 
2. Active recruitment of black personnel at all levels. 
3. Formation of an MSU Human Relations Committee composed of an equal 
number of representatives of the Student Body, Faculty and Administration.  
4. Development of a Black Studies Program leading to an Interdepartmental 
major with emphasis on the contributions of Africans and Afro-Americans to 
Western Civilization.  
5. Employment of a Coordinator of Black Affairs68
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These proposals reiterated, formalized, and expanded many of the BSA’s initial 
mandates. They helped to further articulate the BSA’s concerns, illuminate key racial 
issues, and extend a branch to other sympathetic student organizations on campus.  
The BSA made additional requests for SGA funding, SGA representation, 
operational space, and campus jobs.69
Information has been received from a confidential source that at the first  
basketball game at the Coliseum a group of Negroes are going to perform 
with a  band and freedom singers to prevent the basketball game from 
taking place. This action will be preceded by a request to you that Negroes 
be permitted to be on the cheerleading team even though they are not 
properly trained. If this request is denied, the above action will occur. If 
this request is granted, I would assume that they will carry this action out 
anyway.
 They also fought for positions on campus teams 
such as the cheerleading squad and the ROTC auxiliary, Angel Flight. Weekly, the Tiger 
Rag posted pictures of different women co-eds in their “Campus Cutie” section; none 
were black. Black students also accused the paper of using the “Campus Cutie” to 
promote white women as the ideal model of beauty.  BSA members even threatened to 
storm onto the basketball court during a game against the school’s biggest rival, 
Louisville. Calling their campaign “Black Power on the Hardwood,” they outlined their 




According to Acey, the tactic worked. By the next game, the administration responded by 
placing a few black women on the pep squad.71
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The students agitated long before their formal presentation of demands, but now 
with the BSA, they had a unified structure to organize around. Black students, thirsty for 
events suited to their interests, flocked to cultural rap sessions. The sessions created 
awareness in the students. In the fall of 1968 the BSA began to gain strength as new 
students joined and brought new ideas and energy to the organization. In the fall, the 
organization began to formalize its demands “to present to the university or president of 
the University for Redress of grievances.”72
If BSA members needed any motivation on how to get a reaction out of the 
administration, they only needed to look at nearby Lane College, a CME-affiliated 
school. Located in Jackson, Tennessee, the small college seemed like an unlikely place 
for a campus revolt. Yet a campus organization called the Black Liberation Front (BLF) 
presented the college’s president, Chester Arthur Kirkendoll, a Bishop in the CME 
church, with a list of fourteen demands. The group, unsatisfied with the president’s 
reaction, set fire to several buildings on campus.
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 This revolt, and others like it, 
according to a Tri-State Defender article, marked a shift from previous uprisings because 
these “were created around black students’ demands for improvement of their lot.” 
Within weeks of the incident at Lane, disturbances broke out at University of Chicago, 
Harvard, Columbia, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Duke, and Tuskegee. All of 
the incidents, with the exception of the sit-in at the University of Chicago “had an 
identity of their own,” because of the manner in which the universities “capitulated to 
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[the demands] black students.” Notwithstanding the rogue actions of some factions on 
these campuses, the revolts “brought forth…a change in mood and healthy innovation 
and academic reorientation that might not have occurred under happier circumstances.” 74
  
   
Believing their demands fell on deaf ears, the BSA began to contemplate its next 
move. Like the students at Lane, the MSU students understood that changing the campus 
mood required drastic, uncomfortable measures. The students reconfirmed their 
dedication. “The black students have made a commitment that Memphis State University 
is going to change and that we are going to help bring about this change.”75 When 
infrequent discussions between members of the BSA and administration bore no fruit, the 
students became impatient. Acey, Pope, and other BSA members decided they would “go 
over and talk to the man about the reasons why he hadn’t taken any action on the 
demands.”76
James Mock, a part of the big five BSA leadership that included David Acey, 
James Pope, Ester Hurt and Eddie Jenkins, was an enigmatic figure who himself had been 
involved in civil rights struggles prior to coming to Memphis State. The students elected 
Mock the unofficial spokesman for the organization. Charismatic and eloquent, with a 
penchant for inspiring the black students, Mock made for an easy choice for the 
organization’s spokesman.  
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At a March 1969 meeting, Mock, Acey, Pope and other leaders approached 
President Humphreys again to ask about his progress on their list of demands. Leaders 
accused Humphreys of giving them the run-around. Humphrey countered the allegations, 
saying that he and the administration had not had sufficient time to address the demands. 
“We’re working on getting some black instructors in and working on getting a black dean 
and working on trying to get a black coach in the organization,” Humphreys explained. It 
is unknown just how aggressive Humphreys’s attempts to hire more black instructors 
were, but the school did offer Reverend Ezekiel Bell, Pastor of Garden Presbyterian 
Church and head of the NAACP, the opportunity teach a Black History course.77 Because 
of other obligations, Bell declined.78 But basketball coach Moe Iba’s “request” for the 
“Negroes on the basketball team to get rid of those naturals [hairstyles],” somewhat 
confirmed black students’ concerns that white coaches could not fully relate to the black 
athletes, and on a larger scale, Coach Iba’s sentiments reaffirmed that their demands were 
very necessary.79
  After several unsatisfactory attempts, BSA leaders prepared the students for 
more direct action. “Yeah, yeah, see they weren’t moving so our next step was to do the 
non-violent direct action and shut it down,” David Acey explained. “We gave them 
opportunities. You know Martin [Luther King, Jr.] said you negotiate, you talk, and once 
that don’t work you move to the next phase.”
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 The students entered that next phase on 
April 23, 1969, when BSA leaders and members confronted President Humphreys in his 
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office. On the surface, the administration believed the students’ gripes stemmed from 
their refusal to fund Adam Clayton Powell’s visit. Yet the students saw it differently. 
After years of frustrations and months of attempting to negotiate, the students used the 
Powell as an issue to expose the campus to their other demands. BSA members 
immediately issued copies of a special edition of their newsletter, Black Student Appeal, 
with their demands included. The students again requested an extensive Black Studies 
Program, a black dean, more black instructors, and more black athletes:     
Are you going to allow racist instructors to constantly stand on us? Are you going 
to give us a method of identifying by bringing additional black faculty members 
on this campus? Are you going to allow us to remain lost as far as history is 
concerned by denying us all the beautiful phases of black history, or are you 
going to suddenly realize that we are in need of our culture, and our true culture, 
that we are in need of a true appreciation of it, and that there we must have: Black 
Studies, Black Dean and Black Athletes.81
 
 
The Black Student Appeal hearkened back to the days of the first black students on 
campus to show that not much, in their opinion, had changed. They complained that they 
were “in Memphis State, but not of it.”82
Unfazed by the pressure, President Humphreys continued to stand ground as well. 
In meetings with BSA members on April 24 and April 25, Humphreys reiterated his 
stance to the students, though he maintained communication and open dialogue with 
them. “Representatives of the Black Student Association met with me this morning and 
gave me a list of points for discussion, change and innovation. University officials will 
meet the representatives of the association to explore the actions requested and to work 
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on those points that can be accomplished,” he expressed.83 The newly instituted student 
code of conduct explicitly forbade “unauthorized occupancy of the university facilities or 
blocking access to or from such areas,” reinforcing Humphreys’ ability to penalize the 
students. Yet he agreed not to take any disciplinary action against the students unless 
“there is any destruction or blocking of any of the passageways or interference with 
anybody who is carrying on his business.”84
Regarding the students’ demands for personnel diversity, Humphreys believed 
that the institution needed more African American faculty, an issue he told the students 
that he and his staff actively worked to change. He disagreed, however, with the students’ 
insistence on a black dean to explicitly handle the concerns of black students. A black 
dean simply hired to service black students, Humphreys argued, constituted a form of 
segregation.”
 
85 James Mock argued that the black students needed their own 
representative. “Black folk understand black folk,” remarked Mock.86
Police roamed the campus at the president’s behest to maintain order.  The police 
presence only agitated the black students more. They refused to further discuss any issues 
with the president until he removed the police from campus. Supported by community 
leaders H. Ralph Jackson, Jesse Epps, and Maxine Smith, the group held a rally on April 
25th in front of approximately 375 students at the school’s University Center.
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been accused of being too general and vague, BSA leaders publicly revealed their 
demands and discussed their grievances.88 Tired of talk and no action, Mock proclaimed, 
“We don’t want any newspaper articles and studies. We want action and we want it 
now.”89 Mock urged students to stand up for their rights, but he stressed that the 
organization remain non-violent in its approach. Leaders tried to hedge the frustrations of 
some students that believed that the time for talk had come and gone. “Don’t think for 
one minute you can run over the National Guard, that you can shoot it out with any 
policeman or any of these racists that might move in on campus with us,” read the BSA 
newsletter in the immediate aftermath of the first sit-in.”90
Undoubtedly other campus disturbances informed how Humphreys and other 
administrators approached the Memphis State situation. He perceived every newspaper 
quote by BSA leaders as threats to the campus. He even accused the students of 
conspiring with other groups from other cities.
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lost,” Humphreys said in a statement issued to local television and radio media.92
On Monday, April 28, still agitated about the police state on campus, members of 
the BSA held another mass meeting in the University Center. After the meeting, roughly 
100 students headed to the president’s office.
 The 
students’ protest and disregard for the law, he argued, damaged not only academic 
institutions, but society as a whole. Police officers continued to patrol the grounds, much 
to the dismay of the students.  
93 The students demanded that the 
administration remove the police officers from campus and refused to leave the office 
until someone in authority gave the police the directive to go. The students argued that 
since they “made no threat of violence” and were protesting “under the banner of non-
violence,” the police presence was unnecessary.94 Students complained of harassment 
from police officers. “I’ve been stopped three times and had my picture taken for walking 
down the street,” complained one black student.95
With the president away, the Dean of Students, Jess Parrish, tried to calm the 
situation and explain to the students that “under the circumstances, some kind of 
protection for the buildings and safety of the other students had to be provided.”
 The students resented the 
administration’s refusal to negotiate without police present on the school grounds.  
96
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what you got to do…we’re not leaving until our grievances are addressed.”97 They 
huddled into the office singing “We Shall Overcome” and “Oh Freedom.”98 The 
students’ insistence on remaining non-violent and singing freedom songs showed their 
commitment to traditional civil rights protest techniques, although the tenor with which 
they presented their demands put them in concert with other Black Power campus 
uprisings. “These kids are pledged to non-violent tactics,” explained attorney Walter 
Bailey.99 Citing Lane College as an example, Humphreys argued that just because 
violence had not erupted, it did not mean that the possibility did not exist.100 At the cost 
of $3,218 per day, the police presence on campus began to bother the taxpayers almost as 
much as it bothered the students, albeit for different reasons.101 Ironically, Humphreys 
claimed that he and the administration planned to decrease the number on police on 
campus before the students stormed his office.102
The reality of the situation set in for some of the students. A few left after Dean 
Parrish summoned the police. Undeterred by some students’ change of heart, Ester Hurt 
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were white, onto a police bus. The students were arrested and charged under the newly 
passed Tennessee State Code, 39-1214, a law that made trespassing, illegally taking 
possession of a public school or educational building, and refusing to leave school 
property a misdemeanor.104 Employing the ‘jail no bail’ strategy made famous by SNCC, 
the students refused bond. Some students wore toothbrushes around their necks because 
they anticipated staying overnight.105 Bailey, one of several attorneys defending the 
students, explained that the students “are dedicated primarily to getting an education at 
Memphis State. They don’t want any more trouble. They were really interested in 
attracting public attention to their problems.”106 James Pope addressed the students in the 
courtroom. “I don’t think that any person, anyone of the 109 students arrested should 
leave this courtroom regardless of whether mom or dad is down here or not,” Pope urged, 
“We got to stick together and if we don’t stick together we’re going to be subjected to the 
same racist bullshit that we are subjected to out on campus down here in this 
courtroom.”107
The BSA stance placed Humphreys and the school in a precarious position. 
Scheduled to participate in a panel, “Dissension in the University: Where Will it Lead?” 
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Humphreys canceled due to the discord on his own campus.108 In the shadow of the 
stand-off between black students and faculty at Cornell University, and as campus unrest 
unfolded at academic institutions around the nation, Humphreys cautiously believed that 
Memphis State would avoid the same fate. Just two months earlier, Humphreys recalled a 
conversation with a black student. “A Negro student told me, ‘you’re not going to have 
trouble here because the black people think they can talk with you.’” Despite the 
tyrannical label that students saddled upon Humphreys, he did believe that he tried his 
best to keep an open mind to the concerns of black students and that they “recognized 
ever increasing strides made by the university in their behalf.” 109 However, no longer 
willing to wait for anyone to decide their fate, young blacks pushed boundaries and set 
the pace. “These are basic demands,” Mock stressed, “This is what we have got to have. I 
don’t want some long, drawn-out study. I want action and I want it now.”110
The university suspended the students involved in the sit-in, though they did offer 
the students the opportunity to appeal the suspension. Attorneys delivered written letters 
from the suspended students appealing their suspension.
   
111 The deferred suspensions 
allowed the students to continue their studies with the understanding that they would be 
permanently expelled for any violation of university policies.112
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the school and the Memphis community avoided the spectacle that other institutions 
experienced; yet there was still a sense that larger troubles brewed beneath the surface. In 
an editorial in the Tiger Rag entitled, “Black Frustration Could Lead to Change to 
Militancy,” the author blamed the school’s “emphasis on white studentry” as the cause 
for the sit-in.113 Arguing that the BSA’s insistence on non-violence separated the 
organization and the sit-in from other campus protests, the article implicitly compared the 
BSA and the more radical students critical of the BSA’s program to Martin Luther King 
and Malcolm X. If the school did not negotiate in good faith with the BSA, the article 
argued, it faced more militant reprisals from students unhappy with the BSA’s non-
violent stance. “If the BSA’s program is continued at length without success, a group of 
students may secede from the main BSA body and organize themselves,” the author 
warned.114 With Community on the Move for Equality (COME) and the NAACP backing 
the BSA, frustrated students would only have the city’s more militant outfits to turn to. 
“We are dedicated to militant non-violence and we will protest injustice by every positive 
non-violent method,” proclaimed the BSA leadership.115
As expected, sides quickly formed in the aftermath of the incident at the 
administration building. Supporters and dissenters gathered on campus for a free speech 
 The sit-in was only a tactic, yet 
the tactic could easily transition into a more permanent, radical philosophy for the 
Memphis State’s black student body, the paper argued.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Memphis Commercial Appeal,  May 22, 1969; “105 in MSU Sit-In Put on Probation,” Memphis 
Commercial Appeal,  May 21, 1969. 
   








rally. Amidst heckling from some students and cheering from others, SGA leaders John 
L. Coscia and Jim Gaylord addressed the crowd and called for a “public hearing to air 
views from both sides.”116 Coscia cautiously measured his words. He also questioned the 
need for police on campus, especially the helicopter that circled the area, arguing that in 
other instances of campus disturbances law enforcement only exacerbated an already 
tense situation. He stopped short of throwing the SGA’s full support behind the BSA by 
suggesting that “we do not have enough information from either side,” to make a fair 
assessment of who was wrong and who was right.117 Vietnam veteran and white liberal 
supporter Victor Smith circulated a petition in support of the BSA.118 Another student on 
the platform, Jim Sims, spoke in favor of the BSA’s cause to end discrimination in hiring 
and curriculum.119 Humphreys quickly shot down the SGA’s suggestion of a public 
hearing as “not practical,” and although the new student center stood across from the 
administration building that housed his office, he claimed “there’s not a place big enough 
for such a meeting.”120
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black leadership support, however, was contingent on the students’ commitment to non-
violence.121
 For students who earlier confessed they felt that they were at Memphis State and 
not of it, certainly the suspensions reinforced that feeling. On-campus and off-campus 
outlets weighed in on the impact of the sit-ins. The West Tennessee chapter of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) issued a statement regarding the Memphis State 
sit-in specifically and campus protests in general. The statement condemned violent and 
obstructive forms of protest, but in true ACLU fashion it supported the students’ right to 
free speech, “even the most unpopular [viewpoints] within the society and the 
university.”
  
122 In an open letter to the president, faculty members blamed the 
administration’s continued reliance on police after the April 23 incident for the tension on 
campus. “We wish simply that the tension which has developed on this campus during 
the past several days be dissipated as quickly as possible and we wish also that the 
situation be handled tactfully and humanely,” wrote the faculty.123
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colleges. The increase in demand for black instructors by black students at predominately 
white schools, according to Mays, would “rob Negro colleges of some bright black 
scholars they would otherwise get.”124
 Letters flooded Dr. Humphreys’ office in support of his stance on the students. 
Some of the letters painted the students as naïve pawns, unaware of the impact of their 
actions. “Don’t let a small misled minority ruin our great Memphis State,” pleaded Mr. 
and Mrs. Pete Henry.
 
125 Other letters accused the controversial Adam Clayton Powell of 
prompting the students’ actions. One letter mocked their request for Black Studies. 
“Please, we in this state are thoroughly disgusted with Powell’s actions. A ‘Black 
Studies’ program? Come on now, use your intelligence, you want to prepare yourself for 
life in a worthwhile helpful existence, so it would seem the most direct way would be to 
learn the same basic studies as any religion or race would,” chastised a group of 
concerned white Memphis State alumni.126  The Commercial Appeal applauded 
Humphreys for the way he handled the situation. “All students at Memphis State should 
understand that this community stands behind Dr. Humphreys when he says ‘We are 
going to carry out the business of the university, regardless of what it takes to do it. We 
will use whatever force necessary,’” read an editorial in the paper.127
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The student reaction was mixed. White fraternities quickly collected 1200 
signatures on a petition that praised the president for his swift action and pledged support 
for any decision regarding the actions of Memphis State 109.128
We the undersigned do support President Humphreys and the administration’s  
enforcement of Memphis State University policies in whatever means that is necessary 
to maintain order on our campus. We feel that the policies of the administration thus 
far, in regard to recent campus disorders, have been toward the over-all benefit of the 
students attending Memphis State University.




White students accused BSA members, dressed in “Afro-American garb,” of snatching 
petitions from students and threatening those who wanted to sign. Some accused the 
petition of “further polarizing attitudes concerning the BSA proposals.” The petition 
snatching accusations did little to help the BSA’s image with the student body. Jack 
Powell’s Tiger Rag article suggested that the BSA hire a “Public Relations Man” to help 
salvage the organizations image from “every loudmouth black radical” on campus. 
Another Tiger Rag editorial accused the BSA of more talk than action. If the BSA was 
concerned with underrepresentation in decision-making, why did they not nominate a 
slate of candidates for SGA elections? “The white students aren’t going to beg black 
students to join their organizations, black students must get involved themselves,” wrote 
Sharon Kraus.130
Black students and their white supporters also used the paper to go on the 
offensive. “It is obvious, that he [the typical white students] has never mistakenly heard a 
so-called friend say that the ‘the place for Negroes will always be the cotton fields,’” 
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wrote Cozette Rogers in reference to the white students’ negative comments. “It is 
obvious that he has not seen the grievances of his people presented for a year without 
result to the unrelenting hearts of his school administrators.” 131 Black students were 
dubious of the administration since they had not responded to students’ requests. They 
felt that drastic actions called for drastic measures.132 Several white students agreed with 
the BSA’s demands, but disagreed with their methods.133 Some white students questioned 
how Humphreys handled the BSA, the sit-in, and the aftermath. They recognized the 
BSA’s commitment to non-violence in contrast to aggressive episodes at other 
universities. The protest was “peaceful to the extreme…the students’ actions fully lived 
up to the principles of the late Dr. Martin Luther King.” So why didn’t the administration 
handle the incident internally?134
Not unexpectedly, there was no consensus on right or wrong, proper or improper. 
Yet the students’ actions, mild by Cornell University standards, and even by Lane 
College standards, rattled the university and a community-at-large that believed they 
escaped the year of student revolt without incident. Administrators missed the students’ 
signals of discontent, and therefore attributed the students’ stance to ill feelings over 
funding for a speaker. But “a militant mood has been building for months among black 
students,” BSA advisor Laurie Sugarmon informed Memphis Press-Scimitar reporter Kay 
Pittman Black. Sugarmon pointed to incidents of covert racism like exclusion in the 
Campus Cutie section of the Tiger Rag. “Overt racial acts on the part of the faculty and 
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the student body are not as bad as they use to be now that there are more black students,” 
she explained.135
Despite its impromptu nature, the sit-in revealed the students’ longstanding 
hostilities toward perceived and real inequalities at Memphis State. The sit-in also 
reflected the students’ awareness of the larger issue of reform in higher education. “We 
are not asking a major educational institution to grant blindly any and all requests made 
by any individual, group or all of its students,” explained the BSA publication, the Black 
Appeal. “We do not expect a responsible institution to succumb to pressure tactics. We 
DO expect, the paper asserted, responsible people to behave in a responsible manner and 
to listen with reason to our demands.”
  
136 The students pushed and the administration 
pushed back, but with both sides’ revealing their position, a dialogue for change opened.  
In an effort to avert any repeat disturbances, the administration formed “an ad-hoc 
committee consisting of administrative officials, faculty and black students…to discuss 
the reasons for black students’ dissatisfaction and to study what measures could be taken 
to avoid future confrontations.”137
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determining the direction in which the BSA will move in the future. If Dr. Humphreys 




After the administration building sit-in, the BSA finally hosted its first Black 
Extravaganza festivities. Adam Clayton Powell did not make an appearance. Neither did 
any of the other high profile activists on the BSA’s short list of possible Extravaganza 
speakers. What the ceremony lacked in celebrity appearances, the students more than 
made up for with their own black cultural showcase. The purpose of Extravaganza in 
Black was to “present a positive program with black involvement that hopefully will have 
a program that is indicative of maturing college young men and women and to further 
develop an appreciation of blacks as a part of the university family,” explained James 
Mock.139
 Considering the sit-ins a bridge to the larger university community, BSA leaders 
hoped that black students, both engaged and ambivalent, would rally together in the 
aftermath. To an extent they did. In the fall of 1969, Memphis State hired its first African 
 Not as explosive as the group originally intended, the show was nevertheless a 
success, considering the weeks leading up to the event. The Extravaganza included a 
fashion and talent show, as well as a Miss BSA pageant. The students’ determination to 
continue despite the arrests, appeals, and school suspensions that dogged many of the 
members showed a resolve that they hoped would serve the organization well in the 
future.   
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American administrator, Ernest K. Davis, to serve as Dean of Student Relations.140 
President Humphreys insisted that Davis was not hired as the ‘black dean’ for black 
students that BSA demanded; instead his job required that he serve as a representative for 
all students. However, black students placed a lot of pressure on Davis to represent their 
specific interests.  Davis realized the importance of his position. In addition to serving the 
needs of all students, Davis expressed, “I hope to place black applicants in meaningful 
positions at Memphis State and in the community.”141 It did not take long for the students 
to lose faith in Davis. Giving him the unfortunate moniker of “Uncle Tom” Davis, the 
students argued that the administration “didn’t know what he was supposed to do, he 
didn’t either.”142
Note to the Dean: Dean Davis, we, the Black Students of Memphis State are very  
appreciative for the outstanding work you have done on campus. Your work is so  
outstanding that we can’t measure your accomplishments. We hope that you 
accomplish  something that would be standing so that we can use in our revolutionary 
movement. Yours Truly, Hambone




The students’ statement, meant not only to disparage and embarrass Davis, cut 
deep. They signed the letter with the name of the Commercial Appeal’s minstrel 
caricature, exposed the depth of their critique of Davis, his job performance, and his 
loyalty to the black students. Hambone’s Meditation cartoon strip, created in 1910, 
appeared in the Commercial Appeal as an almost daily reminder of how whites in 
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Memphis viewed the city’s African American community. The paper’s cartoon depicted 
Hambone as a shiftless, lazy, and unintelligent African American man with exaggerated 
facial features and broken dialect. Black community leaders fought hard to get the 
newspaper to remove the cartoon, suggesting, “Why can’t there be something about what 
Negroes are doing, not as Negroes but as citizens of this city?” The students’ use of 
Hambone, one of Memphis’ most visual symbols of white’s perception of black 
inferiority, placed Davis in low regard.144
David Acey recalled the BSA being instrumental in Davis’s hiring. “We told the 
university they weren’t hiring anybody until they brought the application through us. We 
hired the first dean,” said Acey. When it seemed like Davis was not working in the best 
interest of the organization, the students turned on Davis. “He ended up being a 
gatekeeper and we had to shut him down…we got your back. You wouldn’t have been 
hired had it not been for us, who you think you’re here for? They don’t know what to do 
with us,” Acey explained.
  
145
 With their newly consolidated power, black students pressed to open the doors of 
campus organizations and events once closed to them. Janis Jones Fullilove, later a 
Memphis City Councilwoman, became the first African American woman to join the 
ROTC’s Angel Flight squad. Previously an all-white organization, Fullilove promised to 
“raise much hell” on the squad.
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posed for the Tiger Rag camera’s as the first black Campus Cutie in the newspaper’s 
history.147
 In arguably the organization’s largest show of power after the administration 
building sit-in, in 1969 the school crowned Maybeline Forbes the first African American 
homecoming queen in the school’s history. Forbes, who identified herself as a “civil 
rights activist,” was one of the 109 arrested protestors during the sit-in. Forbes’ 
individual honor turned out to be a victory for black students campus-wide, as well as 
blacks throughout the city. “We felt that we would need 500 to 600 black votes for 
Maybeline to win,” Acey said, “but at least 900 blacks voted. Maybeline’s election will 
have unifying effect on Memphis State’s black students…the BSA showed that it is still 
around and still able to mobilize black students.”
 The newspaper also included more articles that related to black culture, dress, 
and black affairs throughout campus. The paper never credited the BSA or the events of 
that spring for the inclusion of more coverage of black students’ issues at Memphis State, 
yet whether issues resonated with the general student body or not, the BSA’s movement 
created an awareness of the plight of Memphis State’s black students. No longer could 
faculty, administrators, or students claim not to know how most of the black students 
stood on matters of inclusion, racial equity, and black cultural distinctiveness.  
148
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A picture of Forbes with her hand raised and fist clinched in the Black Power salute 
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of their demands of inclusion without losing their identity, Acey argued that Forbes’s win 
would only have an impact on the black students’ identity issues if the administration, 
students, and community treated Forbes the same as the white queens. “Maybeline will 




The future contained more uncertainty than the BSA anticipated. The organization 
started the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Scholarship fund to help recruit needy 
students in the community.150 The Snack and Rap forums continued with distinguished 
lecturers such as James Lawson and Stokley Carmichael. Black and white organizations 
coalesced to host the Inquiry I symposium on contemporary problems, highlighted by 
speeches from Julian Bond and Dick Gregory.151 But dissension diluted the 
organizations’ effectiveness as the years progressed. Even a unifying event like the Black 
Extravaganza did not escape scrutiny from the black student body. “Some of the people 
who ran [for Miss BSA] had not contributed to the black cause at this school at all. 
Somebody should have won who went to jail with the 109 students or at least, had shown 
that she was ‘black-spirited,’” Judy Alexander complained.152
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organized people and in organizing them, I organized around a basic philosophy and 
around a personality, so consequently, many of the black students and white students 
began to relate to Jim Mock as their leader.” Having been in the civil rights movement, 
Mock knew the long-term dangers of any group rallying around one figure, one 
personality. “I failed to teach, instead I started to organize,” lamented James Mock. 153
Further exposing the group’s deficiencies, contended James Pope, “the 
organization has never been a stable organization on that campus. The black students play 
right into the white man’s hands and they’re playing his game beautifully of divide and 
conquer.” In terms of ideology, black students did not always agree on how to organize 
on campus. In that sense, the students’ actions mirrored the national Black Freedom 
Movement. As national movement leaders fought against discrimination, they also 
struggled internally with the direction and intensity of the movement. Black students at 
Memphis State, never a monolithic group, grappled with how much to push. How much 
Black Power is too much Black Power? It was one thing for the organization to demand 
black student representation in campus clubs or coordinate pageants and plays, but BSA 
leadership turned some rank-and-file membership off as they tried to push the group in an 
increasingly more political direction. A high-ranking BSA member thwarted a third 
attempt by the organization to move on Humphreys’ office. “One guy took the initiative 
to run over to the man’s office. He told the man, ‘I think there’s going to be some trouble 
on campus and I think you ought to go over and call Dr. Humphreys and tell him. I don’t 
want to see any violence on campus, you see. I don’t mind the black students demanding 
redress of grievances, but I don’t want to see them commit any violent acts, you see.’” 
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Clearly frustrated, Pope vented, “They’re so divided out there…we hadn’t been able to 
jell together as a unit, as an organization never.”154
Yet some students blamed the BSA for losing its edge. Though leaders vowed that 
the sit-ins and the arrests marked the beginning of a longer, more engaged struggle, some 
black students argued that the group worried more about administrative matters than it 
did about student activism.
    
155 The leadership also suffered a blow when BSA leader 
James Pope and James Buckmon, a BSA member and basketball player, were arrested 
and accused of wounding a white student during an argument.156 Pope’s troubles with the 
police were not a first for the BSA leadership. James Mock came under scrutiny when the 
local news outlets discovered he had a fugitive warrant issued for his arrest by the 
Milwaukee county Sheriff’s Department.157
 
  
When posed with the question, “Can White Racism Be Cured?” Jim Lawson, 
keynote speaker at a symposium discussion hosted by the Memphis State Human 
Relations Club, answered thoughtfully, “We must cure Memphis State! No more talk. 
There will be no cure unless you clear MSU of the racism which exists here. It’s your 
school and your vocation.”158
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viewed Memphis State and its racial complexities as a microcosm of the larger society. In 
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many ways, so did the Black Student Association at Memphis State University. “We 
presented a posture that was uncompromising. We had to. We challenged the Board of 
Regents, the Governor, the State of Tennessee, the administrators at the university and 
the Mayor and we won. We won,” proclaimed Acey. He echoed Fredrick Douglass in his 
call to “dare to struggle, dare to win.”159
 
 
 African American students on predominately white campuses faced a difficult 
task in finding avenues of expression, as well as inclusion. It was not simply a matter of 
needing to belong, but of needing the right to make that determination. Students rejected 
conformity, instead opting to maintain ties to their distinct cultural identities, which were 
reflected in their demands for more black studies curriculum, faculty, and administration, 
as well as fraternal organizations and auxiliaries. At Memphis State, black students 
forged an alliance in the form of the Black Student Association that challenged the 
university’s sticky racial patterns. Thanks to the BSA, the university moved from 
desegregation to integration.  
 
                                                     





“Black Panther Party Not Needed”: The Legacy of Youth and Student Activism and 
the Black Power Generation in Memphis 
 
 “You have to understand that in 1967, hardly anyone used the word black, that was 
fighting words. Back then you were colored and good colored folk and proud to be so.”1
 
 
– John Burl Smith, Co-founder, Invaders 
 
“A Black Panther organization has been formed in Memphis with some of its 
members and leaders drawn from the old black militant Invaders group which is now 
defunct,” reported Kay Pittman Black of the Memphis Press-Scimitar in December 1970. 
The branch functioned officially under the auspices of the National Committee to Combat 
Fascism (NCCF), the organizing arm of the Black Panther Party (BPP). However, it 
operated like most Panther branches across the country.2 The Panther branch represented 
a new day in Memphis Black Power radicalism. The local press now labeled BOP and he 
Invaders, which one year earlier had been the city’s face of Black Power, as “old” and 
“defunct.”3




                                                     
1Tim Sampson, “Blacklash," Memphis: The City Magazine, April 2008, 31-32.  
 In 1968 the Bureau reported the defection of all of its subsidiary 
 
2Judson Jefferies, ed., Comrades: A Local History of the Black Panther Party 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2007), 60.  
 
3“Black Panther Group Formed Here; Free Breakfast Project Underway,” Memphis 
Press-Scimitar, December 11, 1970.  
 
4Invaders, "FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067-1502A" (Memphis, Tennessee, August 
26, 1969). The FBI was able to monitor the organization’s inner workings primarily with the help 
of Memphis photographer Ernest Withers who photographed many moments during the civil 
rights movement.   
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organizations except for the radical arm, the Invaders.5 While not blaming its own 
provocateurs for hastening the demise of BOP, memos from the Memphis Bureau to the 
Federal Bureau credited repeated arrests, negative publicity from the arrests, withdrawal 
of support from black community leaders, and a lack of financial resources for the 
organization’s weakened state.6 By late 1969 only the Invaders were active among the 
organizations affiliated with the BOP. Arrests drained the leadership as well as the rank-
and-file membership of the organization whose leaders once bragged of membership rolls 
of approximately 1,500 of the city’s black youth.7 In another memo outlining the status of 
“subversive” organizations in operation in the city, the memo listed the Invaders as a 
defunct organization that the agency no longer needed to monitor.8
Instead of keeping tabs on the Invaders, the Bureau turned its attention to two new 
organizations that evolved from the leftover membership, We The People and the 
People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP). The BOP’s founder’s dream of creating a solidified 
Black United Front in Memphis never materialized beyond isolated moments of unity 
with other black organizations. Instead, in 1970 Lance “Sweet Willie Wine” Watson set 
   
                                                     
5Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention Organized by the Black Panther Party 
“FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067-2026” (Memphis, Tennessee, November 3, 1968). 
 
6Invaders, "FBI Memo, Racial Matters, 157-1067-1502A" (Memphis, Tennessee, August 
26, 1969). The memo reported that the Invaders’ offices were padlocked due to failure to pay 
rent, they owed over $300 to the telephone company, and adult groups such as Ezekiel Bell, 
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out to establish what he called a “New United Front“ in the form of his new organization, 
We The People.9
The designation of the organization as a “New” instead of a “Black” United Front 
pointed towards Watson’s new political orientation. Using the first three words of the 
Constitution of the United States, We The People signaled a shift from strictly a Black 
Nationalist agenda to one that promoted a more pluralistic vision, while acknowledging 
the importance of embracing a larger struggle for human rights.
  
10 “The only racial 
identity its members assume is that of human beings,” read the We The People 
newsletter.11 Watson recounted that he “went through that stage” of using Black Power as 
the primary vehicle for black liberation, and “to go back to it again would be not to 
progress but to retrogress.”  White people are “not my enemy,” he continued, “It’s 218 
fellows who control this country. That is the enemy.” The “218 fellows” Watson 
referenced were members of the Rockefeller, Ford, and DuPont families among others. In 
Watson’s estimation these families controlled the majority of the country’s financial and 
political resources, at the peril of blacks and the poor. 12
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1970); For more information on the history of the black struggle for human rights see: Carol 
Anderson, Eyes Off The Prize: The United Nations And the African American Struggle For 
Human Rights, 1945-1955 (United Kingdom: Cambridge Press, 2003), 1-5. Anderson’s work 
chronicles the NAACP’s fight for human rights instead of the simply a struggle for civil rights in 
the wake of World War II. Anderson argues that the United States’ Cold War entanglements, the 
“symbolic politics” of President Harry Truman, and Eleanor Roosevelt as Chair of the United 
Nations’ Commission on Human Rights, and the NAACP’s fear of a “being labeled as a 
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Watson took his fight to the nation’s capital, where he levied charges with the 
Justice Department against President Richard Nixon for “murder, perversion, and 
genocide.”13 Watson credited Malcolm X for his more informed understanding of the 
worldwide struggle for freedom. In the last year of his life, Malcolm X, who had long 
linked the struggle of African Americans to the fate of people of color throughout the 
Diaspora, planned to bring a petition in front of the United Nations General Assembly 
against the United States for its human rights violations against African Americans. After 
his release from prison, Malcolm joined the Nation of Islam in 1959 and became the 
sect’s most fiery minister. Critical of integration, Malcolm realized the problem was not 
simply a denial of civil rights, “but a problem of human rights.”14 Although Watson’s 
new allegiances, unlike Malcolm, included whites, his position that African Americans 
had to “stop struggling for civil rights and strive for human rights” aligned with the 
message of the father of the modern Black Power Movement.15  In a series of moves that 
included levying the aforementioned charges against Nixon, attending Earth Day Rallies, 
and protesting against police brutality in front of the Memphis Police Department, 
Watson also ran for the Governor of Arkansas in 1970.16
                                                                                                                                                              
12Kelly Delaney and Lance Watson, interview by James Mosby, June 5, 1970, The Civil 
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grassroots organizing in Forrest City and his March Against Fear to the Arkansas capital 
in 1969. Despite his proclamation that the “rule of the Razorbacks is on the way out,” 
Watson mounted an unsuccessful bid for control of the Arkansas State House.  
The Memphis Bureau of Investigation classified the two new factions as 
extensions of earlier Invader efforts. Bureau memos described We The People as the 
political arm of the Invaders and the Peoples Revolutionary Party as the action arm.17 Ex-
Invaders Maurice Lewis and John C. Smith led the PRP, which functioned more like the 
Black Panther Party than did Watson’s We The People.18 The Commercial Appeal 
reported that the PRP was “dedicated to overthrowing the government.”19 The two 
organizations cooperated on some level as members attending meetings for both 
organizations. At the BPP-sponsored Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia in September 1970, the leadership of the PRP officially inquired to 
“someone in the Central Committee as to setting up a group in Memphis.” Soon after the 
convention, the PRP and its membership united under the Black Panther Party umbrella 
as the National Committee to Combat Fascism.20
By 1970 the splintering of the BPP had begun to play out on a national stage. Its 
split was more acrimonious than the division within the Invaders. Huey Newton’s release 
from prison in 1970 after a jury declared a mistrial on charges of voluntary manslaughter 
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in the 1967 shooting of an Oakland Police officer did not temper the split, as 
ideologically the organization found itself at an impasse between “hardcore 
revolutionaries and sensitive community caretakers.”21 During Newton’s incarceration 
the BPP grew under the leadership of cofounder and BPP Chairman Bobby Seale, Chief 
of Staff David Hilliard, and Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver.22
The recruitment of Soul On Ice author Eldridge Cleaver proved to be one of the 
Party’s most important and influential recruits in the Party’s history. Not long after 
joining the BPP, Clever began to place his imprint on the Party. Over time, his vision 
shaped the perception of the Party as much as did Newton. Cleaver advocated hardcore 
and immediate revolution, while Newton pushed the organization toward its community-
based Survival Programs and away from “reactionary suicide.”  The split created factions 
within the organization that set off events “that signaled the beginning of the end of the 
Black Panther Party as a national organization.
 The Party 
established branches in New York, Chicago, New Haven, Milwaukee and other cities 
throughout the country, extending the reach of the BPP organizing and community 
outreach programs beyond its national headquarters in Oakland.  
23 However, the PRP organized the 
Memphis chapter in advance of Newton’s directive to close all of the local branches in 
1972 “to concentrate on developing local political power in Oakland.”24
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In Memphis the BPP chapter represented a last gasp at sparking a radical Black 
Power revolution. The Free Breakfast program constituted one of the Party’s first 
community outreach efforts after its establishment. Survival Programs offered food, 
clothing, and other services to those in the community that needed it the most. In addition 
to the Free Breakfast program, the Party also instituted the Free Shoes and Free Clothing 
programs. Their Busing to Prisons program helped families and inmates stay connected 
by providing transportation for family members to visit their incarcerated loved ones.  
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale initially conceived the Survival Programs as a 
way to connect the Party to the community.25 In Memphis, the programs had a similar 
impact. Party members labeled the city’s effort to start its own breakfast program as 
reactionary and designed to undermine their efforts and curtail the organization’s 
influence. Members bragged that the black community was not fooled by the city’s 
attempt to stifle the Party’s programs with its offer of a “cup cake and carton of stale 
milk.” As historian Donna Jean Murch has noted, breakfast programs not only provided 
those in need with a free meal, but “ultimately became a conduit to the larger social 
problems facing the African American community.”26
In 1968 and 1969, when the BPP expanded their Survival Programs beyond the 
Oakland community, BOP and the Invaders initiated similar programs on a smaller scale. 
As a component of the War on Poverty financed Neighborhood Organizing Project, the 
free shoes and clothing component provided for the underprivileged. Lance Watson’s 
Operation Breakfast never garnered the necessary support from the community to have 
the impact that he envisioned. He lacked the financial resources and institutional support 
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to keep the program funded. Several years earlier, the Invaders’ radicalism had hurt their 
ability to secure funding and to enact their platform, but the Panthers in some ways 
benefited from their militant posturing and the Black Panther brand. The Tri-State 
Defender lauded the Panthers’ breakfast program as “progress” because it fed children 
that others had “overlooked.”27 The Commercial Appeal, by contrast, looked at the Party 




On January 16, 1971, one week after police opened fire on the BPP Chapter in 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, several families along with members of the NCCF 
visited the Memphis Housing Authority (MHA) to inquire about a notification some 
tenants received to vacate the property by January 16.29 “We have no place to go and the 
housing we are living in, is unfit for people,” a resident explained to housing officials.30 
Urban renewal projects were underway in several lower income areas in the city and 
residents who were forced out because of the urban renewal or city condemnations were 
prioritized on the public housing lists.31
                                                     
27“In Loeb’s Words,” Tri-State Defender, January 23, 1971.   
 Unsatisfied with the housing authority’s 
response, Mrs. Vinie Boyd and her nine children, assisted by approximately twenty 
members of the NCCF “staged a live-in at a field office of the Memphis Housing 
Authority,” in hopes of dramatizing “her need for decent housing.” Boyd had been 
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31“Slum to be Cleared of Vacant Buildings,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, May 23, 1968.   
257 
 
evicted after she refused to pay rent for a home that she described as “unsafe and 
unsanitary.”32 Boyd and her family suffered from health problems due to their poor living 
circumstances. Mrs. Paula Butts and her three children also occupied the MHA office. 
“We have never missed paying $52 a month, but we got tired…one of our children has 
been treated for rat bites. The roof has almost fallen in the rear of the house. The 
bathroom isn’t fit to use,” complained Butts. After a one-night “live-in” the housing 
authority awarded Mrs. Boyd and her family a five-bedroom apartment and promised 
Butts that she would receive an apartment soon.33
The initial protest and success of the Boyd family in procuring an apartment after 
only one day of protest encouraged the Party to repeat their actions. On January 18 the 
organization broke into several other apartments to move in other families in need of 
better housing.
   
34
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 The Panthers moved twelve families into the Ashby and Texas Court 
Apartment Housing Complex. Panther members boarded up windows and covered others 
with the Black Panther Newspaper, while BPP Minister of Information Elaine Brown’s 
Black Panther anthem, Seize the Time, played from speakers inside. Armed with 
weapons, the Panthers hoped the presence of women and children in the apartments 
would stop the police from shooting or throwing tear gas into the building. “The more of 
them [women and children] we have in here the less trouble we’ll have,” said one 
Panther. A standoff between the police and the Panthers ensued. Further connecting 
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Memphis’s radical Black Power past with its new Black Power element, Calvin Taylor, 
ex-Invader turned reporter for the Commercial Appeal, acted as mediator.35
“We want Orelle Ledbetter, Get us Ledbetter” shouted several Panthers, 
demanding to see the Director of the Memphis Housing Authority, as well as Mayor 
Henry Loeb and Police Chief Henry Lux. The police threatened to use tear gas to draw 
the Panthers out if they did not surrender. Taylor identified himself and informed the 
police of the number of women and children in the apartment. “We don’t want to hurt 
those women and children. We just want the people we have warrants for to come out. 
The rest are free to stay,” Lux told Taylor. Taylor relayed the message. After negotiating 
the conditions of their surrender, the Panthers left the apartment. Fourteen were arrested 
and charged with conspiracy to disrupt trade and commerce.




The three-day live-in and subsequent stand-off accomplished what Vinie Boyd 
had hoped – it dramatized the plight of the city’s black poor and placed the issue of the 
shortage of decent and affordable housing for those living in the city’s poorest 
communities on the front page in all of city’s daily and weekly newspapers. The live-in 
also illustrated the unauthorized occupants’ level of hopelessness, frustration, and lack of 
faith in the system. After several attempts to have the landlord of their respective 
properties make repairs with no success, they turned to members of the NCCF for help.  
That these families turned to Black Power radicals, and not the city’s other more 
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moderate black organizations, reflected a need for immediate results that other 
organizations had not delivered.  
The Panthers’ stance elicited strong responses from both sides of the political 
coin. The Commercial Appeal urged the families on the MHA waiting list to follow 
procedure and be patient with the process, while warning the community that “stirring up 
trouble” was the Panthers’ only motive in assisting the families during the housing 
crisis.37 The Tri-State Defender accused the city’s white leaders “dislike for dashikis,” 
and “out and out prejudice” for their inaction in alleviating the economic disparities for 
the black community.38  Point four of the Panthers’ Ten Point Program demanded 
“decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings,” and clearly the dilapidated housing of 
Boyd and the other families were not fit or safe places to live.39 “We couldn’t stand to see 
fourteen people out in the cold,” a Panther explained.40
The subsequent arrests of members thinned the membership ranks, but some in 
the black community, especially those living in the lower-income areas, applauded the 
Panthers’ stance. “Their display of reckless bravery in the face of insurmountable odds 
was a dramatic lift to the morale of blacks everywhere,” wrote Nat D. Williams in the 
Tri-State Defender. Williams criticized the Panthers for carrying weapons into the MHA 
office, but he supported their attempts to “try and do something effective” when no other 
organization in the city would.
 
41
                                                     
37“The Panthers and Housing,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, January 19, 1971.  
 And while not officially supporting the Party’s actions, 
 
38“Mrs. Boyd’s Plight,” Tri-State Defender, January 23, 1971.   
 
39Murch, Living For The City, 128.   
 




the NAACP filed a complaint against the police department for its use of the word 
“nigger” in reference to the arrested Panthers.42
Shortly after the live-in, other BPP branches were established in Nashville and 
Chattanooga. The Memphis branch served as headquarters for the state chapter. The 
Memphis branch saw its membership and community support increase, as well as 
community participation in the Survival Programs. In response to the success of the 
Panthers’ “Free Breakfast” program, the city initiated a free breakfast campaign of its 
own. The Panthers responded by expanding their Free Breakfast program to reach more 
people.
 In earlier years the community shunned 
Black Power radicalism as espoused by BOP and the Invaders. However, the Panthers’ 
bold and effective move gave the Movement a tangible level of success that the Invaders 
had found difficult to obtain.  
43
The city felt threatened by the impact of the Panthers’ Survival Programs. The 
programs provided a bridge between the Panthers and the city’s black youth just as the 
Invaders had during its active years. Party members accused the police of exacting 
“Southern justice” against the city youth because they were “among the first to relate to 
the Black Panther Party and the Survival Programs.” The Panthers blamed the increase in 
incidents of police brutality against black youth as the police’s method of intimidating 
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and frightening the youth into “staying away from the Party and its ideas.”44 In May of 
1971, a twenty-year-old black male accused the police of forcing him into the back of the 
police car, beating him with a night stick, and striking him repeatedly until he could 
barely stand – all for having a “Free Angela” bumper sticker on the back of his vehicle.45 
Labor historian Michael Honey arrived in “terribly polarized” Memphis in 1970 as a 
community activist. He suggested that police brutality stemmed partly from leftover 
resentment from the sanitation strike. Police were “taking revenge on blacks for what 
happened in 1968,” Honey recalled. “They were attacking African Americans for 
anything.”46
The death of seventeen-year-old Elton Hayes on October 15, 1971, at the hands of 
the Memphis Police Department proved to be a breaking point in the black community’s 
battle against police brutality. Three black youths – George Barnes, fifteen; Calvin 
McKissack, fourteen; and Elton Hayes, seventeen – were riding a pickup truck in a South 
Memphis neighborhood. After being spotted by the police, the three youths sped away, 
resulting in a high-speed chase. The driver, Barnes, lost control of the vehicle and ran 
into a ditch in an area outside of the city limits. Police officers gathered at the scene. 
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Some officers watched, while other officers severely beat the three youth. Barnes and 
McKissack survived, but Hayes died from his wounds at John Gaston Hospital.47
The police reported that Hayes died as a result of injuries from the traffic 
accident, when in reality he died from wounds inflicted by the police officers.
 
48 Upon 
revelation of the truth, the black community exploded. Riots erupted in several black 
neighborhoods, resulting in the “most violent race riot in the city since the 1866 race 
riots.”49 In the black Orange Mound neighborhood that Hayes had called home, about 
seventy-five youth near Melrose High School threw rocks, bottles, and firebombs as their 
measure of retaliation for death of Hayes.50 In response, Mayor Loeb called a curfew, 
which enraged both the black community and the leadership. Several black leaders, 
whom Panther members referred to as the community’s “responsible black leaders,” met 
with Loeb to convince the Mayor to call off the curfew.51
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 Loeb complied with the leaders 
request, saying he was giving them the “chance they had demanded – to go into their 
communities and urge calm.” Stax recording artist Isaac Hayes went out into the 
community to help keep calm and offering free tickets to his benefit concert, but some 
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youth rebuffed singer’s advances. “Don’t come down here offering us tickets to a free 
show. Get somebody in here to solve the problems,” the youth replied.52
 While the NAACP and black civic organizations spoke out against the tragedy 
and demanded redress, black youth took their demands to the streets. Approximately 250 
students from Northside High School, led by We The People’s Lance Watson, “marched 
on city and county administration buildings while the adults were making plans to keep 
the city calm.” The group, led by the ex-Invader, held up signs using the term 
promulgated by the Black Panthers, “death to the pigs.” 
  
53 Watson hoped that through the 
tragedy the black community would continue to take a stand against police violence 
instead of being “bystanders as their black brothers and sisters were beaten.”54
In its official organ, The Black Panther Interccommunal News Service, the Party 
praised the youth for taking a stance, especially the rioters. “Instead of sending flowers,” 
youth chose to act by attacking the “oppressors in anyway they could.”
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In the aftermath, nine officers were arrested and charged in connection with the 
death of Elton Hayes. Four of the officers were found guilty of first-degree murder, four 
others “of assault-to-murder in the first degree,” and another officer with “neglect of 
duty.”
 Hayes’s death highlighted the students’ awareness that they could also fall victim 
to police brutality. But it also reminded the youth, as well as the rest of the black 
community, that black life was still undervalued.  
57 The black community, still reeling over the loss of Hayes, demanded a police 
review board as well as more black police lieutenants and captains in the black 
community. Some African Americans blamed the City Council, especially black City 
Council members for not responding to Hayes’ death as aggressively as they should have. 
For years black Memphians had fought hard for representation in the city government 
decision-making body and the death of Elton Hayes as a platform to address other 
concerns as well. In a list of grievances they demanded Councilman Fred Davis “properly 
represent the black community or resign.” They charged J.O. Patterson, Jr. with not 
attending executive council sessions and thereby neglecting some of his important duties, 
but also leaving the black community underrepresented at important meetings.58
Others recognized that the death of Hayes and the black youth’s reaction stemmed 
not simply from his murder and the subsequent cover up by the police. Larger frustrations 
with systemic issues of poverty and inadequate housing fueled their resentment at the 
police officers crude racism. In a sense, Hayes had become Memphis’s youth’s Emmett 
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Till. Just as in 1955, when Ernest Withers’s picture of Till on the cover of Jet magazine 
forced more Americans to acknowledge the region’s racial strife, the Memphis BPP’s use 
of a picture of the badly distorted body of Elton Hayes lying in a casket on the front page 
of their newspaper made police brutality and its most fatal result less of an abstraction 
and more tangible for the youth.59
 
 Hayes was their age and lived in their community, and 
despite their awareness of the rampant police brutality in their communities many 
understood for the first time that what happened to Hayes could have easily happened to 
other black youth.  
In 2008 national and local activists gathered at the University of Memphis to 
commemorate the life and the 40th anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. in Memphis, Tennessee. The event brought together figures from the labor 
movement, as well the civil rights soldiers of 1960s and 1970s, to celebrate King’s 
legacy. They also assembled to discuss the fruits of their own activism. Several members 
of those arrested in April 1969 as a part of the Memphis State 109, as well as the 
members of the Black Organizing Project and Invaders, sat as guests on panels. They 
discussed their role in the local Black Freedom Movement. The venue provided many for 
the first time some legitimacy for their activism. The program’s literature described the 
Memphis State 109 as a group responsible for “bringing new direction and leadership to 
the Black Student Association.” It labeled Charles Cabbage, Coby Smith, and John B. 
Smith “militant founders of the Memphis Invaders Community Activist Movement.” 60
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The program’s description of the Memphis State 109 minimized the importance 
of the group’s contribution to changing the culture of Memphis State University, which 
later became the University of Memphis. The Memphis State 109 did not simply bring a 
new direction to the Black Student Association; they helped to bring a new direction to 
the entire campus. Before the creation of the BSA, African American students fended for 
themselves, and despite their growing numbers many did not feel welcomed or wanted. 
With the administration building sit-in of 1969, Black students harnessed their “Black 
student power” to change the campus dynamics. Diversity grew out of their demand for 
inclusion; after 1969 African American students led the BSA to create outlets to explore 
and celebrate black life and culture, while becoming a more significant presence in the 
mainstream campus life. Their demands helped push the university to expand its Black 
Studies curriculum. Furthermore black students created parallel institutions and 
organizations such as the BSA and Miss Black Memphis State University. They also 
increased their participation in mainstream campus activities. One area that did not see a 
dramatic increase was the number of black faculty, although the school hired David 
Acey, a leader in the BSA, to teach classes in the Department of Communications and 
chair the Black Studies Department.61
Using Black Power as the conduit for protest, the BSA reshaped Memphis State 
University for the generation of students that followed. Recalling the actions of the BSA, 
Acey realized the lasting impact of the organization’s activism on the current state of the 
university. We showed the “students and those who came after us, that freedom is not 
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free. If you don’t continue to work at it and keep it, you’ll lose it…we established this 
spirit of change that led to the integration of Memphis State.”62
 
  
In 1968 no one referred to the Invaders as “community activists” or to the 
organization as a “community activist movement,” yet Charles Cabbage, Coby Smith, 
and John B. Smith sat on the stage in the Rose Theater recalling their days as young 
Black Power activists. Minister Sukara A. Yahweh, formerly Lance “Sweet Willie Wine” 
Watson, did not participate on the panel, but he walked through the audience handing out 
copies of his biographical information and his affiliations and accomplishments during 
the Black Freedom Movement.63
In subsequent years, newspaper and magazine articles would mythologize the 
organization that was once blamed for the events that precipitated the death of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. When Charles Cabbage died on June 29, 2011, a Commercial Appeal 
article called the Black Power activist a “voice of reason” that “spoke for the 
community.” However, a reader objected to the newspaper’s characterization of 
Cabbage.
  
64  Instead of calling Cabbage a voice of reason, the writer suggested that the 
headline should have read: “Person who materially aided in destroying Memphis dies.”  
The writer blamed Cabbage for causing the riot that brought King back to Memphis, 
which he claims destroyed the city’s reputation.65
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understanding that eluded he and the Invaders during their most active years, but he still 
could not shake the stigma of King’s death.  
In the fall of 2010 the Invaders once again gained notoriety when the Commercial 
Appeal’s Marc Perrusquia revealed that famed photographer Ernest Withers operated as a 
confidential FBI informant. Withers’s famous images of the civil rights movement graced 
the pages of magazines. He enjoyed access to movement leaders not afforded to many, 
which in the FBI’s estimation made him the perfect informant. Withers reported on the 
activities of King during his visits to Memphis in 1968, but Withers is also credited with 
providing much of the information that “helped the FBI break up the Invaders.”66
By his own admission, Withers believed that the Invaders “were not capable of 
much action,” but their radical rhetoric could cause trouble for the civil rights movement. 
The Invaders, conversely, looked to Withers as a father figure and an ally. They 
frequented Withers’s studio and befriended his sons. While Withers may have had some 
affinity for the young men, from FBI reports he viewed them as cons, hustlers, and 
thieves looking to “scare and blackmail the community.”
 After 
1968, he almost exclusively reported on the activities of the Invaders. Questions about 
Withers’s motivation remain unanswered since he passed away in 2008 without publicly 
revealing his role, but his role as an informant reveals the complex relationship between 
the Invaders, the Memphis black community, and Black Power.  
67
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revelations, former Invaders like Yahweh continue to hold Withers in high regard. "That's 
my daddy…If he was (an informant) I don't know anything about it ... He would call me 




Ultimately Black Power in Memphis in its different incarnations created a space 
for the youth and student activism that emerged in the period after the sit-in movement of 
the early 1960s. In Black Power they found a malleable and adaptive philosophy that 
traversed different sectors of life in Memphis. Through their activism, young Black 
Power activists set a stage for an increasingly more radical Memphis after 1968 when 
even moderate organizations such as the Memphis branch of the NAACP began to evoke 
the spirit of the Black Power Movement.69
 Memphis youth and students developed a cross-section of Black Power activism 
that in various ways mirrored the national Movement, while responding to local 
conditions. Viewing the sanitation strike as a major force for Black Power, the Black 
Organizing Project’s involvement and relationship with black leadership during that 
campaign shaped the organization’s future from that point forward.
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as complicit in the civil rights leader’s death.71 Shaking that stigma proved impossible, 
even though BOP sought to carry part of King’s legacy through its involvement in the 
Poor People’s Campaign.72
The organization’s foray into War on Poverty projects suggested how Black 
Power could be applied to the institutions of liberal politics, but it proved unredemptive, 
further stymieing Black Power’s ability to penetrate mainstream local politics. Charles 
Cabbage and Coby Smith’s first experience with the War on Poverty funded organization 
MAP-South in 1967 placed Black Power on trial and on the defensive. In 1968 the 
organization received War on Poverty funding to operate the Neighborhood Organizing 
Project, a community organizing program. However, mismanagement by the Invaders, a 
lack of institutional support, and pushback from conservatives all factored into the 
program’s small imprint.  
 
However, the Neighborhood Organizing Project also included courses designed to 
affirm the importance of black culture, identity, and black history. Behind the criticism of 
the program’s value to the Memphis community, these efforts reinforced Black Power’s 
cultural importance, arguably its most tangible impact.73 The Invaders themselves 
became a local cultural phenomenon among many black male youth who emulated their 
style of dress and mannerism, making the Movement, if not politically accessible, at least 
culturally accessible.74
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Oree McKenzie when he approached the organization for funding, BOP, the Invaders, 
and their Black Power program were “hard products to sell.”75
 
  
On campuses, Black Power took on a different tone. Upheaval at historically 
black LeMoyne-Owen College unexpectedly placed the small school in the throes of the 
new cultural and political black renaissance in the fall of 1968. Disgruntled students and 
zealous Invaders challenged the school’s administration for more student control and 
community engagement. In the end, protesting students won several concessions, but Dr. 
Hollis F. Price, LeMoyne-Owen’s president emerged as the hero. His ability to keep the 
campus calm, keep students out of jail for their actions, and maintain a reasoned and 
measured approach to the students’ grievances earned Price praise from the black and 
white community. Dr. Price, who was scheduled to retire at the end of the year, had 
“earned the right to end his career in an aura of peace and honor,” as Nat D. Williams 
wrote.76
At predominately white Memphis State University, civil rights and Black Power 
stood side-by-side. Students informed by the emerging Black Power Movement 
 Despite the community’s support of Price’s stance, however, the students gained 
their demands, and the Invaders helped to push the school to remain mindful of its 
neighbors in the community. The institution, at the center of the city’s civil rights 
movement in the early 1960s, became the first campus to experience student unrest 
showed that the school was not insulated from the Black Power Movement, despite its 
strong institutional and community support.  
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connected the new language of Black Power with the civil rights concerns of old. Unlike 
their counterparts at LeMoyne-Owen, black students at Memphis State fought not simply 
to be heard, but to also be seen and included. By creating the Black Student Association, 
African American students created their own vehicle for campus change. What they 
lacked in terms of Black Studies, they gained through “rap” and debate sessions where 
they would argue the merits of violence versus nonviolence, discuss the decolonization 
movement in Africa, student protest at other institutions, and to local community issues. 
The students hosted plays and pageants that celebrated their blackness in the manner they 
believed the institution should have. In the spring of 1969 students sat-in at Dr. Cecil 
Humphreys’ office after unsuccessfully securing redress of their demands. They 
remained nonviolent and sang Freedom songs. Once arrested, they refused bail fusing 
together ideologies of civil rights and Black Power. Their actions ultimately changed the 
dynamics of the campus life for all students.  
 
Youth and student activism helped shape the Black Freedom Movement in 
Memphis. Black Power, as articulated by student and youth organizations served as an 
ideological counterpoint to the community’s established black leadership. Youth and 
student activism, moreover, reveal the diversity in the articulation of Black Power 
ideology. As Coby Smith expressed as a young Black Power ideologue, the Movement’s 
roots existed as much in Ida B. Wells as it did in the fiery Malcolm X. Even Benjamin 
Hooks, Jesse Turner, Russell Sugarmon, Vasco Smith, and other prominent African 
American Memphians more closely associated with the civil rights movement provided 
not only young black Memphians, but Memphians in general, with examples of black 
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economic and political self determination. When asked if he saw any difference between 
his view of power and those of younger Black Power activists, Sugarmon responded, 
“None that I can see except in terms of levels of stridency and hyperbole in speech.”77 
These men were far from firebrands in comparison to the Invaders, but Black Power’s 
iconography of guns and raised fists obscures these parallels.78
 
 
Using Black Power to respond to the specific conditions on campuses and in the 
community provides a glimpse of the regional, and ultimately the parochial nature of the 
Movement. African American students using Black Power at Cornell University in 1969 
organized differently than the African American students at Memphis State University in 
1969, yet challenging the white power structure was the goal of the students at both 
institutions. Although the Memphis press frequently referred to the Invaders as a Black 
Panther-styled organization, they were not the Panthers who were essentially a local 
organization with a national and international reach. However, when Charles Cabbage 
and Coby Smith created BOP and the Invaders in 1967 as their response to local 
conditions in their community, they followed the example of Huey Newton and Bobby 
Seale when they founded the Black Panther Party for Self Defense in Oakland in 1966 
while maintaining ownership of their movement. “We were students. We were not a part 
of any national organization like the Black Panther Party. We were Memphis grown, and 
Memphis own,” remarked John B. Smith. Whether moderate or radical, implicit or 
explicit, used as a tactic or embraced as political philosophy Black Power gave youth and 
                                                     
77Russell Sugarmon, interview by James Mosby, May 5, 1968, The Ralph J. Bunche 
Collection, The Civil Rights Documentation Project, Howard University, Washington, DC.  
 
78Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour, xiii.  
274 
 
students a language through which to shape the black politics of Memphis, It was not just 
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